



Daily Report—

Supplement

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa SUPPLEMENT

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*** ECOSOC President Concerned About Future Aid**
*90AF05804 Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French
18 Jul 90 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Increasing Concern Over Reduction of Development Assistance"; first paragraph is LE MAURICIEN introduction]

[Text] In Geneva on Monday, Mr. Chinmaya Gharekan of India, chairman of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), stated that despite the many reassurances from industrialized countries, developing nations continue to believe they will pay the price for the changes in the East.

For developing countries the short-term "consequences will not be very pleasant, and they will be particularly serious for Africa and all of the Least Developed Countries (LDC)," he told the press. He said that all of the specialists expected that a part of the international assistance to the Third World would be redirected toward East Europe. They also fear that an increase in interest rates on loans could only worsen the debt burden.

During its meetings, the ECOSOC devoted a day to studying the implications of upheavals in the East and decided to repeat and go further into the examination next year.

Various suggestions for avoiding reduction of development assistance were advanced during this preliminary examination.

1. Making projections of developing countries' midterm requirements, which could be turned over to the specialized financial institutions (IMF, World Bank).
2. Commitment by the rich countries to maintain the levels of development assistance in real terms.
3. Reviewing, as of now, and not in 1993, what resources will be needed by the IMF and the World Bank to meet the needs of the countries of the East as well as of the developing countries.

*** Political Reform Seen Driven by Economic Aid**
*90AF0603 London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL
in English 27 Jul 90 pp 3-4*

[Text] It is now clear that the main cause of the wave of political change sweeping Africa (AC Vol 31 No 4) is not the aspirations of African intellectuals, much as they long for liberty; nor is it a union of the political opposition and the masses, which has been conspicuous by its absence with fitful exceptions in Zambia, Kenya and Zaire. (South African is, of course, a special case).

No. The principal cause of Africa's wind of change is the World Bank and the donor countries. They are explicitly demanding political change as a condition for further

loans to Africa. They are ignoring this premise only where it appears to be against the short-term interest of the donors.

Other factors include the events of Eastern Europe, particularly the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu. In fact, many Africans had been signalling their dissatisfaction with the status quo for years, long before they had even heard of Ceausescu. Since the early 1980s fewer and fewer African intellectuals have been claiming, with any semblance of conviction, that single-party government is democratic, or that it is authentically African, or that it aids development. Throughout the 1980s these were mostly the arguments of the European left and of griots and praise-singers in Africa. Some other African intellectuals acknowledged, when they thought they would not be arrested for doing so, that the single party was a facade for tyranny and an aid to private enrichment. At best it was a benevolent dictatorship. They noted that single-party or single-person rule was aided in different ways by all the donor countries. France actively aided the suppression of dissident movements in all the French-speaking countries and provided intelligence on the exiled opposition to African secret police services. The United States created Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and tolerated Samuel Doe in Liberia. Britain favoured Daniel arap Moi in Kenya. Neutral and peace-loving Sweden connived at the brutalities of the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in exile, never seriously questioning SWAPO's disregard for human rights or its lack of accountability. When aid money went missing, more arrived. Small wonder if African intellectuals concluded that these practices had the tacit approval of the West.

The last decade was also a period of acute impoverishment for Africans, the majority of whom (as in most countries) appear to be generally uninterested in questions of political theory. Many Africans are now so poor that they are prepared to back virtually any demand as long as it implies change. More political parties? Fine, as long as something changes. This may not be sophisticated but it is natural that the poor should reason thus and that opposition politicians, hungry for power, should exploit it.

In private at least, many Africans recognised the repressiveness or venality of their own government years ago. But until now they have been prevented from making their views known by the mighty repressive apparatuses of African states and, often, by the complicity of the West, which too often ignored expressions of African disaffection when it concerned a friendly government, or ascribed them to subversion or to an inherent African lawlessness. It is Western views which have suddenly changed. Until 2 years ago, Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny was generally labelled as the Wise Old Man of Yamoussoukro. Now he is the foolish builder of a useless basilica. Presidents Mobutu and Moi were labelled moderates. Now they are attacked for their failures. These gentlemen have not changed character

over their years, nor have their governments substantially changed their basic methods. The change in attitude is a by-product of the end of the Cold War.

African leaders have every reason to feel indignant, as they made clear at the July Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit, at Western demands for political reform. But African heads of state are not well-placed to complain of cynicism and unfairness. On the whole, they have little option but to bite their lips and embrace the new democracy if they wish to remain in power.

The new attitude of the West was first spelled out by the World Bank in its 1989 report "From Crisis to Sustainable Growth." Essentially, the World Bank argument is a technical one. The bank and its sister, the International Monetary Fund, were summoned in the early 1980s by African governments which had run out of foreign exchange. The bank and the Fund, called upon to lend vast sums, did what any prudent banker would do. They insisted that their loans be repaid and that the appropriate conditions for this be created where they did not exist. Drawing on its expertise and having an eye on its own credibility as a commercial borrower, the World Bank recommended domestic policy changes which would help to secure a return on its loans. In retrospect, some of the World Bank's demands were too harsh. But, the Bank has concluded, responsible governments would not have got themselves into such a plight in the first place by applying misconceived policies and by stealing public funds for private purposes. Hence the Bank's appeal for better governance. This is defined as more freedom of political expression and more transparent administration of public funds. The World Bank stops short of explicitly demanding an end to one-party rule.

The main donor governments have now declared that they will give priority in allotting aid money to governments which respect human rights and which are free from corruption. This is less than absolutely sincere: since making these statements, the U.S. government has continued to shore up President Mobutu in Zaire (the U.S. consul in Lubumbashi refused to testify to a government inquiry into last May's massacre there). The British government continues to give more aid to Kenya than to any other African government.

The selectivity with which these new criteria are being applied suggests that an insistence on good governance could be used as an excuse to abandon those African countries considered basket-cases, while maintaining leverage over the more interesting ones, with less regard to the standards they adopt.

The French government, as usual, tends to treat its African partners as a bloc. All are now being urged to open themselves to pluralism and to delegate administration to technocrats while the old heads of state preside over the transformation to provide continuity. This formula has been applied to Benin, Gabon, and Côte d'Ivoire. It may soon be applied to other French-speaking countries too (see box). Meanwhile Paris is

withholding a much-needed devaluation of the CFA [African Financial Community] franc until it has been able to usher in a new political dispensation. The French aim is to hasten political reform without precipitating revolution—hence the nickname 'Paristroika' (AC Vol 31 No 14).

The political reforms being imposed on Africa are not likely to result in greater prosperity. Desirable as they may be, they may well result in greater volatility in the short term. They are not being accompanied by any Marshall Plan-type aid, such as is being directed towards Eastern Europe.

African states have so little clout in international fora, since sub-Saharan Africa accounts for less than 2 percent of world trade, that they have little opportunity to voice their demands, such as for an agreement to raise international commodity prices or for debt relief. Since the end of the Cold War they are unable even to offer themselves to the highest bidder as allies and recipients of aid.

Perhaps the most interesting international role is that of the Catholic church. In Gabon and Benin, Catholic bishops chaired round-table conferences on national political life. In Mozambique, the church has mediated between rival guerilla armies. They have attempted the same role in Angola. In Zaire, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ghana and Kenya, they have urged the resumption, or the continuation, of multi-party rule. African Christianity is arising as a political force. We may see an African version of Christian Democracy, a concomitant of the political Islam which promises to drift south from Algeria (AC Vol 31 No 13).

The State of Play

There is an active debate on the merits of one-party or multi-party systems in all of sub-Saharan Africa except Malawi. The following are among the more significant cases:

Côte d'Ivoire: The French aim is to promote a technocrat at the head of government while octogenarian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny is encouraged to engineer a smooth succession. Houphouët-Boigny wants to go out on a high note like his hero, General Charles de Gaulle. But can he wait that long? The people to watch: Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara; president-in-waiting Henry Konan Bedié

Benin: The laboratory for French experiments in African policy. Former Marxist dictator Mathieu Kérékou remains head of state, while a reformist government administers West Africa's most open government. Kérékou is still commander-in-chief of the army and could stage a comeback. People to watch: Kérékou; prime minister Nicéphore Soglo, once a World Bank executive director.

Zambia: President Kenneth Kaunda's government is in inexorable decline. A referendum on the one-party state

is due on 17 October. If the donor-countries consider the referendum unfair, it will attract international condemnation since KK is now regarded as a lame duck. A coup would be likely. On the other hand a victory for the ruling party would not satisfy Zambians for long as their living-standards continue to decline. The people to watch: Lieutenant-General Christon Tembo, currently on trial for subversion; Vernon Mwaanga, the ex-minister who is making a new career as an advocate of a multi-party system.

Kenya: President Daniel arap Moi is telling the world: 'Back me or you will have chaos in Kenya.' Britain is backing him, despite his poor democratic credentials, because there is no other potential leader in sight. The people to watch: the ghost of the murdered foreign minister Robert Ouko; the jailed plutocrat-turned-dissident Kenneth Matiba.

Mozambique: Direct talks have finally started between the rivals Frente para a liberacao de Mozambique (Frelimo) and the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo). South Africa is the main ally of both, and wants peace at last. The people to watch: Armando Guebuze, the charismatic government transport minister; President Joaquim Chissano, an accomplished diplomat; Raul Domingos, Renamo negotiator-in-chief.

Zaire: Long-standing dictator Mobutu Sese Seko now has a human rights commission and a multi-party system made to measure. Does this make Zaire democratic? Of course not. The man to watch: Mobutu, the cleverest manoeuvrer in Africa and one of the world's consummate cynics. His eventual successor will probably be in uniform.

Tanzania: Out of the limelight, but full of promise for an eventual transition to a multi-party system and an institutional transfer of power. The true architect of this is the wily Julius Nyerere, who thinks long-term. The man to watch: President Ali Hassan Mwinyi.

Some Others: Africa's only real multi-party democracies are Mauritius and Botswana, Namibia and Algeria bode well for the future. In Gambia, Tunisia, Morocco and Senegal, multi-party systems do not threaten the grip of those in power. Gabon and Madagascar have gone multi-party. Somalia has promised to follow suit. So will others in the French-speaking block. In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe is swimming against the tide by promising a one-party state. He may not be able to pull it off. South Africa has always been multi-party, as long as you're white. Now it is promising one person, one vote.

Kenya

* Challenges Facing KANU Review Committee Viewed
90AF0545B Nairobi *THE WEEKLY REVIEW*
in English 27 Jul 90 pp 3-5

[Text] By the time the Kanu reform committee headed by the vice-president, Prof. George Saitoti, got down to business at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre on Wednesday this week, there were great expectations that the end result would be far-reaching reforms in Kenya's political system. But on the other side of the fence, there was a great deal of scepticism, the question being whether the 19-member committee would merely go through motions of accepting presentations from a wide variety of individuals and interest groups, and then come out with a set of minor cosmetic reforms amounting to little more than window dressing.

There might well be justification for both points of view. The appointment of the reform committee at the annual delegates conference in June was Kanu's way of reacting to pressure for change not just from critics clamouring for the party to relinquish its hold on absolute political power but also from within the party ranks, where a few politicians were willing to acknowledge that there were, indeed, shortcomings within the party that needed to be looked into. It may well have been an announcement by Kanu secretary-general, Mr. Joseph Kamotho, to the effect that the party would be organising a national "Kenya We Want" conference where everybody—critical churchmen and lawyers, included—would be welcome to present their view that sparked-off the multi-party debate. That was the justification used by Anglican Bishop Dr. Henry Okullu when he fired the first multi-party salvo in April, kicking off a debate that was initially welcomed by party headquarters as a prime example of Kenya's political climate. But the entry of former cabinet ministers Mr. Kenneth Matiba and Mr. Charles Rubia changed matters somewhat as Kanu regrouped to fend-off the potential threat from the two Kanu expellees who came to stand out as the moving forces behind a growing multi-party movement.

It was against this background that Kanu convened the annual delegates conference, which demanded strong measures against the multi-party advocates and came up with the Saitoti committee to look into possible areas of reform, with particular emphasis on the electoral system—specifically the 70 per cent rule at the Kanu nomination process and the party disciplinary measures, where the spate of expulsions over the last few years has been cited as a matter of concern. At the same time, Kamotho announced that the proposed national conference would not be held. The justification given for calling-off the long awaited convocation was that a series of nationwide rallies held by President Daniel arap Moi to rally the forces against proponents of the multi-party system had given ample opportunity for the people to air their views.

That divergent views could be expressed in the heated atmosphere of major political rallies might have been stretching incredulity rather far, with a more plausible rationale being that Kanu had been shocked into realization about the depth of public feeling on political issues and was not about to convene a public forum where it would not be in a position to set the agenda. A Kanu committee to look into areas of possible reform would certainly be more manageable. The subsequent order that the multi-party debate cease and the latter developments when Matiba, Rubia and other proponents of the multi-party system were arrested and detained did not cool political temperatures. Instead, Nairobi and a number of principal towns in Central Province were hit by bouts of rioting that turned out to be a sobering experience.

Incidental matters aside, Saitoti's committee comes into action at a crucial time when it is somehow expected to repair the fractured body politic. Church leaders persistently state the case for a national conference or even a referendum on the multi-party issue. The insinuation in that case is that the Kanu Review Committee can hardly be expected to come up with anything tangible and that much more than a reform of Kanu is required. The fact that terms of reference for the committee had not been publicised by Tuesday this week did not help the situation. Originally, the committee was mandated with the express task of looking into the problem areas in regard to the electoral system and party disciplinary machinery. It could get more than it bargained for.

Party critics have been busy preparing their representations, and it could be safe to assume that they will not limit themselves to narrow areas. When Archbishop Manasses Kuria of the Church of the province of Kenya of late a vehement critic of the system, late last month criticised the composition of the committee, he also welcomed the opportunity to appear before it in person and present a catalogue of grievances. A number of other church leaders intend to do the same and the committee might well find itself inundated with more presentations than it can handle in the time set.

Another political problem area before the committee embarked on its sittings this week was that the *modus operandi* remained unclear. Addressing a press conference last week while releasing the timetable for the sittings, Saitoti revealed that a good number of written presentations had already been forwarded to the committee. But once the sittings started, interested parties would have the opportunity to appear in person or opt to pass their views either through Kanu headquarters, or through their respective district or provincial commissioners. It was not clear whether appearing in person would mean making verbal presentation or simply handing over written proposals. Speaking to *The Weekly Review* on Tuesday this week, Mr. Ngugi Njoroge, the deputy director of public relations and public policy at the Kanu secretariat, affirmed that the sessions would have an element of dialogue, with the possibility that a person making an oral presentation might in turn have to

field some queries from the review team. That might get complicated when the time element is taken into account, depending on the number of people who present themselves.

Njoroge also said that the sessions would not be open to the media and other interested parties, until such a time as the review team had compiled its findings and was ready to come out with a set of recommendations. It is not clear why the committee opted for "closed" sessions, but if that is intended to forestall the possibility of suggested reforms becoming a matter of public debate, it might not work at all: There is not much the committee can do to pre-empt a situation where some of the parties making presentations also make them available to the media.

Within the terms of reference disclosed by Saitoti last week centering on the party's nomination rules, election rules and disciplinary measures, there is bound to be a wealth of suggestions on issues that have occasioned Kanu a great deal of scrutiny in recent years. The present nomination by the queue-voting method was first used in the 1988 general election after heated public debate in the preceding months over the suitability of queue-voting as an electoral mechanism and the desirability of the controversial 70 per cent rule where a candidate attaining the figure at the nomination stage is declared to have been elected unopposed. With the committee having been formed with the express instructions to look into the 70 per cent issue, then there is every likelihood that its scrapping, or modification, might be one of the results of the review.

On the queue-voting, the party already has rules intended to make its application almost foolproof. But from its use since the 1985 Kanu elections and the 1988 general and party elections, the aftermath has left a bitter taste in the mouth as losing candidates complained of blatant rigging. That was a result of election officials unashamedly ignoring the laid down rules in order to ensure that the favoured candidate emerged the victor. The end result was that while the official position remains that rigging is impossible in such an open system conducted in broad daylight, in instances where it did take place, the electorate was immediately aware. But there was hardly any avenue for redress, with the party president being the sole arbiter. Some losing candidates who lodged appeals in the High Court after the 1988 general election were turned away because the courts had no jurisdiction over party matters.

The problems with the party's disciplinary machinery also warrant a close look. With the spate of expulsions since 1982, matters have come to a head, with the expellees going for a head-on confrontation rather than merely pleading to be re-admitted. No wonder then that it was party expellees Matiba and Rubia who resurfaced as standard bearers for the multi-party advocates. At the basic level, there have been complaints that the party disciplinary machinery had been misused by powerful politicians to hound their political rivals into silence. At

a more philosophical level, there has been the issue of one losing his political rights after being expelled from the single political party. The latter might seem academic—after all, many expellees continue to lead rich and rewarding lives without being Kanu members and exercising their political rights in general elections, where one need only be a registered voter to indicate his preferences. But for a political animal, being able to vote alone is not enough; not being able to participate as a candidate is sheer torture. So wherein lies the solution?

The matter of the disciplinary machinery being misused can easily be taken care of by tighter procedures. But whether expulsion can be done away with altogether is another matter. Clubs and societies generally have such provisions as a measure of last resort. But then one has the alternative of joining another club. How this aspect will be handled should be interesting.

The narrow scope of the terms of reference aside, the real fireworks with the review committee will be set when much more controversial areas are broached, as they are sure to be. On the one hand remains the issue of reforming and revamping—read strengthening—Kanu. The other involves weakening Kanu. If the review team was assembled as Kanu's reaction to the multi-party debate, then there is every possibility that those who have no time for Kanu reform but prefer the opportunity to have an alternative party could bring their petitions before the Saitoti committee. That might well be an extreme scenario but anything out of the terms of reference will present Saitoti and his team with a challenge. Any proposals in that regard could be dismissed forthwith. They could be politely accepted and then shelved or they could be taken seriously and be seen to have had an impact come the time for the review team to sift through the mass and come up with its recommendations.

That might very well turn out to be the biggest test, with the final outcome expected to at least demonstrate that it was all worthwhile, and not merely a pro-forma exercise designed as a temporary safety valve.

Uganda

* **Government Opens Sales of Parastatal Shares**
90AF0620D Kampala *THE NEW VISION* in English
9 Aug 90 p 12

[Article by Didas Bakunzi]

[Excerpt] Government is to relinquish some of its shares in viable state-owned enterprises to the public, the deputy Minister of Commerce, Mr Israel Kayonde said yesterday.

He said government was also considering to promulgate appropriate tax and investment laws intended to create better investment incentives for the general public.

The deputy Minister was delivering a key note address at the opening of a one-day Kampala Stock Exchange workshop held at Kampala International Conference Centre. It was also attended by the former Vice-President of New York Stock Exchange Mr. Robert Bishop.

Mr Kayonde said shares in cement industries, Nyanza Textiles Industries (NYTIL), Tororo Industrial Chemicals and Fertilizers (TICAF) and many others were open for the general public. "It is government policy to relinquish some of its shares in certain viable state-owned enterprises to the public," he said.

He assured participants to the workshop that government would establish a regulatory body which will protect the interests of the investor and ensure that commercial honour and integrity is adhered to in the securities markets.

The deputy Minister said many of Uganda's industries had excessive unutilised capacity which should be harnessed by injection of additional funds. This, he said, should be facilitated by the Kampala Stock Exchange when it becomes operational. [passage omitted]

* Government Lays Off 50,000 Workers

90AF0620B Kampala *WEEKLY TOPIC* in English
27 Jul 90 p 1

[Excerpt] Over 50,000 group employees have been dismissed from the public service in a government bid to reduce expenditure on wages.

The employees' services were terminated by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Service Dr. Martin Orech on July 6. He instructed all heads of Department to give a 21 days' notice to half of their group employees.

Orech advised that government would only pay half of the usual wage bill from August 1. Only employees of the Ministry of Health and Mulago Hospital have been spared.

A senior official at the Ministry of Public Service who spoke on condition of anonymity told *WEEKLY TOPIC* that the government has no intention whatsoever to pay terminal benefits to the workers. "Only those few who have been contributing to NSSF can take their claims there," he said.

At the moment nobody knows exactly how many workers make up the 50 percent or how much money will be saved. But according to the past Public Service census in 1987, the government had 240,000 workers, of whom 100,000 were group employees. Another 100,000 were low level officers in lower salary scales. Only 40,000 were skilled or senior staff.

Since 1987, recruitment of group employees continued until 1989 when temporary appointments were banned

by the President. Orech invoked the Presidential directive in June when he reminded all officers aged 55 and above that their continued stay in the civil service was illegal.

The Programme for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA) report also stresses that the money spent on group employees is not known because ministries pay their allowances from discretionary funds. [passage omitted]

* Foreign Investors Get Tax Break Under New Code

90AF0620A Kampala *FINANCIAL TIMES* in English
6 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Dan Elwana]

[Excerpt] Uganda now has an Investment Code which forms the contractual background, hitherto missing, for a working relationship between investors (local and foreign) and the Republic of Uganda.

Under the new Investment Code published in the UGANDA GAZETTE No 29 of July 13, all new investors in Uganda (Ugandans as well as foreigners) shall under the Certificate of Incentives issued by the Uganda Investment Authority, be entitled to claim upwards of five years tax exemption (this includes corporation tax, withholding taxes and taxes on dividends), if they believe their proposed investment falls within the category prescribed in the Code. The Code is to be administered by the newly formed Uganda Investment Authority.

The notice in the UGANDA GAZETTE spells out clearly that an investor intending to make a new investment in Uganda and for that purpose importing any plant machinery or construction material which is not available in Uganda shall be exempt from import duties and sales tax otherwise payable on those goods.

The package of incentives under the new Investment Code (when it comes into force) shall apply specifically to that category of a foreign investor who makes a capital investment or an equivalent in capital goods worth a minimum of US\$500,000 by way of total equity capital. [passage omitted]

* New Dam To Increase Hydroelectric Capacity

90AF0620C Kampala *THE NEW VISION* in English
30 Jul 90 pp 1, 16

[Article by Fred Jenner Bananura in Jinja]

[Excerpt] The Owen Falls Hydroelectric Power Station is to step up its power capacity from an earlier projected 150 Mega Watts to 180 MW. And the government has advanced plans to build another hydroelectric plant close to this one in Jinja.

President Yoweri Museveni disclosed this while on a tour of East African Steel Mills Corporation here on

Friday. The industry is undergoing rehabilitation. President Museveni revealed all this while dismissing fears expressed by the Corporation's General Manager, Dr William Muhairwe, who anticipated problems of power shortage due to increasing demand of power generated by Owen Falls Dam.

In a memorandum submitted to the President, Dr Muhairwe had written "If the Hima Plant draws full power, Nytel switches from oil-fired electric boilers, Steel Rolling Mills start melting, the Kabale extention is energised and the rate of industrial growth is maintained, then we may not

have the 10 to 15 MW we need to run the steel plant to full capacity, running 24 hours daily."

President Museveni did not go into details but other sources said the government intended to have a total generation of 5,000 Mega Watts at Jinja Power Station for local consumption and export. President Museveni was very impressed by the rehabilitation work going on at the plant. He wrote "good work" in the Visitors book. "Slow thus slow-reached the earthworm to the well" Museveni recalled a local proverb. Mr Museveni promised to be back to open the plant in March 1991. [passage omitted]

*** Trade Minister on New Industrial Policy**

90AF0614D Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 10 Aug 90 p 9

[Kent Durr, Minister of Trade and Industry spoke to Brian Schmidt, staff writer of THE ENGINEERING NEWS]

[Text] South Africa's present industrial strategy is based on the White Paper of 1985 which emphasises industrial development through import replacement together with tariff protection and export incentive. Since 2 February this year the ball game has changed. Is a new industrial strategy being formulated and if so what will the new features be?

Although in other respects an historic date, 2 February does not herald a major change in industrial policy although of course it has impacted on every facet of our lives.

Import replacement has been mentioned for some time as having a lesser role to play, simply because opportunities are limited and more capital intensive, and we are less obsessed with strategic arguments.

To export more and more added value products, we must hone our competitiveness.

This requires inter-alia a review of tariffs, which is now complete.

Industrialisation with higher exports are our stated goals.

Deregulation, small business encouragement, the government export incentive scheme (GEIS) and privatisation all point to the same objective.

In the final analysis the private sector should be the driving force for growth.

What importance will you be placing on international competitiveness and what will your attitude on tariff protection for local industry be?

International competitiveness is paramount if we are to succeed as a nation.

The sooner we face this reality the better.

Much is being done to improve competitiveness.

This includes deregulation, liberalisation of trade, the new GEIS and the review of tariff protection.

The purpose of tariffs is to provide a leg-up to viability.

Problems in our competitiveness arise when a high tariff wall becomes a fixture.

Government as facilitator must help infant industry.

It must also encourage increased competitiveness.

In accord with successful support elsewhere, the government is assisting target sectors with high potential and with help in the initial stages.

A case in point is the programme for support for the innovation in the electronics industry where R40-million a year, for the next 5 years, is available for the development and launch of new products.

This form of leg-up support might be considered elsewhere.

We note that you have just struck a new trade agreement with Malawi. Are negotiations taking place with other southern African countries and if so, with what in mind?

Yes, certain aspects of the Southern African Customs Union Agreement are currently being reviewed.

The last general review dates back to 1969.

The BLS [Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland] countries are of the view that specific provisions should be reviewed to improve their position within the customs union.

There are also ongoing negotiations with Mozambique to improve the trade relations between that country and South Africa.

You have come on record as saying that overseas companies are standing ready to invest billions of rands in South Africa. In what projects are they likely to invest and what are the factors still keeping them from taking the plunge?

There is interest in several major mineral beneficiation projects as well as in the chemicals and plastics industries.

Furthermore several major motor industry related projects are in the pipeline.

Many have taken the plunge and the new improved attitude towards South African is gaining momentum.

Naturally constitutional uncertainty and certain parties clinging to outdated, failed economic ideologies do not help investment attitudes.

What industries, in your mind, have the greatest potential to create wealth for the new South Africa?

Industries with the greatest potential to create wealth and a better South Africa are the manufacturing industries.

We already have a broad array of primary extractive industries.

Now we must move to downstream industries and create beneficiated and manufactured products.

* New Navy Chief Discusses Reorganization

90AF0613A Johannesburg ARMED FORCES
in English Aug 90 pp 10, 13, 14

[Interview with Chief of the S.A. Navy Rear-Admiral L. J. Woodburne—first paragraph introduction printed in bold print]

[Text] Rear-Admiral L.J. Woodburne was appointed Chief of the Navy with effect from the 1 July 1990, and this in-depth interview with the Admiral was conducted within 3 weeks of his assuming command. During the interview Admiral Woodburne answered a number of questions concerning the present and future role of the S.A. [South African] Navy.

Admiral, can we reverse the usual order and thank you in advance for arranging time for this interview, especially so soon after taking over command of the South African Navy.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] Admiral, would it be fair to say that over the last few years you have had rather rapid promotion, and have held a number of different senior posts in the Navy. Could you give a short resume of your career.

[Woodburne] I joined the Naval Gymnasium in 1958, after which I attended the Military Academy. I then qualified as an anti-submarine warfare officer. In 1966 I attended the Specialist Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving Course at HMS Vernon in the United Kingdom. My first shore command was OIC SA Navy Diving School and my first seagoing command was as Captain of one of our minesweepers. I then went to France for submarine training and on my return, I took command of the SAS Emily Hobhouse. From 1978 I was with Special Forces, and 1981 completed the Naval Staff Course. From 1983 to 1985 I was posted as a Military Attaché and in 1986, promoted to Commodore as Director of Naval Operations. In 1989 I took over Naval Command West as Rear-Admiral, and on 1 July 1990 I was promoted and appointed as Chief of the SA Navy.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] You have taken over the Navy at a time when there is a lot of 'chatter' going the rounds concerning cuts in the Defence Budget and at the time when the 'cleaning ship' operation declared approximately 20 percent of the Navy's personnel redundant. The paying-off of personnel and early pension programme should now be complete. Will this have any effect on the efficiency of the Navy?

[Woodburne] Yes, we will have a more effective Navy. The reorganisation that has taken place was very carefully planned over a period of time, and we now have much shorter lines of communication with only two levels of command. In actual fact, we have a very busy programme with the same number of ships at sea, with more time at sea and more sea miles per year than ever before, and more involved in providing a maritime service. We still have to settle down with the new

structure, but our operational capability and the support of our flotillas has not been affected.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] To the question of the Budget, are there any existing procurement or development programmes that are nearing completion that will affect the availability of funds for future budgets.

[Woodburne] No—The budget horizon is 5 years with projects phased according to availability of funds. So we have projects in various stages. As some come to an end, others start up, while others are only halfway. The ending of a project does not have a marked effect on the budget or other projects.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] So, in fact, any procurement, retro-fitting or development will require an extra slice of the Budget cake.

[Woodburne] This is not so, as projects are planned and phased, as I have explained. Only something unforeseen could have an impact on the budget which, depending on its very high priority or special circumstance, may necessitate a redistribution within the Defence Budget.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] For what it is worth, there have been a number of news reports in recent months in the popular media that could be interpreted to show that South Africa is badly in need of a maritime force that would fulfill the duties that are normally undertaken by a Coast Guard service. Could the South African Navy undertake this role? Are there vessels available in South Africa that can be used for such a service, and what number and type of ships would be needed to provide policing of the 200 mile limit in respect of fishing, safety and other requirements.

[Woodburne] Yes, provided we are given the required resources with which to do the task. It is by nature our business to run ships and we have a well established infrastructure, expertise and experience to support such a force. Most naval vessels have an inherent capability to carry out this task to a greater or lesser extent. I would not hazard a guess at the numbers, but the prime requirement is good seakeeping for extended periods and good endurance. In other words, ocean-going vessels, as compared to coastal patrol craft. It must be realised that the introduction of the concept of an EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] has dramatically increased the area to be patrolled.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] In view of these changing or additional roles, is it not a pity that the Marines were disbanded. Is there a chance that the force will be re-introduced.

[Woodburne] The Marines were disbanded for three main reasons:

- with the withdrawal from SWA [South-West Africa]/Namibia on riverine COIN [Counterinsurgency] responsibility fell away;
- the landward COIN responsibility was seen as an Army responsibility;

- the patrolling of our commercial harbour was a police responsibility.

Although the protection of our own Naval installations remained our own responsibility, this task could be performed by sailors trained for the job.

There were also the financial constraints and the need to rationalise. The Marines were therefore disbanded as the requirement for Marines had fallen away. Those are the bald facts. There is no likelihood of their being reintroduced in the medium term.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] In a period of a little over 2 years the Navy has undertaken two foreign visits and been able to show the flag in Chile and the Republic of China. I know that the visit to Chile was a great success and I understand that the visit to Taiwan fell into the same category. On both occasions the SAS Drakensberg was used as the flagship and the limited accommodation on this ship restricted the number of personnel who could experience 'sea time.' In future, if similar visits are planned is there any chance of the SAS Tafelberg being used as it is possible that Citizen Force members could then be accommodated.

[Woodburne] Yes, the Tafelberg could very well be used for similar visits in the future. Her main disadvantage is her rather slow speed. I must point out, though, that by providing temporary accommodation, Drakensberg was able to carry close to three times her normal complement in relative comfort during the visit to the ROC. Where the ship normally carries a crew of 101, she carried 275, of which almost 45 percent (121 persons) were National Servicemen. The Navy, therefore, relied on its NSM to a good extent and allows them ample opportunities with such visits. Citizen Force members can, therefore, be accommodated in large numbers in both ships.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] On the subject of foreign visits, do you see this as a future function of the Navy.

[Woodburne] In today's changed environment, I certainly see the Navy taking an active role in furthering the government's diplomatic initiatives. I sincerely hope that we will be called upon to visit other countries in the future, particularly in Africa. I am sure, as was the case when we used the Drakensberg to transport logistic aid to Beira, Mozambique in 1988, we can provide certain assistance to other African countries. From a purely professional point of view, I would like to see us exercising with other navies again, as was the case when I was a young officer and later as a submarine commander.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] Your Citizen Force Reserve must, at this time, amount to a substantial number, specially after the disbandment of the Marines. Are there any plans to alter the asking and structure of this element and to provide additional training of a sea-going nature. Sometimes the impression is gained that the hearts of all members of the CF [Citizen Force]

are not in their formations. Is there a need to retain reluctant officers and other ranks.

[Woodburne] One must be careful not to generalise. Yes, we do have a large CF reserve. Some of them may not have their hearts in doing CF call-ups; that is understandable. They have their own domestic situations and own priorities. Furthermore, times have changed and the requirement must be re-evaluated. In this respect, you are quite right. I have made it one of my objectives to have a close look at CF and its position and contribution to the new Navy.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] A number of countries have a system whereby commercial vessels and crews form an active part of the Navy, in a Reserve role. I am thinking of the system that functions in some of the Scandinavian countries, are there any plans to introduce a system along these lines.

[Woodburne] No. It would not be cost-effective and there is no requirement. This does not preclude the State commandeering merchant vessels during hostilities.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] There is continual speculation as to the future of the two laid-up frigates. I understand that there were plans to start re-commissioning these ships during the current budget year, but that due to cuts, this was postponed. Can you give you indication of the future of these ships.

[Woodburne] The future, or fate, of the two old frigates is presently under investigation. Without pre-empting the findings, I am of the opinion that the time has passed in which we could have effectively modernized these vessels from a cost point of view. The Navy certainly needs to embark on a surface ship replacement programme, as the hull-life of the Strike craft will soon be coming to an end. It would make more sense to place our efforts and resources into procuring new vessels than to dishing-up secondhand vessels with a limited hull-life.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] I understand that there is unhappiness within the ranks of the Navy concerning the very few sea-going commands for senior officers. Most officers of the rank of Commander and Captain are limited to sailing a desk. Is there any practical solution to this problem.

[Woodburne] Except for our combat support vessels, such as Drakensberg and Tafelberg, and the hydrographic survey vessel, Protea, the other combatants (Strikecraft, Submarines and MCM vessels) are physically demanding and require relatively young, go-getter type commanding officers. Command at sea is the ultimate in any combat officer's career, and it would be nice if there were more opportunities for advancement at sea.

The answer is bigger ships and more ships. Bigger ships, I am sure we will get to replace the strike craft one day, as the strike craft—deadly as they may be—have real

limitations because their small size causes severe physical hardship for the crew, especially in foul sea conditions. In addition, their range is limited, as is their endurance. More ships? Well that is a matter of financial priorities.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] The existing flotilla of Strikecraft have been in service for some years, operating in what can be turbulent seas. Are their replacements being considered? Would they be replaced by a larger type ship.

[Woodburne] It takes a new ship programme at least 10 years from inception to finally having the first ship operationally at sea. By the year 2000, most of our Strikecraft's hull lives would have expired. It is, therefore, imperative that we embark now on a replacement programme if we don't want to lose our surface strike capability. As I have already mentioned, the replacement ships need to be much larger than the Strikecraft—common sense tells me that they should be in the region of 2,000 tonnes.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] In most countries that have a system of National Service, Naval service is generally for a longer period than that for the Army. As the Navy always attracts more applications than it can accept, is there any plan to adopt this system.

[Woodburne] No—National Service is a commitment that should affect all equally. There is no sense in getting the Navy out of step with the rest of the Defence Force in this regard.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] The Navy, over the last few years, appears to have taken a greater interest in the voluntary Naval Cadet organisation. Has this proved to be worthwhile.

[Woodburne] The voluntary Navy League Cadet Corps is a prime recruiting ground for the SA Navy and, to a lesser degree the Merchant Service. In the past 10 years an average of 14 cadets per annum have joined the PF: 4 to 5 the Merchant Navy and 2 to 3 the harbour services. Among the many PF members who began their naval careers in the Naval Cadets are R. Adm. (Ret) Paul Wijnberg, R. Adm. Ray Eberlein and Capt Bob Harrison. About 30 cadets are called up annually to do their National Service in the Navy. Former naval cadets form a significant part of the Navy's Citizen Force. They include Cdr David Forsythe, OC of SAS PORT REX and Cdr Doug Barrick, OC of SAS INKONKONI.

[ARMED FORCES JOURNAL] There are a number of ex-service and other maritime organisations in South Africa; do these provide a sufficiently powerful lobby for the Navy.

[Woodburne] No, nor is it a requirement. What is important is for these organisations, including the Navy, to strive to create a greater awareness amongst the authorities and the general public about maritime matters.

There is a need for a national maritime policy. The RSA [Republic of South Africa] is too dependent on maritime affairs to ignore the vital issues at stake, such as our dependence on maritime trade, fishery protection, offshore mining and drilling, the EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] in general—in short, the management and protection of our maritime assets. South Africans in general are sadly unresponsive in this respect—except when it is an emotional issue.

* Further Trade Links With USSR Envisaged

90AF0606A Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 3 Aug 90 pp 26, 30

[Article by John Cavill and Andrew McNulty: "The Bit Between the Teeth"]

[Text] Apart from the PR kudos of helping to fund the USSR's perestroyka on a scale exceeded so far only by the West's third biggest economy—West Germany—there is only phase to describe the deal struck between De Beers Centenary and the Russian precious metals and diamond administration, Glavalmazzoloto (Glava): It was sweet, necessary and full of promise.

At a stroke, Centenary's US\$1bn 5-year advance to Glava deals with several short-term problems. In particular, it sterilises part of the Russian stockpile—just enough to cover the loan to be held as collateral by the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) in London—which was threatening to come on to the market during a period of weaker demand.

There are also longer-run, strategic benefits. By bringing into the CSO fold the world's fourth largest diamond producer (and a leading gem producer), Centenary has flashed a powerful signal to other producers. Negotiations are said to have started for the renewal next year of certain marketing agreements, such as the Australians.

The direct financial effect on Centenary's results will not be greatly significant. The CSO has said it buys in quantities of rough diamonds from non-quota producers and analysts believe about 80 percent-85 percent of Russian exports have for years been marketed this way.

Much more important is the boost to confidence in the share and diamond industry. Julian Ogilvie Thompson, chairman of De Beers and Centenary, sees the deal as "extremely good news, not only for De Beers Centenary, but for the continued stability and prosperity of the international diamond industry."

Ogilvie Thompson has said he would like to see the discount of De Beers' share price to net asset value reduced or eliminated. A formal agreement with the USSR must help to bolster investor sentiment and analysts are seeing it as another step towards unlocking value in the share.

This time the chairman has remained in the background. The deal is being presented as a Centenary affair; members of the negotiating team are all London-based (see

box) and the agreement was signed on behalf of Centenary by Deputy Chairman Nicholas Oppenheimer, who heads the CSO. The announcement was made by Centenary and press inquiries to 44 Main Street were referred to London. That pattern will probably recur increasingly in the future as the Swiss-based company establishes its identity as a separate entity domiciled in Europe.

For the USSR, the \$1bn cash fills a considerable part of the hole in its hard currency liquidity, effectively rescheduling short-term debt, which is outweighed in external liabilities of more than \$43bn, and at the same time protects the value of its fourth-biggest export earner.

Gosbank Chairman Viktor Geraschenko had publicly admitted the USSR had a pressing need to find \$2bn to cover arrears on import bills, giving the gold market a fright until he specified it would be raised from sales of commodities other than bullion or oil. Since then West Germany has oiled the wheels of reunification with a \$3bn credit and now Centenary uniquely tops up Soviet gold swaps, estimated at between 200 t-300 t.

Nor is it likely the Russians would have made the approach to De Beers before the setting up of Centenary. The opening of international opportunities—on the borrowing and investment fronts—was as much a motivation for the decision in 1988 to hive off the offshore business of De Beers as was the desire to realise value for shareholders. Negotiations are said to have started in May.

Be that as it may, the timing was fortuitous. Reports have appeared from time to time that sales of Russian diamonds were influencing the market, as in 1984 for example, when the rough market was in recession. These reports may not have been substantiated but in this market perceptions and rumour are important. More recently the USSR's economic difficulties have raised fears of potentially disruptive sales into a flagging market.

Indeed, diamond trade sources outside De Beers tell the FM that supplies of rough gems from Almazjouvelirexport (AJE) have risen this year at periodic tenders held in Moscow. At these tenders are sold the 10 percent-15 percent of Soviet stones which do not "indirectly" flow to the CSO's Russian sorting floor in Charterhouse Street. Average prices at the 1990 tenders were reported to be \$133/carat against \$155 last year, though this may have been due to variations in the quality of Siberian production.

As much of the tender offerings also finds its way through the trade to the CSO, it is likely that any excess would have been mopped up by Centenary at a net cost to its cash position and interest earnings.

That is all very well in a rising market; but the tender sales could have more adverse effects when conditions are more difficult. In reporting the record 1990 first-half sales of \$2,48bn, the CSO noted a slackening of demand

at the fourth and fifth sights (after prices were raised 5 percent at the third sight). In the United States, still the largest retail market by value, sales of diamond jewelry disappointed last Christmas and are said to have remained soft. Hence the overtones of relief in the trade's universal acclaim for the agreement signed last week. De Beers will share that relief.

Funding the loan will be straightforward. There will be some increase in Centenary's gearing though London analysts say that after five sights the Swiss company's cash position could have improved by \$300m-\$400m from the end-1989 pro forma balance sheet, which showed net current liabilities of \$29m including cash of \$590m.

The margin over Libor—the London Inter Bank Offered Rate for 6-month dollars, currently 8.125 percent—is not disclosed; the Russians do not want to show their hand to other lenders. But a reasonable commercial rate is unlikely to be much less than 1.5 points over Libor. So Centenary gets an earning asset—against a non-earning addition to its stockpile, which was \$2.4bn on 31 December or 71 percent of net assets—backed by collateral valued by the CSO at current prices, which is taken off the market.

The impact on the 1990 bottom-line result should be essentially neutral, however, because earnings will hinge on second-half sales. That also appears to be the view the market is taking. After rising before the announcement, the share (or linked unit) price weakened slightly on the news and continues to consolidate around R94. Not surprising, given the increase of more than 50 percent this year.

The CSO will undoubtedly buy some of the stones in the Russian collateral as the market permits and depending on the quality of goods coming from variable run-of-mine production. High-value Soviet stones have always provided essential sweeteners to boxes of goods at the sights.

The short-run symmetry of the agreement with Glava is capped by the longer-term formal contract for the CSO to handle all Russian exports of rough diamonds for the next 5 years.

While the impact on overall CSO sales volumes will be marginal, bringing the full Soviet sales into the CSO fold will help to ensure stability of the market and, importantly, of the CSO single channel—or cartel—structure.

The significance of the contract will not be lost on other producers who may consider breaking with the CSO.

It is reported in London that the USSR had been talking to the Israeli and Indian cutting and polishing trade, as well as to Botswana and Angola about setting up a producers' association independent of the CSO.

Now the world's second biggest producer of high value gems has officially joined the CSO for 5 years, the case for independence may lose its political impetus.

The Soviets, for their part, will be getting their money directly instead of via commission-earning agents. Ham-bros, a London merchant bank, is said to have been one such channel.

Though the marketing agreement with the Soviet diamond industry after it began to blossom in the early 50s—negotiated by Sir Philip Oppenheimer (cousin of Harry), later chairman of the CSO—formally ended 3 years after Sharpeville, the Soviets appear to have stuck to its spirit for the past 27 years.

Under the agreement it reserved the right to sell some stones itself—at the Moscow tenders—to keep direct touch with market conditions.

The FM [FINANCIAL MAIL] understands any excess in Soviet output pro rata to the quotas for producers laid down by the CSO was stockpiled. There are, incidentally, two Soviet stockpiles: one from "normal production" and that of the National Treasury, which holds large gems of 10ct and more in the diamond exhibition in the Kremlin; viewings are by arrangement for diplomats and VIPs. Stones from the Treasury hoard are not included in the Centenary collateral.

While the Centenary background statement on the Glava deal carefully states "the Soviet Union has had no direct contract with De Beers or the CSO since 1963," it does not rule out contact in stating the Russians had "consistently marketed production in a manner which did not disrupt the stability of the market."

Certainly the speed—little over 2 months—with which a \$1bn loan and a \$5bn marketing agreement deal was done does not suggest the participants were total, or overtly hostile, strangers, willing as each side may have been to conclude business.

For the CSO, there will also be longer-run benefit in the removal of uncertainty. As Capon puts it: "We didn't know what the future would be. Now we do." The insights gained should include greater understanding of the Soviet diamond industry. Siberian production is expected to increase beyond current levels, which the U.S. Bureau of Mines estimates at 12m ct, including about 4.5m ct of gem or near-gem quality.

Does It Open the Door?

The imponderable about the Glava pact is whether it opens the door for agreements involving other products. Platinum, for example, could also be seen as an appropriate subject for a marketing understanding should a supply surplus build up in the next 4 years, as some forecasters predict.

The USSR is also showing signs of being willing to open the door to Western mining companies.

Later this month Severovostokzoloto (the North East Gold Mining Association) is holding its first exhibition of equipment in Magadan, a port in the south-east of the USSR on the Okhotsk Sea.

According to METAL BULLETIN, Japanese, U.S., Canadian, Korean and other mining groups have been invited to "Kolyma-90"—names after the mineral-rich Kolyma River basin situated in the north-east of the Soviet Union.

This follows meetings between North East officials and Australian mining and mining equipment companies at a trade fair in Vladivostok sponsored by Australia.

They talked about cooperation and possible joint ventures. Emphasis was on gold but, according to METAL BULLETIN, one Australian delegate said: "They've got everything up there."

It all poses the question: will Anglo's newly formed Anglo European Holdings (AEH), into which the group's interests in Europe have been packaged, be far behind in following up the toenadering between Centenary and the USSR?

Centenary/Glava: Stars of the Pact

The De Beers Centenary-Glavalmazzoloto (Glava) pact has significantly raised the profiles of the Swiss-registered half of De Beers—and of its London-based executive board headed by deputy chairman Nicholas Oppenheimer.

Julian Ogilvie Thompson, chairman of both De Beers and De Beers Centenary, and the rest of the board members were certainly kept informed and consulted. The approach by Glava would have been known at the time of De Beers' annual general meeting on 25 May, at which shareholders ratified the establishment of Centenary—pivotal to the negotiations.

But the negotiations were left essentially to the executive committee of the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) in London. The team was led by Oppenheimer, who signed the agreement with Glava head Valery Roudakov. It was, incidentally, Oppenheimer who visited Luanda in January 1989, and concluded a prospecting, mining and marketing deal with Angola's State-owned diamond firm, Endiama, to bring another gem producer into the CSO fold. Apart from Oppenheimer, the deal with the USSR has thrust into the limelight directors who would normally be mute names in the annual report.

As Tim Capon (50), one of the new trio appointed to the board in March, points out, the four-man team involved in negotiations with Glava and Almazjouvelirexport did not take De Beers' bankers along. "We felt from the beginning we would and could handle it," he says. "We had enough resources."

The three others with key specialist roles in the deal are:

- Alex Barbour (61), veteran senior diamond director responsible for the sorting programme and preparation and valuation of stones for sale. Barbour joined the De Beers board in 1984;
- Anthony Oppenheimer (53), son of Sir Philip. He was the lead negotiator of the first marketing contract

- with the Soviet Union and is deputy chairman of the Diamond Trading Company. A director since 1980, Oppenheimer's portfolio broadly encompasses external relations—links with the cutting centres, advertising and PR; and
- Gary Ralfe (46), responsible for financial affairs, who was Nicholas Oppenheimer's personal assistant for over 2 years before being appointed to the executive committee, is the junior member of the team, joining the board in March. He started work for Anglo American in 1966, serving in SA [South Africa], Australia and France before heading the European Gem Service in Amsterdam for 5 years and then becoming secretary to Anglo's executive committee.

*** CP Condemns NP/ANC 'Coalition'**

90AF0582A Pretoria *DIE PATRIOT* in English
20 Jul 90 p 1

[Article: "CCB [Civil Cooperation Bureau] and Dissidents' Accusations Looming; Nat/ANC [National Party/African National Congress] Coalition Could Be Embarrassing"]

[Text] Press reports of a NP/ANC [National Party/African National Congress] coalition in the wings are proving embarrassing to the National Party as the ANC desperately tries to stave off a Harms Commission hearing on alleged ANC atrocities.

General Herman Stadler of the SA Police has prepared more than 1,600 pages of evidence concerning ANC political acts of violence, attacks on civilians and other atrocities such as necklace murders and punishment meted out by the so-called peoples' courts.

Attorneys for the ANC asked for a postponement on 19 June "for one month" in order to study the police documents. The SA Police advocate dismissed the reasons given by the ANC for the postponement and said the shortness of notice only had relevance to cross examination. Counsel for the SADF [South African Defense Forces] supported the police in this regard and said he could not understand the sudden sensitivity of the ANC because the evidence had been admitted by the ANC in any event.

"It is important that our evidence be heard as soon as possible considering the security forces' 'disembowelment' in the eyes of the public," said the security forces' legal representatives. Furthermore, the police and the defence force had been forced by the commission to continue with cross examination at short notice, and why couldn't the ANC do the same?

Pressure

Justice Louis Harms provisionally postponed hearing evidence on the ANC for one month. It is clear that the ANC does not want its terror tactics and dirty washing to spoil the adulterous reception its leader Nelson Mandela was receiving from gullible Westerners overseas.

It is also interesting to note that Mrs. Winnie Mandela has not as yet been called to give evidence in the Stompie murder trial where she was allegedly present when he was badly assaulted in her house.

Has pressure been brought to bear on the whole situation? ANC dissidents who returned recently to South Africa were taken into police custody at Jan Smuts airport on arrival. They subsequently surfaced and called for a public enquiry into their claims of torture and random killings in ANC prison camps in Angola and Tanzania.

Dissident Mr. Mwezi Twala said in a recent SABC TV documentary that the camp commander of the notorious Quatro camp in Angola during the time when most of the killings took place was now in London as part of the ANC's security department.

Killed

Another dissident whose companion Mr. Nicholas Phungulwa was shot and killed recently following a visit to the ANC office in Transkei claimed they had been "set up" by the ANC. He had told the Transkei police that he had seen the youth who did the shooting inside the Transkei's ANC offices. He had come out of hiding to do the interview with the SABC, he said.

Chief of Staff of the ANC's armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, Chris Hani, rejected demands for a public enquiry into the dissident's accusations. "We are not going to allow ourselves to be dragged before a Commission of Enquiry", said Hani.

The question is: will the government insist on an enquiry after this impudent statement by ANC? Is Hani so sure of winning that he is prepared to show his dictatorial colours before he sees his organisation taking power?

With this kind of ANC arrogance, the National Party will find it hard going to maintain a "coalition" with the ANC. Says the FINANCIAL MAIL: "Are we witnessing, possibly for the first time in history, a Western leader voluntarily negotiating himself out of power?" Many leading Afrikaners, even liberal ones, are now expressing misgivings about de Klerk's path. Even Mr. Piet Cillie, ex-editor of DIE BURGER, a left-wing newspaper in the Nasionale Per stable said that Verwoerd's vision did not succeed because "we did not have the will or ability to succeed and the vision of such a policy was systematically dismantled."

Cowardice

Short on principles and long on cowardice, the NP has disappointed even liberals who secretly hoped they would stand fast. Said one financial weekly: "While some British politicians have been willing to sacrifice the highest office because of principles, such scrupulousness is not common in the NP. While Mandela says that group rights are not even up for discussion, the NP says

this was not a sacred cow anyway, forgetting that guarantees on group rights were precisely what de Klerk and Viljoen held out to the white minority not all that long ago."

It would seem that in the eyes of many top NP members, an alliance with the ANC is now their only chance of survival. Says one: "The ANC and the NP will form part of the middle ground".

What a comedown for the once proud National Party! The first government in history to voluntarily abdicate power; a party publicly reviled by liberals for not having any principles; and now kicked around by a bunch of terrorists who intend tramping them into oblivion once their brand of third-world democracy has been attained.

*** CP Defends Farmers' Referendum on Land**

90AF0558A Pretoria *DIE PATRIOT* in English
13 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] All credit to the initiators of the recently held referendum by White farmers in the Transvaal where a nearly 95% majority of these farmers rejected the handing over or alienation of any more White agricultural land to people of other races.

The Transvaal Agricultural Union who formulated the referendum may not realize it, but they have set a precedent in White resistance politics in South Africa.

The referendum was held among all farmers in the province, not only those who belonged to the union.

Although the Minister of Home Affairs Mr Gene Louw objected to the use of the word "referendum" in terms of the Referendum Act, the fact is that a rose by any other name is still a rose, and the farmers have dug in their heels. They have thrown down the gauntlet to this country's weak government and told them that they will not be party to the ANC's [African National Congress] redistribution of land policy which the farmers see as a distinct possibility under the NP [National Party] government's present policy of appeasement to the ANC.

The concept of "unused" land, schools and hospitals has become yet another way of handing over this country by stealth to the third world. By denuding city centers of Whites through their benign neglect of the Group Areas statutes, the government has precipitated the situation where White schools stand empty.

By refusing to increase nursing personnel salaries over the years, the government has depleted White staff at White hospitals who were replaced by non-White staff. This in turn caused many White patients to flee to private nursing homes, resulting in many empty beds in previously full White hospitals.

Mr Harry Schwarz, DP MP for Yeoville said at a recent Rotary International conference at Sun City that there was "no reason" why "unused" land should be denied to Blacks.

He said that a settled "Black agricultural community" could be created on unused land through the help of agricultural education and the cooperative use of machinery. How this would be done he didn't specify.

There will never be enough land in South Africa to satisfy Black demands, given their numbers and given the paucity of really fertile land in this country.

One has only to look at the Transkei and Ciskei to see what happens to land when it is overgrazed and underutilized agriculturally. Transkeians huddle in little settlements in tin shacks while nobody works the land. It is populated by goats and cattle; there is little measured or controlled farming, and in any case, the birth rate puts paid to any real progress in this respect.

Harare

In Harare, Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe stated last month that there was not enough land for Black farmers and his government would soon embark upon a "land acquisition" programme which would mean taking over White commercial farmland and giving it to "land-hungry people."

The government would also bring before Parliament legislation limiting the amount of land one could own. This will naturally affect the multi-nationals who have bought up land over the years in the erstwhile Rhodesia.

The question of land in terms of a political base is now being discussed all over Europe. Since time immemorial, a nation's political philosophy was always based on a territory to back that philosophy.

White South Africans are now seeing their land rights eroded as millions of third-worlders crowd their cities and residential areas.

According to the Urban Foundation's five-year study on population trends and their implications for the future, South Africa's population will double to 60 million in 19 years time. The Black metropolitan population will quadruple to 23.6 million during the same period.

It is time Whites in urban areas held a referendum stating unequivocally that they will also not hand over their properties to the third world.

What the farming referendum has done is pre-empt the ANC and it is time other sectors of the community used this voter veto to stop the government in its sell-out tracks.

*** CP Explains Opposition to Hospital Integration**

90AF0558B Pretoria *DIE PATRIOT* in English
13 Jul 90 p 2

[Text] The full integration of hospital services in South Africa [SA] was announced by State President F. W. de Klerk during his trip abroad this year.

To please overseas politicians in a futile bid to break the sanctions grip on this country, Mr de Klerk has exposed White South Africa to a third world hospital "service" which, on the face of it, portends a dangerous trend in SA medical services in the future.

A number of Kwa Zulu nurses, auxiliary health workers and school pupils and teachers have recently been identified as AIDS infected, it was revealed last week.

These nurses and health workers are handling patients on a daily basis; although Natal's representative of the AIDS Advisory Group, Prof Dennis Pudifin says these people pose no threat to patients because AIDS is transmitted "mainly by sexual intercourse", this is not strictly true.

A few months ago Patriot revealed details of a report sent to the British government by the Conservative Party's Social Affairs Committee which said that AIDS could be transmitted in a number of ways during ordinary social contact.

Question

The question now arises: with hospitals multiracial, Whites will now be exposed to AIDS in a number of ways which would not occur in White-run hospitals. AIDS patients are isolated in these hospitals, but third-world hospital services leave a lot to be desired and it is this standard which seems to be prevailing in provincial hospitals today.

Before 1988 AIDS occurred mainly among White homosexual men, but heterosexual cases are now being diagnosed at an alarming rate. Of these latter case, 91% are Black. Of the number of transmissions from mother to child, 100% are Black.

According to the May issue of the SA Medical Journal, there will be about 168,000 persons, mostly Black, testing HIV positive by the end of this year. By the end of next year, the figure will be nearly half a million.

The cost of treating a single AIDS patient in South Africa can range from [Rand] R8,000 to R100,000 according to the Johannesburg City Health Service which says that more than 40% of AIDS cases in South Africa are not reported.

The medical director of the insurance giant SANLAM estimates the cost of treating aids patients in South Africa could hit R9.5 billion in five years time.

Southern Life has established a special AIDS reserve which now totals R125 million.

Impact

The impact of these ever-growing numbers of AIDS carriers on the future of South Africa is chilling, particularly when viewed against the growth of the killer virus in countries bordering South Africa.

While trying to cover up its AIDS problem to protect its tourist industry, Zimbabwe has been forced to face up to a growing epidemic. Dr Stan Houston of the Zimbabwe School of Medicine says that AIDS is now the commonest form of death in the country's hospitals. And for the past three years, AIDS has been the commonest form of death in the country's paediatric hospitals.

In Zambia it is no better. The country will be "finished" if AIDS is not halted says the country's president Kenneth Kaunda. A senior Zambian diplomat in India, three Cabinet Ministers and Kaunda's fifth son have all died from AIDS.

Malawi, one of the biggest exporters of labor to South Africa, is said to have the highest percentage of HIV positive in Africa. Nearly 35% of all adults have AIDS or are carriers, and the doubling rate is now down to eight months.

Integrated hospitals could be the beginning of the end of South Africa's White population over the next two generations. The AIDS problem will see the decimation of whole populations in Africa over the next twenty years according to the World Health Organization.

Horror stories already abound about what is happening in South Africa's provincial hospitals which were once world acclaimed. Provincial hospitals were sued at least 60 times by patients last year for medical disasters ranging from:

- an intra-muscular injection causing gangrene;
- lost eyesight as a result of poor anaesthesia administration;
- a broken-off needle left in someone's breast;
- death after wrong medicine dosages;
- brain damage after cardiac arrest during a tonsil operation;
- amputation of both legs of a toddler after an incorrect diagnosis;
- the loss of both legs after poor post-operative care;
- second-degree burns caused by a warming pad.

While everyone recognizes that mistakes can be made, and that these mistakes can occur in the best-run first-world hospitals, South Africa is compounding its problems by introducing third-worlders into a profession which is not generic to Africa.

Perhaps it is time for a nation-wide petition on hospital services which would doubtless be just as successful as the farmers' land referendum.

* CP Reveals 'Secret' ANC Plans for Power

90AF0582B Pretoria *DIE PATRIOT* in English
20 Jul 90 p 2

[Article: "ANC Plans for Power; Secret Document Leaked to Patriot"]

[Text] The ANC [African National Congress] has drawn up plans to take over the country through "People's

Power"—the mobilisation of all Blacks through the use of existing organisations, the creation of cells and the well-known communist tactic of reporting to the hierarchy any rumours or resistance among "the people" to the ANC.

Leaked to PATRIOT, the "M-Plan" clearly states that the ANC/SACP/COSATU [South African Communist Party/Congress of South African Trade Unions] alliance has no intention of "sharing" power with what it terms the White minority racist regime.

While State President F. W. de Klerk and Constitutional Minister Dr. Gerrit Viljoen tell Whites that their future will be guaranteed under a Bill of Rights, the ANC alliance says no such thing.

Negotiations are seen as a foot in the door to a takeover. The ANC outlines clearly how all Blacks must be drawn into the struggle. No one must escape, from the lowest farm worker to women's organisations, burial societies, taverners' associations, taxi drivers, churches and traders.

Says the document: "The unbanning of the ANC/SACP and the release of Nelson Mandela has not only created a revolutionary mood and excitement; it has also created unprecedented space to mobilise and, more importantly, to organise our people. This space must be fully exploited."

"Creating organs of peoples' power is the only way of ensuring proper direction and of taking the offensive forward in a disciplined way. We have a rich organisational experience from '85/'86. Conditions exist for us to harness this experience to make a qualitative leap forward to a totally new situation, of a type extremely difficult for the (de Klerk) regime to reverse through the use of sham negotiations or other tactics."

Aim

The aim of the ANC alliance is to control the country through all existing organisations and new ones to be formed. With rigid control, they will have enough power when they get to the negotiating table to be able to demand political power from the NP [National Party]. They want a transfer of power, not a sharing of power.

The aim of the "M-Plan" is to coordinate a national call to the people to organise organs of mass "democracy" in every part of the country, urban and rural. Organisational guides will be created showing how these organs should be set up and will include guides for setting up street, village and shop steward committees, peoples courts and defence committees.

A programme of action follows which integrates these organs of "mass democracy" into a national political programme; a campaign for a Constituent Assembly will be popularised with the election of local organs of peoples' power consciously paving the way for this "democratic process".

Timetable

A timetable will provide for example "that in three months the rudimentary elements of mass organisation should be set up in every part of the country, and in six months, a national civic organisation is launched."

"Joint MDM/[Mass Democratic Movement]/ANC structures need to be involved at all levels" says the document. "The masses hold the key to change, and this organisation will lead to a situation of dual power which will put enormous pressure on the regime to see negotiations through to genuine elections. The alternative for the regime will be to face a scenario of insurrection."

"For us", says the ANC, "the path to either option is essentially the same."

What the ANC alliance is saying, in effect, is that if power is not attained by the government caving in during the negotiation process, the armed struggle will continue until power is taken.

COSATU

In another document entitled "Assessment of the Current Situation", it is clear that political power is on the agenda. The ANC talks of the takeover by "democratic forces" of "Bantustan" governments, and of the "hegemony" they have achieved in the homelands.

COSATU is revealed as the most organised component of the liberation struggle and that COSATU's aim is to build working class politics and leadership way beyond the factory floor.

The document states that the ANC is the representative of the "vast majority of people in South Africa".

A "National Civic" will be built where power will be decentralised to the lowest level of organisation. "Marshalling and roadblocks during times of crisis must be under disciplined political command with clear procedures and coordination says the document.

COSATU is encouraged to get its million members to join the ANC. Says the document: "We will remain convinced that socialism is morally, politically and economically better than capitalism."

And finally: "Our overall task is to build the unity of our people, township residents and hostel dwellers, unemployed and employed, Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho. Our struggle is to build one nation. Any action that fuels divisions must be stamped out immediately."

* CP Condemns UN Praise of De Klerk

90AF0584B Pretoria *DIE PATRIOT* in English
27 Jul 90 p 1

[Article: "UN Praise of De Klerk the Kiss of Death"]

[Text] Given the United Nations' record of anti-South African invective and punitive action over the past thirty

years, it is clear from the recent kudos heaped on SA's State President that he must be now doing what the United Nations has been trying to accomplish for years: hand the country over to Black Marxist rule.

A report to the United Nations on South Africa was drafted by UN Under Secretary-General Abby Farrah after a "fact-finding" mission to South Africa earlier this year.

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar praised President de Klerk's "bold and courageous" reforms and said he was greatly encouraged by events in South Africa this year.

Foreign Minister Mr Pik Botha said he hoped the UN Assembly would "acknowledge its responsibility to refrain from any action that might harden attitudes and polarise positions."

Mr Botha and his government should never have allowed the United Nations into South Africa to compile their report. All the government has done is give the UN more ammunition with which to castigate this country and to wage further economic war against SA.

There will be absolutely no let-up in pressure despite the government's reforms and, given the UN's record of hatred of White South Africa, it is obvious that they have now established a toehold into South Africa's affairs. UN comments imply that they will be "watching" Mr de Klerk for more encouraging signs of capitulation.

Enemy

The United Nations has been at the forefront of the onslaught against this country for more than thirty years. The real United Nations is nothing more than a Western-financed anti-Western cabal run from behind the scenes by the Soviet Union and dominated by scores of tin-pot basket cases calling themselves "non-aligned".

Dr Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former American Ambassador to the United Nations pointed out in 1984 that the domination ideology of the UN "is a version of a class war that has been developed by an adaptation of Marxist categories" regarding relations among member nations.

Today the majority of members (99 out of 158) form part of the so-called non-aligned bloc. The most active members of the bloc belong within the Soviet orbit. Cuba even presided over this bloc during the past few years until the presidency was transferred to Marxist Zimbabwe in 1987.

The Soviets themselves declare that they consider the "non-aligned" bloc to be an instrument of their international policy, and many countries adopt this fallacious title while they are actually hard-line Marxist.

Revolutionaries

The UN has granted more than R500 million over the last ten years to revolutionary movements, mostly

Marxist. These include SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] and the ANC [African National Congress]. UN "refugee camps" in Angola and Botswana were used as centers of armed training for the ANC and SWAPO.

The UN's record in Africa is notorious: in a blatant violation of its own charter, it sent troops to the Belgian Congo to support Patrice Lumumba against pro-Western secessionist Moise Tshombe.

UN troops committed innumerable atrocities, massacring defenceless civilians, clerics and even the wounded in hospitals.

Forty six civilian physicians from Elizabethville sent telegrams to the Pope, President Kennedy and other world figures imploring their intervention to bring an end to "the terrorist bombardment of hospitals and civil populations by the UN". (CHICAGO TRIBUNE Jan 20, 1963).

To no avail. The United Nations continued its programme of destabilisation of pro-Western leaders, and its systematic campaign of boycotts and sanctions against South Africa is well known.

It recognised the Marxist-dominated SWAPO as the only true representative of the peoples of SWA [South-West Africa], and aided and abetted SWAPO in its terror campaign against those peoples. More than 800 of South Africa's security personnel lost their lives fighting this UN-supported terrorist organisation.

Notwithstanding the fact that the nations of SWA twice voted in favour of continuing under South African tutelage, the United Nations rejected this, stating that the people were "politically not mature enough to make such an important decision."

Yet these same people were "politically mature" enough when SWAPO was foisted upon them by the United Nations.

Praise from the United Nations is something which should be shunned by any representative of fairness and justice in South Africa. That the government even allowed the organisation in is shameful: that Minister Pik Botha commented upon the report which the United Nations issued gave the world body the credibility it needs to continue to meddle in SA's internal affairs. With their foot in the door, it is possible that the United Nations now sees itself as playing a possible role in a future "transfer of power" to the Black majority.

* CP: Economy Used as 'Ethnic Battlefield'

90AF0558C Pretoria *DIE PATRIOT* in English
13 Jul 90 p 4

[Text] Mr Daan Nolte, CP [Conservative party] spokesman on Trade and Industry said in a statement last week that the nationwide stayaway and the concomitant disruption in the South African workplace was

allowing the Xhosas and the Zulus to misuse this country's economy as a battlefield in their inter-necine power struggle.

Said Nolte: "The State of Emergency had provided the means to act against ANC [African National Congress]/Xhosa-inspired economic sabotage. The estimated production loss of [Rand] R750 million must be retrieved from somewhere. This stayaway action is but one element of larger action which indicates the economic chaos awaiting South Africa".

These stayaways are successful because Black workers are intimidated to toe the ANC line. If the truth be told, 90% of workers would prefer not to strike; they are only interested in earning a living and educating their children.

The government is threatening to change the laws to make it easier to prove that intimidation has taken place. But the ANC's youth wing SAYCO [South African Youth Congress] has threatened further mass action if the government even tries to tinker with the laws. Not only does the ANC intimidate workers: it intimidates the government as well and no bets are being placed as to who will win this round.

With negotiations "at a delicate stage", the Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok will encounter heavy going from his cabinet colleagues if he tries to stop the ANC's untrammelled surge to control over Black South Africa.

In Soweto Putco buses were stoned as they tried to convey passengers to work. Limpet mines exploded at Kathlehong on the East Rand and in Dube, Soweto; in Soweto, the stayaway was almost 100% successful. People feared for their lives if they went to work. Youths barricaded the streets, and taxis took different routes on emergency trips to Johannesburg for fear of reprisal. A Soweto mob set fire to a passenger train, causing disruption to rail traffic. Similar problems were reported throughout the country.

Production

Strike and stayaway action has cost South Africa nearly 1.2 million man days in lost production in 1990 alone, treble the amount of days lost last year. There has been a dramatic increase in man days lost in the public sector. A labor report recently released by consultants Levy, Piron and Associates said that the public sector lost-man-days figure jumped from only 0.4% of the total in 1989 to 46.2% during the first half of 1990.

Around 3 million workers stayed away on July 2. This resulted in R750 million in lost production. Many companies had to close down including, ironically, Mercedes Benz in East London, the company which allowed its workers to work "overtime" in order to manufacture a special luxury car for Nelson Mandela.

It is clear that the ANC is out to establish absolute control, and that the government is powerless to stop this march to power.

In a document given to Patriot entitled "Revolutionary Theory and Practice in a Post Victory Situation" and believed to originate from sources within a Marxist advisory group counseling the ANC, the steps to total power are clearly enunciated.

After achieving power, says the document, a revolutionary party is at its weakest. It must consolidate that power as quickly as possible during its metamorphosis from a cell-based organization to an open control body. It must protect itself from counter-action by those who have discerned the revolutionaries' true aims by reassuring these forces with promises of cooperation and reconciliation.

"This should sufficiently still the uncertainties of the majority of anti-revolutionary elements to enable the revolutionary powers to take over all facets of the state-the army, the police, the civil service and the media."

"The final phase is the total control of the population. All "reactionaries" will be eliminated and this elimination must be seen to be done in order to dampen any further dissent. This action is accomplished by public trials and executions.

The document continues: "A revolutionary party which seeks to merely build on the old is digging its own grave. Preservation of the old forms and functions will merely serve to preserve the bourgeois and reactionary ideas which created them."

"Thus it is of no concern to the victorious revolutionary if the existing economic infrastructure is destroyed through lack of investment or the flight of capitalists. This could be beneficial. It would enable the total reconstruction of society, from its base up. The people would be totally part of the revolutionary spirit for there would be nothing else with which to identify."

Maybe Nelson Mandela sees himself wearing Savile Row suits and driving a Mercedes Benz in the new South Africa, but many of his cadres have other ideas. If they have their way, even those naive liberals who believe they will be "left alone" to make their money will wake up with a shock. It will be then, alas, too late.

* CP Criticizes Blood Transfusion Desegregation
90AF0575A Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English
26 Jul 90 p 10

[Text] The Conservative Party [CP] has strongly criticised the opening of hospitals to all races and a more recent announcement by the SA [South African] Blood Transfusion Service that no racial distinction was made between the blood of donors given to any recipient.

The CP's chief spokesman for National Health and Population Development, Dr W.J. Snyman, said in a statement yesterday this practice created "extreme danger" that recipients of blood and blood products could contract AIDS.

"It is true that all blood is thoroughly tested for the virus but there is an inherent danger that a so-called epidemiological window exists, which means that the time that lapses between when the disease is contracted and when laboratory tests prove positive can vary from a few weeks to three years and even longer.

"The danger therefore exists that negatively tested blood can indeed transfer the disease."

Dr Snyman said it was also true that this means of contracting AIDS was responsible for only 8.3 percent of cases, but when a well-known virologist predicted that 500,000 cases of the disease could be expected in South Africa next year, this percentage could be expected to increase considerably.

He said a pathologist whose name could not be mentioned for ethical reasons alleged the incidence of AIDS had increased within five months from one in every 600 to one in every 200 of cases tested. At the Natal Blood Transfusion Service, the number of positive cases tested was one out of 116.

"It will therefore be irresponsible for South African health authorities to, irrespective of people, distribute blood and blood products or allow them to be distributed to unwitting recipients who would be in danger of contracting this feared disease in this manner," Dr Snyman said.

The Highveld Blood Transfusion Service's (HBTS) policy was not to practice racial discrimination either with regard to its donor population or the allocation of blood to patients, according to a statement by the South African Institute for Medical Research yesterday.

All internationally recommended laboratory procedures were also applied to blood products in order to ensure acceptably safe blood to patients.

"These include tests for infection with either of the two strains of the AIDS virus, carried out individually on each donated blood unit as part of a battery of tests designed to exclude contamination with the infectious agents recognised as blood transfusion risks, including the hepatitis B virus."

The "window period," when in rare instances blood may be infected with the AIDS virus before the antibodies were detectable, was a cause of concern to all blood transfusion services and was receiving continuous attention throughout the world.

* Mayekiso Discusses Membership in SACP

90AF0584A Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION*
in English 3-9 Aug 90 p 5

[Interview with Moses Mayekiso: "Leading Labour and the Party"]

[Text] After 40 years as an underground political party, the South African Communist Party (SACP) launched itself as an above-board mass organisation last weekend and announced its internal leadership.

Among these leaders were four senior trade unionists, Moses Mayekiso, general secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers, the union's president, John Gomomo, COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] first vice-president and president of the Food and Allied Workers' Union, Chris Dlamini, and COSATU assistant general secretary Sydney Mufamadi.

This has raised a number of important questions, mainly over the joint leadership roles of these leaders in the Party and the labour movement. Their appointment comes at a time when there is increasingly a tendency to keep structures of political parties and trade unions distinct and separate.

NEW NATION spoke to Mayekiso, who first entered the labour movement in the 1970's while a labourer at Toyota, about some of these issues and how he came to join the Party.

Mayekiso was dismissed following a strike and soon after joined the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) as an organiser. He has been credited with playing a crucial role in establishing one of the first shop steward's councils.

He was elected regional secretary of MAWU in 1982 and, soon after, general secretary.

Mayekiso is also president of the Alexandria Civil Organisation.

[NEW NATION] When did you join the Party?

[Mayekiso] I don't think the date is important. I can, however, say that I have been a Party member for a long time.

[NEW NATION] What attracted you to the Party?

[Mayekiso] I read about the Party through my trade union work. I also read about the ANC [African National Congress] and the alliances with SACTU [South African Congress of Trade Unions] and the SACP. I also learnt about the Party by meeting Party people when going outside the country.

I think it was also through influences in the trade union movement, influences in the community and meeting the Party leadership inside and outside South Africa, that I learnt about the Party. Through this process, I became convinced that the Party was my home.

I also realised during this time that there was a need for a strong worker organisation to be able to fight for the working class and deliver working class liberation, which, at the end, is socialism. And, for this, you need a strong party.

Working in community organisations, I realised that the Party had a following. It also had a following in the ranks of the workers.

[NEW NATION] How did you finally join up?

[Mayekiso] I was recruited, but I was already having ideas about joining when I was approached.

[NEW NATION] In Eastern Europe, where trade unions were effectively made transmission belts of the Party, moves have been made to entrench the independence of the labour movement. Do you see your appointment to the ILG [Interim Leadership Group?] as a move in the opposite direction?

[Mayekiso] I also believe in the independence of the trade union movement—Independent from the political party.

I don't see a contradiction—I don't see my position compromising the independence of the trade union.

This is because you join the Party as an individual, and you are bound by the policies and constitution of that organisation as an individual.

You work in that organisation, in this case the Party, as an individual. But, in the trade union movement, you are controlled by the trade union's constitution and its policies. Whenever you are doing your trade union work, you must be controlled, you must be led, by workers. What is important is the control of the workers.

The structures of the political party must be kept distinct from that of the trade union. These distinct structures will align themselves in a discipline fashion, over issues, over programmes and campaigns.

The main point I am raising is that there are policies in the union that have to guide my trade union work, and there are policies in the Party that have to guide my political work.

But I'm not saying that in the trade union, there is no political work. If that political work is a result of a decision by the union, then I have to be bound by the trade union approach.

First and foremost, anyway, I am a trade unionist.

[NEW NATION] In the short term, there is unlikely to be any contradiction in the positions of the Party and COSATU. But can there be guarantees that this will not happen in the long term?

[Mayekiso] In the long term that may happen because the trade union movement has its own structure, and therefore its own policies and approaches to campaigns.

This is also true of the Party. So there will be issues where we don't see eye-to-eye.

[NEW NATION] If that happens, how will you conduct yourself?

[Mayekiso] What happens depends on how the issue is canvassed and who is reasonable and who is not in the situation where there is conflict. At that stage, you make a decision based on what you think is right.

Also, I have to take into account who I am representing in the alliance. Assuming I went to the alliance representing the union, then I'll be bound by the trade union approach.

Let's take the living wage campaign. I am sent as a representative of COSATU to the alliance, I'm given a mandate, then the mandate becomes very important here.

I must be guided by the mandate, even if it does not go along with me as a Party member—the majority decision of the trade union movement must bind me.

If it happens that I am sent on a Party mandate, then I must carry out the Party instruction, even if I believe that the Party is wrong and the trade union movement is right. I think the mandate becomes the deciding factor.

[NEW NATION] In practical terms, how do you ensure that members respect mandates from their respective constituencies?

[Mayekiso] I think there are constitutions and policies that guide you on how to carry out a mandate. That could in itself serve as a code of conduct.

[NEW NATION] What mechanisms, if any, do you think have to be put in place to ensure that leaders holding positions in both Party and union structures, do not betray their mandates and use their positions to advance one or the other position at the expense of either structure?

[Mayekiso] That is an issue that people are worried about—namely that the Party can use the trade union movement and the trade union can use the Party. My approach to that is—if you have no structures and no policies, then you can be easily used.

But, if you have clear policies and strong leadership, it is not easy to be used. It is a natural thing for the trade union movement to try and convince the party—but, in the end, it is important that the right line prevails.

As long as there is no coercion, to say, that you have to follow the Party line—like it or not—as long as the democratic process holds. Because we cannot avoid the Party. The Party will be next to the trade union movement—because workers believe that the Party is our organisation.

[NEW NATION] What do you see as your role in the Party?

[Mayekiso] This is a new role and I see my task as organising people into the Party and helping in shaping Party structures, policies and constitution, and to help in the campaigns and in recruiting and educating people. This is not very far from the trade union role.

But, as I said, first and foremost, I am a trade unionist.

[NEW NATION] As we understand it, the issue as to whether leadership figures in unions should participate as leaders in the Party has not yet been resolved in COSATU. Do you therefore see your appointment as being subject to a final decision on this issue, and what are the issues being debated?

[Mayekiso] My position is temporary, it is interim. There will be an elected leadership next July. So the elections will decide.

Secondly, the question of cross-leadership is still under discussion. But I don't know if that discussion is going to succeed.

I see a situation where, if you talk of the leadership, there will be regional leadership, local and national leadership. People are going to be elected into these positions. And there are areas, whether you like it or not, where people will demand that you serve in a certain position. How do you get around this? I think we are going to encounter problems.

Also, if we say that the influence in the Party must come from the organised workers, then the most experienced are the organised workers. If they want to lead the working class, they have to make sure that there is participatory leadership. We can't just say we are going to shout at the Party that COSATU says this or that.

But it will be wrong for the whole leadership of COSATU to be swallowed into the leadership of the Party.

Maybe that must be discussed—that some people can participate but some cannot. And, also, how should they participate?

Maybe we will say it is wrong for Jay Naidoo to be general secretary of COSATU and also general secretary or president of the Party, otherwise we will be in controlling positions. But, with membership of the executive, I don't see many problems.

It has not created problems for the ANC and the Party. The alliance has not weakened the ANC nor the Party.

[NEW NATION] What contribution do you, as a leading figure in the trade union movement, see yourself making as a member of the Party leadership?

[Mayekiso] I think my role and that of people like Chris Dlamini will be informed by our role in building the trade union movement, our role in building the democratic structures in the trade union movement, our role in building the civic structures through the democratic structures, the street and area committees, the shop

stewards councils—all these are structures aimed at encouraging accountability of the leadership of that organisation to their constituencies.

We are not going to leave that tradition. We have to put that tradition into the Party if we are going to succeed in building what the Party wants to build—disciplined organisation and a leadership of high calibre—because that is built through the struggle, through the democratic and accountable structures. You can't expect the leadership to be accountable if there are no structures. Given our experience in building these structures, we can contribute a lot.

[NEW NATION] Do you think your appointment to the Party leadership will facilitate representation of organised workers' aspirations at a political level, for example at the level of the constituent assembly?

[Mayekiso] I think, in choosing us for these positions, the aim was to ensure that this structure should not lose that important link with the workers.

So, therefore, we have to, whether we like it or not, put the position of what the workers expect the Party to do, to represent the workers' interests, hopes and aspirations. So yes, that will happen automatically.

But we are not going there to represent COSATU or organised workers. But, as COSATU people, as trade unionists, we know what workers expect of their party. We will share those ideas with the Party leadership. In that way we will have an influence in the Party.

Also, through the alliance, through structured meetings where we discuss issues with the Party, with the alliance as a whole—this is the most concrete level, where people go there with mandates.

* SACP Sets Up Key Regional Groups

90AF0582F Johannesburg *THE WEEKLY MAIL*
in English 3-5 Aug 90 p 9

[Article by Gavin Evans: "SACP Unveils Its Plan for Branches Across the Country"]

[Text] The central committee of the South African Communist Party [SACP] yesterday announced that it has appointed a secretariat, a PWV-based [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging Industrial Area] working group and that internal leadership groups (ILGs) will be appointed in six regions around the country.

Its new interim structure will exist until the SACP's next congress, which takes place on its 70th anniversary on July 29, 1991.

The Party's general secretary, Joe Slovo, has said that underground formations would remain in place for the time being, but that branches would be set up in each of the regions with open membership.

This means, in effect, that the underground and above ground structures will exist side by side until next year's

congress when a new central committee will be elected and a new programme drawn up. By then it is believed that there will be no underground members.

Over the next year, the central committee announced, the ILG will meet at least once every two months, while in the interim working group, composed of members based in the PWV area, will meet every fortnight. In addition, a secretariat has been appointed to see to the running of the Party's headquarters in Sauer Street in central Johannesburg. It is housed in the same building as the African National Congress' [ANC] national head office.

Regional ILGs will be set up in the PWV area, Natal, the Eastern Cape, Border region and the Western Cape, and these will be responsible for setting up branches.

According to a central committee statement, "special attention shall be paid to ensuring a proper and adequate representation of women at all levels". At present the 22-person internal leadership group includes only two women—Ray Alexander and Cheryl Carolus.

The ILG meeting on Tuesday stressed "that we seek a membership which actively participates in the work of the SACP, its allies, ANC and COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] and the broad democratic formations".

"Already we have received thousands of applications for membership of the Party. These are receiving our urgent attention," the statement said.

Until next year's congress, the highest structure of the Party remains the central committee which was elected at the Party's last congress, held in Cuba last May. According to the SACP journal *UMSEBENZI*, this included representatives both from the internal underground and from exiled units.

The 1989 SACP constitution states that the congress is the highest authority of the party, and must be called at least once every five years. It elects the general secretary, chairman and 18 other members of the central committee, which may then appoint a further five candidate members.

Since the 1989 congress, the SACP's internal leadership group chairman, Raymond Mhlaba, and ANC National Executive Committee member Govan Mbeki, have been appointed to the central committee.

* Possibility of Relations With USSR Explored

90AF0473A Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 13 Jul 90 p 41

[Article by Eddie Botha]

[Text] Two top-ranking Foreign Affairs Department officials conducted secret high-level talks recently with Moscow. The possibility of establishing official diplomatic links with the Soviet Union was discussed.

Foreign Affairs Director-General Neil van Heerden and deputy Herbert Beukes have just returned from the Soviet Union after making a stopover in Moscow during a trip to Japan.

The FM [FINANCIAL MAIL] learns from a reliable Soviet diplomatic source that Van Heerden and Beukes had discussions with their Soviet counterparts on the opening of an SA [South African] "interest office" in Moscow. It would operate on the same basis as the American presence in Cuba—not formal diplomatic ties, but ties nonetheless.

In theory it means that Pretoria would be represented by a friendly and neutral country in the Soviet capital. In practice, however, the South Africans would have their own building manned by their own diplomats. The only restriction would be that SA's name would not be seen from the outside of the building and the SA flag not be flown.

The possibility of a Soviet interest office in SA has also been discussed.

According to diplomatic sources, Van Heerden's and Beukes's visit to Moscow was initiated on a previous visit to Havana by Van Heerden during a meeting of the Namibian monitoring commission. It was suggested to Van Heerden that he should visit the USSR.

In December the FM reported that Foreign Minister Pik Botha would visit Hungary ("Current Affairs" 22 December). Botha's trip—a closely guarded secret at that stage—took place in January. It was followed by a highly successful visit by Trade & Industry Minister Kent Durr to Poland.

The thawing of relations between SA and the Soviet Union has been evident in the number of visiting Soviet journalists to this country. A frequent visitor to SA has been Boris Piliatskine, the southern and eastern African correspondent of *IZVESTIA*. Diplomats were last year convinced that the Soviets were keen to place a permanent correspondent of *PRAVDA*, the State-controlled mouthpiece, in SA.

This week it was reported that SA and Czechoslovakia may establish formal diplomatic ties this year.

A Foreign Affairs spokesman confirms that a senior departmental official is due to visit several East Bloc countries this month to assess the possibility of establishing formal diplomatic ties.

Stellenbosch Sovietologist Philip Nel says the Van Heerden-Beukes visit is news to him but it confirms a trend of interaction that has taken place between SA and the Soviet Union. "There has been a constant traffic of Soviet journalists visiting SA and in talks with them all have lauded the policies of F.W. de Klerk," he says. "However, they claim that internal problems in the Soviet Union restrict diplomatic initiatives coming from Moscow. SA should play the leading role, they say."

In June Nel had talks with the second in charge of NOVOSTI, an information distributing magazine, in SA and he was "very keen to open an office in Johannesburg."

Nel adds that the present trend fits the pattern which the Soviet Union has followed with South Korea and Israel. "When people opened their eyes the Soviets had a presence in those countries. Visits by journalists and those like Neil van Heerden's may be the forerunner of diplomatic ties."

* Unions Urged To Face Economic Realities

90AFC582G Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 27 Jul 90 p 21

[Editorial: "Investment and the Unions; Measuring Reality"]

[Text] The trades union movement here, partly as a result of the rapid process of political reform, has had its brush-up and is riding a wave of euphoria. It is becoming increasingly braggart in its claims and irrational in what it believes its future role should be in a more egalitarian society.

The danger for it is that it might not appear to have noticed the pit into which it could quite easily stumble. The acid test in the years immediately ahead is not going to be whether it has achieved high percentage wage increases but whether most of the members it has now will still be in jobs and on its books.

From the way the movement is going, it may well find that the surge in membership of recent years is soon quite abruptly reversed. That certainly was the case in Britain during the Eighties when, after 30 years of trade union hegemony, public opinion rounded upon it. As the British economy first contracted and then—when wages and prices were stabilised—began to grow and restructure with a strong bias towards high technology and the provision of services, the unions lost more than 10m members.

What trades unions tend to forget—when they are demanding higher wages that are not economically justifiable—is that they are not enriching the people at large at the expense of the capitalists.

They are enriching themselves at the expense of the people.

Higher wages without productivity gains inevitably lead to fewer jobs. As lay-offs increase union membership decreases of its own volition. For trades unions traditionally have no interest in the unemployed—nor in the general state of economic wellbeing. And the more successful they are at achieving high wage settlements, the more they themselves represent a diminishing sectional interest.

Indeed, as one of this country's few internationally acclaimed economists, the late Prof Bill Hutt, used to

teach at UCT [University of Cape Town], the more unions use the intimidation of collective bargaining to raise wages, the more they inhibit economic growth or the size of the cake available for distribution. The result as market forces adjust over a period, is that their wage gains were illusory. So it can be argued that the more successful the unions are in the short run, the greater the seeds of their enfeeblement later on.

Over more than 10 years there has been a significant shift in real earnings here from whites to blacks. White real wage increases over that period have been below inflation whereas black wages have maintained their value. The consequences are already beginning to bite.

Last week the FM [FINANCIAL MAIL] reported some employment trends on coal mines that should send a cold chill down the spine of every union member. From 1984 to 1989 the skilled annual wage increases per man rose by 96.6 percent while those of unskilled men (mainly blacks) rose by 128 percent. But the number of unskilled miners dropped by 21.2 percent while skilled employment rose 4.5 percent and coal production rose 9.2 percent.

In terms of tons produced, unskilled productivity rose 38.2 percent while skilled productivity rose only 4.2 percent. The reason was that as wage costs climbed, collieries increasingly mechanised to contain costs.

This trend is prevalent throughout the manufacturing industry. Each week more companies report that profit growth is down as a result of disruptive labour action—that is strikes. See the report elsewhere on AECI [not reproduced].

What trade unionists will be very quick to point out is that, though corporate profits are down, they are still showing increases substantially above the rate of inflation. That is true but what they don't evidently understand, or want to, is that those profits do not accrue entirely to the benefit of shareholders.

Of course, dividends are paid from those profits. But they are generally not excessive and are determined by competitive forces. A company that pays dividends that are too high for too long will not be reinvesting in its own future. One that pays dividends that are too low simply will not get the capital it requires to grow.

In any event, workers through their pension funds (heavily subsidised by employers) benefit indirectly from those dividends as, in fact, they do from profits retained by enterprises to invest in the technologies, research and innovations they require to stay in business.

As leftwing-inclined economists like Joseph Schumpeter have pointed out, the amount of profits reinvested in a company is of increasing importance, if not critical, if the enterprise is to survive and grow in a world where technological advance has become terrifyingly rapid. Simply put, without that reinvestment, competitors who

have invested in the future will swamp the laggards. Jobs will be lost without new jobs being created in the enterprise in question.

There are times when wages should fall so that companies, particularly in the older industries and some of our gold mines, are able to contain costs and attempt a return to profitability. The alternative is eventual closure, perhaps staved off for a time by ill-advised State subsidies, and unemployment.

Others will claim that wages should not be allowed to fall below what is claimed to be the minimum level needed to support a family of four in a black township. What they don't say is that this level is determined usually by academic sociologists according to their own criteria. Reality is more often than not remote. As any accountant will explain, the determination of costs is the principal area of creative endeavour in his profession.

As unions increasingly face the reality of their own self-interest, they will hopefully come to realise that it is far better in the long run for them to foster enlightened employment practices in a competitive economy than attempt to use their collective strength to thwart economic reality.

* ANC Official on Role of Education

90AF0614B Cape Town NEW ERA in English
Jun/Jul/Aug 90 pp 19-21

[NEW ERA talks to Raymond Suttner about his new job as education officer of the ANC's interim Leadership Collective]

[Text] [NEW ERA] What role would political education play in building the mass ANC [African National Congress]?

[Suttner] I think that the character of political education since the unbanning of the ANC and SACP [South African Communist Party] has to change.

The UDF [United Democratic Front] was not a centralised organisation, and the scope of our education process was not very wide. We tended, particularly, to neglect the rural areas.

I'm very aware of the need to treat this job as a national job, and that means paying more attention to the rural areas and their special needs.

Also, because of the special needs of these areas, and some of the urban dwellers, we need qualitatively new forms of education.

We're investigating much greater use of cassettes and video—even ways of powering video through solar energy, for areas where there is no electricity.

We must also pay greater attention to literacy work. In the past we've treated literacy as something unconnected to our political activities. Now we are establishing quite a firm bond with literacy groups, because participation

in their activities will help us to get through to people who are not accessible in English.

When we have more full-time organisers, we might train some of them to go out into the rural areas and do literacy work.

Literacy must also be part of our strategy of empowering people. In building organisations, the fact that people have been illiterate has limited their ability to fully participate.

Literacy work is not only necessary to get our policies across—it is necessary to change the quality of people's lives. Up to now, we haven't generally been able to do this.

We don't have the capacity to dispense patronage like the collaborators do. The best we've done up till now, in some cases, is to reduce crime. I think bringing literacy to people will make a major impact.

We have to address problems in building the ANC. Up to now, the ANC has spoken to people essentially from stadiums. You cannot get real responses from a crowd of 100,000 people. The result has been that the masses have been inadequately involved in ANC activity.

This becomes especially problematic when we enter into difficult areas, like negotiation, where it is important to take the masses with us.

The whole process of branch and region formation, in my opinion, has not been sufficiently politicised. There has to be a clear political conception of what it means to be an ANC member, what it means to belong to a branch, what your duties are and what your rights are, how you should conduct yourself, and so on.

[NEW ERA] How should the question of negotiations be addressed within this process?

[Suttner] The key questions are how we involve the masses in negotiations, and how we strengthen our hand at the negotiation table by raising our demands in mass struggle.

We have not done enough to interpret documents like the Groote Shuur Minute. I don't think it self-evident to the average reader what that means in terms of the spirit behind it: that we are in the process of securing the release of all political prisoners, and the return of all exiles—the document does not say that as such.

We have not taken sufficient care always to ensure that the meaning that we give to it is communicated widely.

Even if that meaning was stated explicitly in the document, we would still have to fight for it. I think people need to understand that even if we say we believe that everyone will be released, that will be not only because of what's written in that document, or the work of the working group. It will be a result of people struggling to

ensure that it is given the meaning which we find most compatible with our goals, which means meeting all the demands.

[NEW ERA] In negotiations there's never going to be a situation where one side's view of ends or processes is going to be accepted absolutely. How can the political education process then prepare people for some of the situations which are going to arise? Rather than only interpreting what has happened, actually anticipating?

[Suttner] That raises the question of compromise. I think it's very important that political education should inform people that slogans like "long live the spirit of no compromise" are actually politically naive and unviable in the real world.

One does not set out to compromise, but we need to equip people with an understanding which enables them to evaluate when a compromise is necessary or essential, and how a particular compromise may lay the basis for further advance, or even when further advance is not possible where you may still be compelled to compromise because something worse may happen to your organisation if you do not compromise.

There's no such thing as a "spirit of no compromise" among people who are serious about politics. But we don't set out on negotiations with a view to compromising. We set about negotiations with a view to securing a package which meets our needs, absolutely, or as adequately as possible. The question of compromise falls within our view of strategy and tactics.

[NEW ERA] What about the question of policy. We're in transitional phase, and the ANC doesn't seem to have policies as such. It has the general principles enshrined in the Freedom Charter, and it has the Constitutional Guidelines, but as regards specific economic and social policies, those things are very underdeveloped. What level of attention should policy questions be receiving in branch-level ANC education?

[Suttner] While we appreciate the urgency of clarifying our views, we must do this in a way which is compatible with the democratic character of the ANC which we want to build. As regards things like the economy, there is definitely not an adequate and clear position.

It is also a strength that we are open, and willing to develop our policy.

[NEW ERA] How should people understand the ANC-SACP alliance? Some activists tend to collapse the two, and present the masses with the notion that support for the ANC means automatic support for the SACP as well. Could you comment?

[Suttner] People try to collapse what are distinct identities into a single identity. The Alliance is a unity of distinct groups—the ANC and SACP are distinct organisations, which express their policies partly independently of each other and partly in relationship to each other.

The ANC does not dominate the SACP in forming its policies, nor does the opposite happen. I think this is a relationship forged in struggle, and through a common evaluation of the results of that struggle.

Amongst the masses, both organisations are very popular. The SACP has a more specific policy, which will not be supported by the many people who do not believe in Marxism-Leninism. But it is our responsibility to ensure that the ANC is a home for all democrats.

[NEW ERA] Isn't there a danger of sectarianism in the education process?

[Suttner] One of the lessons we have learned in the 1980s, is that it's very important to remember the fundamental strategy of our movement, which is a mass-based strategy.

Not only must we be open to people who have different interpretations—if we are to learn from recent Soviet experience, we have to seek the cooperation of people who might previously have been dismissed ideologically.

We have to be broad. At the same time, we have to achieve a degree of ideological cohesion and common purpose.

[NEW ERA] How was what happened in the socialist world affected political education? To what extent does it challenge some of our concepts? What can we learn from Glasnost?

[Suttner] In the first place it is crucial that we don't try and collapse everything into political organisations, whether it be a party or the ANC. I'm a bit concerned by the way in which the UDF has been treated—people are helping it along in its demise.

In fact, the UDF still has a very important role to play, in that there are a number of organisations that are not purely political—civic structures and street structures comprise people with a variety of political views: these people have to be organised, not as a political grouping, but as people who are concerned about their community, crime and that sort of thing.

That lesson is not being adopted as yet.

The second one concerns glasnost. I think we've got to look very critically at our own political education tradition—the way in which we've come to our own understanding, the way in which people have learned about politics. I think we should be very critical about this, because as I see it, we have a very dogmatic tradition.

We do not take people through a process of understanding. Most debates relate to the origin of a particular view. If it can be traced back to some official publication of the ANC, or SACP, it is treated as being correct. The merits of the argument are not properly assessed.

Ultimately this really disarms people, because they have learned in a dogmatic way which does not involve intellectual creativity.

We must treat policy as a process, not as something static. I feel we are entitled to give a dynamic interpretation.

I don't think we have to stick rigidly to what has been stated up to now. I think we can take that policy a lot further, and this is part of our duty.

[NEW ERA] That necessitates far-reaching debate. On the one hand you speak of the need for a relatively uniform understanding and ideological cohesion. On the other hand there's a need for a wide range of views and interpretations to come forward. Is there an element of tension between those goals?

[Suttner] Yes, although a lot of our positions are fairly settled, I don't have a problem with debates being reopened because we constantly need to reevaluate our positions.

All our positions must be reevaluated from time to time. At certain points it becomes urgent that we do settle on a position. But not before we are clear, and we must be open to things we were not previously open to.

[NEW ERA] The economic debate would be a good example. The Freedom Charter says that mines, banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole. The ANC's new economic policy document talks of nationalising only enterprises that have been recently privatised by the regime, and setting up state-owned corporations in new sectors. Now I think that what the new document is saying, without spelling it out, is that on this aspect, the Charter's formulation is not appropriate at this point....

[Suttner] I think we have to be open to, and discuss, those sorts of interpretations. We mustn't disguise it.

If we are saying that the Freedom Charter is no longer adequate on certain questions, we must explain to people why this is, and move that way in a democratic manner, not just because specialists have come with that view.

We must first of all be open to that view ourselves, and then, if we diffuse it among the masses, and get them to respond.

You said earlier that the Constitutional Guidelines were our policy. In my view, the Guidelines have not been adequately discussed with the people, and they've got to respond to it properly.

The ANC has an urgent need to move away from the politics of rallies, to the politics of building the ANC as a mass-based formation, in a way which is simultaneously making gains at this time, and also building the new South Africa.

* ANC Official on Creating Mass Movement

90AF0614A Cape Town NEW ERA in English
Jun/Jul/Aug 90 pp 16-18

[NEW ERA discussion with Trevor Manuel of the ANC's Western Cape Interim Committee]

[Text] [NEW ERA] What are the challenges you face as the ANC [African National Congress] sets out to reconstruct itself as a legal mass movement?

[Manuel] The situation is not an easy one, because at this stage we have to merge various styles of work.

The methods of work that had been necessary in the underground and exile are qualitatively different from those that has been possible within the UDF [United Democratic Front] and MDM [Mass Democratic Movement].

Also, in any circumstances, the process of getting democracy underway is not always understood. If you take the UDF example, there had been a sense of agreement that a Front of that nature was necessary. The idea was tested. The call was made. Individuals were involved in the process.

Now, there's no way that that process could be called democratic. Only after the regional and national launches was it possible to define lines of accountability and establish a democratic process.

We have to look at the ANC in a similar light.

Building an organisation of individual members in a period such as this is a very new experience. When Nelson Mandela joined the ANC, he would have joined an established branch. So, even that layer of leadership wasn't part of the experience of trying to build the organisation from scratch as we are trying to do now.

But at the same time, we're able to draw on immense goodwill. Many people have worked in the interests of the ANC without ever having been members of the organisation as such.

They are not afforded an opportunity of being integrated into the movement's processes. Integrating them is a major challenge.

[NEW ERA] Could you outline the process of bringing the ANC's leadership structures home?

[Manuel] The present regional committees are interim structures—they are appointments in an attempt to try and get the ANC off the ground in the region.

Once the interim committees have built branches, there will be a conference in each region well before the 16 December national conference. I say well before because we need maximum preparations on the ground for that conference, and that can be effected only by democratically elected and mandated regional structures.

Those regions will also have to receive returning exiles, who will come in with a range of skills, and a range of different experiences. It's going to be difficult.

Some of them may have phenomenal skills which are unknown to the region, and therefore unrecognised. On the other hand, there may be tendency to revere people simply because they had been in exile, even if they do not have the same organisational strengths as activists who have been working on the ground.

Bringing those two forces together is going to be difficult in the initial period.

Building a broad movement will be a challenge for those of us who have tended to work in quite an activist style in branches and organisations that have been quite small.

I think in many instances that our activists are scared of venturing out. It is something we have to come to terms with.

We also have to accommodate a number of people who have been members of other political organisations who have now decided to join the ANC.

To realise our mass potential, we have to shake off some of the unhealthy aspects of activist life—like relating only to activists in a very narrow framework. The ANC is going to be big, it's going to be broad. There are people who want to join but not be as active as activists would be. These are things we have to come to terms with.

[NEW ERA] What is expected of ANC members in the immediate situation?

[Manuel] It would be required that people undergo a process of training. This would include familiarisation with the ANC Constitution, the Freedom Charter, and other ANC policy documents.

And, of course, there are areas where the ANC's policy is still not defined.

When we invite people to join the ANC we are in fact inviting them to become part of the policy-making of the ANC.

The ANC has an existing code of conduct that was adopted at Kabwe. We would see it as a primary task for the newly established branches to familiarise their members with that code of conduct, because the discipline of a unitary organisation will be more direct than that which operates in a broad front of affiliates.

[NEW ERA] What relationship does the ANC envisage with the UDF and other existing mass organisations?

[Manuel] There has been a decision by the UDF, strongly supported by the ANC, that some form of front coordinating mass organisations needs to remain in place.

The mass-based structures have made a phenomenal contribution to bringing us to the verge of realising our objectives. They also have a continuing role during transition and beyond. It is important that we retain an organic link with organisations that don't only comprise members of the ANC.

The coordination of the various mass-based structures will be the task of the Front. It is an important political task. However, the more up-front political positions of the UDF would be scaled down.

There can be no easy formula for defining the relationship between the two, but it is something that will be grappled with.

The bulk of the ANC core are part of mass-based structures. In light of the importance of mass organisation, ANC members should be deployed to build such organisations.

Civic organisations should not consist only of ANC members—they have to draw in a range of people. At the same time, we must unapologetically recruit within those organisations, to continue to build the branches.

[NEW ERA] You raise the issue of policy. The ANC surely faces difficult challenges in respect of political education. This is because the ANC doesn't really have policies—it has demands, and a programme of principles. Other than the Constitutional Guidelines, it doesn't seem to have policy in spheres like health, education or even the economy. Doesn't that situation demand something of a leap from the political culture that has prevailed up until now to get the ANC branches discussing policy issues rather than simply demands?

[Manuel] I think it takes a leap all over. In the politics of resistance, we could get by with a number of clichés and a lot [of] rhetoric. But the reality has to take some sort of form. What we have seen happening in respect of economic policy (the Harare summit between ANC and COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] economists) is certainly setting a trend in relations to other areas.

If we want to run local government, then we must define a housing policy. It cannot be idealistic. One often asks people these days: "How would you allocate houses?" and so on. There have to be hard and fast decisions.

If we want to manage parts of the economy, we must have people capable of doing it. That brings with it responsibility. At certain points we would have to explain to workers demanding better wages why it is impossible for them to receive those wages at that point. These are going to be the responsibilities that come with governing.

There are going to be critical choices facing us. The issue of policy-formulation is long overdue. It underlines the fact that we are seriously preparing to govern, and we have to take these challenges a lot more seriously than we have in the past.

People's expectations are very very high. They want an end to poverty and deprivation.

The very simplistic interpretation of the Charter, for instance, says to people that as soon as you've voted ANC, houses, security and comfort are yours. The land will be shared, and so on.

Now we are calling branches to participate in policy making. This is not to dilute mass expectations, but to take people through a process. To define, in concrete terms, what a housing policy is going to be. What a living wage is going to be. How these will be attained in a society such as ours. All of those become very fundamental tasks.

[NEW ERA] How is the ANC going to involve the membership of its branches in the negotiation process?

[Manuel] Until now, we have had perfunctory talks with the government. Even in the next stage, the working group has to deal with particular problems. A fair amount of homework has been done on both sides, and its a matter at this stage of putting positions, and trying to secure the maximum out of the process.

The real negotiations will start in preparation for the establishment of a transitional government, and even more importantly, the creation of a Constituent Assembly. Its going to be a lot easier in those stages to generate more participation. This is a situation which we welcome.

When we talk of ensuring the participation of the people in policy formulation which affects their lives, that is not unrelated, it is not a pipe-dream. Nor is it simply a means to keep people busy. That is the essence of the negotiating process.

At the same time, we emerged from the Groote Shuur talks with our strategies unchanged. The only way to force issues onto the agenda is to take them up in mass struggle.

De Klerk will not admit it, but Rina Venter's recent announcement opening hospitals is the fruit of the Defiance Campaign.

The lifting of restrictions on individuals was a product of the Defiance Campaign, taken up after the hunger strike which had made detention without trial too costly for the regime.

The ease with which an initial redefinition of a political prisoner is accepted—the Groote Shuur Minute refers to the Namibian experience, which is light years away from the way De Klerk defined political prisoners on 2 February was a product of the hunger strike on Robben Island and elsewhere.

The negotiating process must take on a mass character. The ongoing struggles of people must be intensified. Issues must be placed on the agenda.

An example would be the consumer boycott in Welkom, which has the fullest support of the ANC, and is led by members of the ANC. It is that kind of action which clearly shows that negotiation does not substitute for other forms of struggle—it merely extends our struggle.

For us, the next period must increasingly take on that form. When Mandela said that negotiation must not happen above the heads and behind the backs of the people, it is precisely that. You cannot put 7 million people around the table. But the agenda is determined by the prevailing circumstances, which in themselves are a product of struggle.

* NUMSA Officer Discusses Economic Challenges

90AF0614C Cape Town NEW ERA in English
Jun/Jul/Aug 90 pp 28-31

[NEW ERA interviews NUMSA [National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa] Education Officer Alec Erwin about the challenges ahead]

[Text] [NEW ERA] For years we haven't had to do more than speak in general terms about economic demands. Could you outline some of the more complex economic challenges we will face.

[Erwin] The Freedom Charter constitutes a set of demands, a statement of intent. There is a need now to set out a programme, where concrete policy proposals are integrated.

The obvious problems in our economy require a detailed programme to be worked out quickly. And that must go beyond the Freedom Charter which is really a statement of demands and principles.

[NEW ERA] Could you outline some of the challenges which go into translating the Freedom Charter's demands into an economic programme?

[Erwin] Our economy faces major problems—massive unemployment, low wages and low growth. Also deprivation in the form of housing and other forms of welfare and social services.

The Freedom Charter sets out the intention to try and deal with those problems. The challenge is to find policies which overcome them taking into account the structure of the present economy.

[NEW ERA] Some of the economists of big business argue that there's some difficulty combining the objectives of growth and redistribution. How would you respond?

[Erwin] All economic programmes are difficult, because there are competing demands within an economy. So, while not underestimating the difficulties and complexities of a programme, we are quite convinced that one can develop a programme that brings about economic growth through redistribution.

What we mean is that there would have to be a restructuring of production to reallocate income, employment and wealth. That redistribution would promote a new round of economic growth—a sustained economic growth path.

[NEW ERA] Would that restructuring be affected within the framework of a mixed economy, which would still see most production being privately owned?

[Erwin] We're talking about a transition programme, which is essentially a mixed economy. But the crucial aspect is that the state will play the leading role within the reconstruction—it would not be market forces that play that leading role.

[NEW ERA] What attitude should a future government take to both foreign and local capital? What should be expected of them in the mixed economy, and how should those expectations be pursued?

[Erwin] Let's distinguish for a moment between capital as a financial instrument, and capital as a class in the society in control of factories.

With regard to capital as a financial instrument, there is no doubt that the present capital market is badly distorted from the point of view of development and growth—measures will have to be taken to restructure that capital market to direct investment towards production.

With foreign capital as a financial instrument, the strong view is that we should not be dependent on foreign capital to carry out the reconstruction. Foreign capital, to the extent that comes in, should be to supplement local financial resources in financing reconstruction.

If we're looking at capital in the sense of the owners of the means of production, then I think an important distinction is being drawn between the conglomerates, which means a financial house which owns enterprises within a wide range of industries, as opposed to an enterprise in a particular industry.

The conglomerates pose special problems in South Africa, because of their massive power and concentration. Most of the researchers and delegates in Harare were convinced that the conglomerates in their present form are inimical to and equitable growth path in the future.

[NEW ERA] So you would still see the need for an economic programme which breaks up monopolies?

[Erwin] We're using the work conglomerate, because a big enterprise within one industry may or may not be efficient. What we're particularly concerned about are the conglomerates, where one finance house—Anglo American, for example—controls interests across a wide range of industries, and their major focus is the development of the conglomerate rather than the development of the productive capacity of each industry.

From our point of view in charting a growth path, we're much more concerned with the growth of productive capacity in each industry, and that's where the conglomerates pose a problem.

[NEW ERA] What sort of measures are possible in the framework of a mixed economy, both to direct investment from finance into production, and to break up the conglomerates?

[Erwin] Well, a range of measures are being recommended. They fall into three categories.

First, nationalisation and public ownership, where it would be essential for the state to retain control of the existing nationalised industries, and, if necessary, to renationalise certain privatised industries. And to seriously consider starting new state corporations in certain areas.

In doing that, the criteria must be the need to effect a policy instrument, rather than just to own the assets for the sake of owning them.

The stress should also be on effective and efficient operations in the state sector. The state would play a strong and active role in carefully defined sectors of the economy.

The second area would be legislation, such as anti-trust legislation.

The third area would be monetary and fiscal regulation of the economy.

[NEW ERA] Could we move onto the question of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, and the retreat by most of the socialist-oriented national democratic states. How does that effect your view on the prospects for socialism in South Africa?

[Erwin] It's a particular political system of socialism which has collapsed in Eastern Europe. That political system influenced the economy—particularly the centralised nature of the planning system in those economies.

The particular political system, with the over-emphasis on the Communist Parties as the only or dominant party in the economy and society—that that poses acute problems for democracy and the efficacy of the state.

It's quite clear that an over-centralised form of planning that does not allow for decentralisation and democratic participation poses particular problems, and would not be appropriate for the South African situation given our level of economic and political development, but that doesn't mean that socialism is not feasible (if by socialism we mean the effective socialisation and democratic control of the means of production).

Socialism, as a project, in Cosatu's view remains valid. What we are concerned with in the Harare discussions is the working mechanics of a transition economy, which

must lay in place certain key foundations for the future socialist society that we would like to achieve.

[NEW ERA] You've spoken about over-centralised planning—what would a more democratic system of planning involve, and in what combination with the market would it operate?

[Erwin] Decentralised planning would be less dependent on administrative measures to carry out the planning process. Economic incentives—and not necessarily incentives related to profit alone—would play more of a role in the planning process.

The other idea recommended from the Harare discussions is the mass organisations in civil society would play a much more important role in formulating and implementing the planning process.

[NEW ERA] Would that mean the same extent of planning as in the Soviet Union previously—planning the outputs and inputs of each industry—or would it be a more strategic planning of what sectors of the economy are being developed and so on.

[Erwin] It would not attempt to plan the exact inputs and outputs of each enterprise. That process had a place in the earlier phases of development in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, but the general view is that it would be most inappropriate to attempt that in South Africa.

So, the planning has the purpose of ensuring a coordinated and coherent approach to the problem of our economy, and it sets the conditions under which the state would act in the economy, within the planning process.

So, it is a planning process—we're not talking about the ad hoc piecemeal fiscal and monetary policies which characterise the capitalist mixed economies.

[NEW ERA] Is socialism an immediate prospect in South Africa? If not, how will conditions be created for its emergence, and what would be the objectives of the working class in a mixed economy?

[Erwin] You need to create the possibility for collective ownership as a basis for socialising the means of production over time. You have to create democratic processes to allow the working class to express its political power. And you have to develop an ability to consciously plan the development of the economy rather than be at the mercy of mechanical market forces.

Those are the three components necessary to lay the basis for a future socialist society.

[NEW ERA] Why would you say that socialism is not an immediate prospect in South Africa?

[Erwin] There are three things that make it difficult as an immediate prospect. The one is the massive structural

distortions of the economy, which make it extremely difficult to move rapidly to a socialisation of the means of production.

The second, and this is an important lesson from Eastern Europe, is that the socialisation of the means of production does not depend on state ownership alone. It resides in a political and economic process that integrates democratic political processes with economic processes. That must be a process—you can't step into it overnight.

And then the third factor is the balance of political forces. Obviously the stronger the working class and the mass organisations, the more rapid the process will be. If you're going to have a socialist society then the working class has to have effective political control. Again, the experience of Eastern Europe shows that you cannot legislate this into being—it's a complex process.

How long it takes will depend very much on the success of the economic reconstruction, and on the political power and consciousness of the working class.

[NEW ERA] The question of nationalisation has become a major focus of public debate. Could you comment on this issue, and point out the other policy issues which we should be discussing?

[Erwin] Nationalisation is a central, but not the only, component of economic reconstruction. The danger of focusing only on nationalisation, which is what capital would like us to do, is that it takes attention away from other vital areas of political and economic restructuring.

Nationalisation is therefore only a part of the reconstruction programme. It's an important one—if the state is going to play a leading role it must do so from the basis of its own publicly owned resources.

The purpose of nationalisation should be to implement a particular growth path, designed to meet the immediate problems of the economy. The purpose is not simply to put assets in public ownership.

[NEW ERA] Could you talk about the position of South Africa's economy internationally, and what development path it should follow in order to improve its position?

[Erwin] The experience of the last 30 or 40 years both in the socialist world, and in the capitalist and particularly the developing capitalist world, has shown that countries should be very careful before they isolate themselves from world markets.

And we've done that in South Africa. We've hidden behind import protection for a long long time. And now we find that there's a considerable disparity between our cost of production for a manufactured item and the costs of production for those same products on a world scale.

So, what we're going to have to do is carefully reintegrate ourselves into a world economy that is itself changing

rapidly, with the advent of a united Europe, the economic power of Japan and other economic blocs. The world economy is changing rapidly, and events in Eastern Europe make those changes even more dramatic.

So what's envisaged is a growth path which concentrates mainly on developing the domestic economy, but in a way which keeps us or makes us competitive in international markets.

[NEW ERA] Today in economic debates the issue of environment-friendly growth seems to enjoy more prominence. Why has this become an issue, and how might it affect the future of our own economy?

[Erwin] The lesson is very clear. If you grow without any regard to the environment you are simply inviting massive future costs to your society as you have to desperately try and clean up your environment which is a danger to people.

The growth path being discussed is one where environmental factors (even when that does involve some additional cost) are essential. It is worth spending that additional money now and saving it in the long-run, than saving on the cost of environmental sensitivity now and potentially ruin your economy later as you try and scramble to correct it.

And there is no doubt that the rapid growth in some of the socialist countries where too little regard was paid to environmental problems is a problem. And some of the developing capitalist countries are even worse examples of a situation where growth for the sake of profit without any regard for the environment has caused massive economic destruction.

[NEW ERA] The workers and youth who have been the backbone of the struggle have economic expectations that are perhaps unrealistic of the immediate post-apartheid period—do you see any problems associated with that?

[Erwin] It's quite understandable and almost correct that there should be a high level of expectations. What is essential is that there should be strong government which involves mass organisations in its planning process so that they can get an idea of what's involved.

We're going to have to have a government that's prepared to take on the economic reconstruction in a determined way. But as I have stressed earlier, an extremely central focus of this economic reconstruction must be the involvement of mass organisations, so that they can both educate and discuss and become involved in the process of planning. And it becomes a process that rank and file people feel that they're a part of rather than some central government and a few experts have drawn up, and they feel has been imposed on them.

That, of course is extremely dangerous in a situation of poverty and high expectations.

[NEW ERA] In that respect would you say that the level of policy discussions in the mass organisations thus far has been adequate?

[Erwin] No, it has been far behind, and that's a major problem. It's probably only in Cosatu that this has taken some serious nature at this point, and we have to change this quickly.

* Gerotek Vehicle Testing Facility Described

90AF0613D Johannesburg ARMED FORCES
in English Aug 90 p 37

[Article by Paul Diepenbroek BSc (Elec.) Eng: "Vehicle Testing—The Gateway to Africa"]

[Text] The assurance of safe and reliable transportation are prerequisites placed directly on the shoulders of the vehicle manufacturer in South Africa. These prerequisites, although most often legally or contractually enforced, are demanded by the user and the manufacturer's integrity and credibility are at stake. However, the endeavour towards this credibility may be shared with qualified testing authorities.

Adequacy, reliability and safety are ideally designed into the components comprising the vehicle and ultimately the vehicle itself. Degrees of failure after the vehicle has been put into operation, in the environment for which it is intended, range from annoyance to unacceptable.

Simulation of operation and predicted operating conditions, through the various stages of engineering design and development prior to and after production, is effective in detecting latent defects. Remedial action can be implemented in order to avoid failures, however, critical from being experienced in the field. Gerotek Vehicle Testing provides a complete test facility for the design audit of vehicles under typical African conditions. Essentially an open air laboratory, evaluation under controlled conditions ensures accurate and repeatable results, by an independent, objective and qualified authority, at the various system levels and phases of design.

Situated in the north of southern Africa, Gerotek's vehicle testing facility is exposed to the extremities of the African climate, in which daytime temperatures reach 38 degrees (Celsius). An altitude of 1450 meters above sea level and with snow-free winters, allows the testing of vehicles to be conducted under predominantly dry conditions, throughout the year. With these unique conditions, and facilities comparable with the best the world has to offer, available to the vehicles manufacturer locally, potential in a highly competitive international market is significantly enhanced. Further to the manufacturer abroad, a Gateway to Africa is opened.

The combination of test tracks comprising the facility allows the dynamic performance, endurance and sub-system interaction of vehicles to be assessed. Both

wheeled and tracked vehicles have been accommodated in the construction of this unique vehicle test facility.

A banked high speed, a smooth ride and handling as well as a rough track are used in the evaluation of wheeled vehicles on hard surfaces. A skid pan is used to determine handling under wet conditions. Gravel tracks are used to assess the off road ability of wheeled and tracked vehicles, whereas a straight track, including a side slope, is used for acceleration, braking and handling on hard surfaces. A suspension track includes various waved and corrugated surfaces. Other installations include gradients, steps, ditches and tilting platform as well as fording, sand and mud troughs.

Integrated subsystems, such as power and braking units, may also be evaluated at the facility using newly installed roller and braking dynamometers. The Environmental Test Facility of Gerotek complements Vehicle Testing's capabilities by simulating the typically harsh environment in which complete vehicle and vehicular subsystems are required to operate. Resilience to nominal as well as extreme temperature, humidity, vibration, shock, salt spray, ultraviolet and electromagnetic radiation is assessed. This simulation although practical could also be a theoretical analysis hence identifying problematic areas in electronic, electrical and mechanical components. Remedial guidelines are given in the event of components failures encountered or anticipated.

Gerotek Test Facilities supported the vehicle manufacturer by performing a design audit at any stage of development or during operating life. The integrity of this manufacturer or his esteem in the market is the ultimate reward, since the user has the prior knowledge that his safe and reliable motoring has been strived for and thereby assured.

* Rooikat Passes Performance Tests

90AF0613B Johannesburg ARMED FORCES
in English Aug 90 pp 15-17

[Text] A number of factors can be advanced that might have influenced the development of the Rooikat armoured fighting vehicle in addition to those already published and expressed.

It has been said that it is a replacement for the Eland (Panhard) series. It can also be said that an anti-tank missile is a replacement for a Boyes rifle, but the Rooikat is a completely different weapons system to the Eland that were incorporated in the South African Defence Force [SADF] almost 30 years ago.

At that time the South African Defence Force was desperately trying to re-equip after years of almost total neglect, with an Order of Battle consisting of poorly-trained Citizen Force elements, poorly equipped with World War II cast-off material.

Since that period South Africa has been able to develop a battle-worthy military force that has been created

within specific parameters that have been set, based on knowledge gained on the battleground.

These parameters have been formed in line with the SADFs philosophy of High Mobility Operations (HMO). This doctrine was employed in Angola and it would be reasonable to expect that one of the main thrusts in an application of the HMO philosophy would include the use of the policy of the pre-emptive strike. It is in this context that the development of the Rooikat should be seen.

While the potential operational threats in sub-Saharan Africa with space and a restricted and very poor communications network have required the development of a special type of vehicle. Self-sufficiency and an ability to traverse extremely difficult terrain are two important characteristics of the new vehicle; no doubt tactics that still play an important part in South African military thinking—a leftover from the Anglo-Boer War, when the Republican Commandos were able to play havoc with the British Army formations and the 'rear areas.' In the sub-Saharan context this new vehicle has the potential of playing the classic cavalry role of wasting the rear echelons and areas after the style of the Jeb Stuart in the American Civil War.

The Rooikat is unique in being a weapons system that has been developed to fill a role in a particular function in an accepted doctrine, rather than a doctrine that has been created to achieve maximum effect from available equipment.

The main gun of the Rooikat is the 76 mm system based on the OTO Melara that has been subjected to a long development programme and reports are that it is capable of defeating a T-62 from a frontal hit and a T-72 from the side. Insiders are of the opinion that these claims are of a conservative nature. While the manufacturers of the OTO Melara are reported to be at present engaged in an update of their system, estimates place the Rooikat's main gun system as some years in advance with a muzzle velocity in excess of 1,600 m/s.

The choice of the 76 mm ballistic system resulted from a total system engineering approach to the design of the Rooikat, based on the needs stipulated by the end-user. The stipulated requirement by the end-user is the most important aspect of the whole Rooikat system. It is a requirement that was not only decided by engineers, slide rules and computers, but by experience gained on the battlefield against Soviet armour and other weapons.

While the preliminary studies included a number of other main gun options, these were rejected for a number of reasons. As an example, the disadvantages of fitting a 105 mm to the Rooikat in its present form would have included:

1. System mass increase of 750 kg due to gun and ammunition.
2. Ammunition Stowage Reduction
76 mm: 48 rounds

105 mm: 36 rounds

This implies fewer engagements between replenishment.

3. Recoil length/force (mm/ton)

76 mm: 340/14

105 mm: 750/14—925/11

This implies larger turrets with smaller max. depression angle. (Larger turret implies larger target).

4. Lower rate of fire due to ammunition handling

76 mm: 9.8 kg (APFSDS)

105 mm: 18.9 kg (APDSDS)

5. Larger gun leaves less space for crew and poorer ergonomics.

6. Larger gun and turret inertia implies lower reaction time in traversing turret and elevating gun.

The option to fit a 105 mm to the existing vehicle is still there and will obviously receive careful consideration as development of the Rooikat follows the initial production run. But any decision to fit a larger main gun will have to be weighed against the performance achieved by the South African-designed and produced 76 mm APFSDS/T round, with its muzzle velocity in excess of 1,600 m/s. Perhaps the main characteristic of the Rooikat weapons system.

The Rooikat was not envisaged as a tank killer in a tank-versus-tank situation, but as a combat reconnaissance vehicle for use in a high mobility operational situation to fit in with the developing South African doctrine of mobile warfare. What was needed was a vehicle that was capable, while being able to give a good account of itself should it meet up with a MBT, of reaching and destroying logistical units and columns, Command and Control BQ's, Airfields and Air Defence Systems, artillery and APC's. The main threat against the Rooikat being seen as missile-equipped infantry, mines and 14.5 mm and 23 mm weapons.

With an operating range of 1,000 kilometers, the vehicle would cause havoc in rear areas with the main gun having an effective range of 12,000 meters against soft-skinned targets using the 76 mm HE/T round; a canister shot is also available in the 76 mm munition range.

While generally seen in the role of a reconnaissance vehicle, the Rooikat must be seen as part of the doctrine for which it was designed, High Mobility Operations. This doctrine includes the modes of either, or both, of High Intensity or High Mobility and as the numbers of vehicles entering service with the South African Defence Force increases various other roles will be tried, rejected or accepted. A mix of tanks, IFV Ratels and Rooikats is certain to be high on the list of priorities for future exercises at the Battle School.

Military observers will be watching the SADF/ARMSCOR [South African Defense Forces/Armaments Corporation of South Africa] team with interest for further announcements concerning a range of support vehicles for this long-range, high mobility cross-country vehicle. Logistical/Fuel, maintenance, recovery and ambulances, that will have the ability to act in support of the Rooikat must form part of this expected range of supporting vehicles.

Lessons learned during the Angolan conflict will influence future procurement plans. No doubt opinions will be varied and will be guided by the proposed possible employment of the Rooikat with consideration being given to such factors as to whether the employment of Ratel logistical vehicles would have eased the supply situation during the Angolan battles.

Integrated Fire Control System

The Integrated Fire Control System (IFCS) is an integrated computer-based Gun Control System (GCS) and Fire Control System (FCS) which provides an automatic fire control facility with fast reaction time and a high first-round hit capability. A gunner's sight, with integral laser rangefinder provides the target interface with the IFCS. Comprehensive built-in test (BITE) facilities are incorporated into the system.

Ballistic offsets are automatically computed and implemented when the laser rangefinder is triggered, to compensate for various factors affecting the ammunition ballistics. The offsets are implemented both at sight (electronic sight slaving) and the main weapon (auto lay), and a 'ready-to-fire' indication appears in the Gunner's field of view advising him to fire. The total reaction time from lastig to firing is typically less than 2 seconds.

The FCS provides automatic fire control by computing and implementing the ballistic offsets for the selected ammunition type, taking into account:

- a. Target range, which can be:
 - Automatic, from the laser rangefinder
 - Battlerange, for close battle conditions
 - Manually entered
- b. Target speed, automatically derived by tracking the target.
- c. manually entered environment data, comprising:
 - Air pressure (altitude)
 - Ambient temperature
 - Ammunition temperature
 - Headwind
- d. Crosswind speed; automatically sensed
- e. Weapon tilt (cant); automatically sensed
- f. Vehicle slope; manually entered
- g. Gun jump characteristics of the main weapon (manually entered)

Ammunition Family for the Rooikat

76 mm APFSDS/T Round

The 76 mm APFSDS/T is an armour-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot, kinetic-energy round. It consists of a subcalibre projectile in a sabotized shot assembly, together with a propellant charge in the brass cartridge case.

The projectile design includes a tungsten alloy penetrator nose windshield with penetrating blocks, tail fins for in-flight stability and a tracer.

76 mm HE/T Round

The 76 mm HE/T round is designed for use against personnel, soft-skinned vehicles, light armoured vehicles (up to 20 mm armour) and bunkers. The projectile is fitted with a point-detonating (PD) and selectable-delay fuze which provides a super-quick characteristic of 170 micro-seconds—or a delay action of between 30-70 msec.

Other Rounds

Other rounds which are available include 76 mm canister shot, a 76 mm practice round and a 76 mm smoke round.

* Inability To Stem Rising Violence Analyzed

90AF0606C Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 10 Aug 90 pp 26, 28

[Text] The temper of the times is violent—which is why so many hopes were this week focused on a successful outcome to the Pretoria talks. And indeed, the suspension of the ANC [African National Congress]’s armed struggle represents one less thing to worry about. Now the real concern must be whether ANC-Pretoria talks—which, up to now, have not and could not include Zulu leader Magosuthu Buthelezi—can take the peace process much further. By common cause, the rising level of violence has its roots in economic hardship and political rivalries. So even if two of the protagonists (however important) agree to agree, many others still feel left out.

The situation in Natal is particularly alarming.

The daily unrest report continues to log the carnage. In only one typical 24-hour period recently, four people—including three in Natal—died in politically motivated violence and 14 were injured. In the Cape, the homes of four black policemen were torched; private and police vehicles were stoned and damaged in townships near De Aar, Welkom, Pretoria, Westonaria, Wolmaransstad, Potchefstroom, Kraaifontein, Uitenhage, Balfour and Krugersdorp.

In the first 6 months of this year, political violence killed 1,591 people, according to the SA [South African] Institute of Race Relations. That compares with 1,403 for the whole of last year. Three-quarters of those deaths were in Natal.

Since January 1987, 4,067 people have died in Natal’s political unrest, according to official figures. Allegations of security force partiality persist but, in some ways paradoxically, there are also continued calls for intensified police and military action to stop the violence.

The ANC charges that Inkatha is exporting the violence to the Vaal Triangle. Inkatha denies that and makes charges of its own. Whatever the truth, factional killing of a political nature is making itself felt throughout the country. Most of the victims and aggressors are black.

But random, race-based terror—and of course crime—is also on the increase. A rightwing vigilante group claimed responsibility for bombing a bus terminus and injuring 26 people in Johannesburg recently and there have been mysterious murders of blacks by whites. There have also been attacks on whites by blacks—and not all in proximity to unrest areas. In Natal, the murder of a number of elderly whites has raised the spectre of Kenya’s Mau Mau, though the killings were probably a ghastly form of opportunism.

To what extent is such violence running to a political agenda, as opposed to being the product of essentially isolated extremists and criminals? As events of the past 2 weeks have shown, suspicion will quite rightly continue to focus on underground communist cadres with access to weapons, however much [of] the leadership disclaims traditional revolution as party policy except in the case of failed negotiations.

On the Right, the rhetoric is more lurid. The ultra-Right Boere Weerstandsbeweging says: “We Boers have fought many enemies and we are prepared to pay the supreme price for our Boer republics.” Who can doubt that they mean business? Boerestaat Party leader Robert van Tonder has vowed that “the Boers will not again make the mistake of forgiving their enemies after they gain control of the country.”

Desperation sinks in as traditional power slips away. “The ultra-Right is pretty desperate, hurt and angry about what is happening in SA,” says Lloyd Vogelman, director of the Project for the Study of Violence. “Because their feelings are extreme, they will rely on extreme measures. They have access to guns and training. They are extremely dangerous.”

From their point of view, F.W. de Klerk has sold out to communism, an official object of white fear and loathing for decades. And of course, this week’s “talks about talks” with the ANC included three delegates who hold SACP [South African Communist Party] membership cards.

"Part of the reason for the growth in rightwing violence is the fear that the NP [National Party] government has already de facto abdicated," says John Kane-Berman of the Institute of Race Relations.

Willie Breytenbach, head of African Studies at Stellenbosch, estimates that of 40 percent of whites who support the Conservative Party and organisations to the Right of it, "about 90 percent are fearful of what's going to happen and the other 10 percent are fearless. Whites are punch-drunk. Most of them have made up their minds that things are going to get worse."

De Klerk is well aware of the dangers on the Right—and the real showdown has yet to come. If he acts decisively, he will risk the stigma that always clung to Jan Smuts because he acted against brother Afrikaners.

It is also difficult to denounce utterly the rightwing for taking up arms for ideological purposes when you have been negotiating with people who have been waging an "armed struggle" for 30 years. Of course, the ANC's Walter Sisulu says the war waged by Umkhonto we Sizwe cannot be equated with rightwing violence "as all whites here have a vote and black people don't." And white extremists don't believe black people should ever have a vote, which is partly why they have taken to violence.

Violence is not neatly contained within political camps. What do black leaders make of a "constituency" that shows no signs of abandoning violence as a way of life? Black youths between the ages of 15 and 24 account for 90 percent of all township violence. According to the Inkatha Institute Unemployed young adults often take advantage of anarchy. Anger, frustration, poverty, illiteracy and the denial of basic rights have combined to create a generation that sometimes seems responsible to no one but itself.

"Violence is a demonstration of weakness, not a position of strength," says Andre du Pisani of the SA Institute for International Affairs Research. "Countries in political transition release political energy. Violence is a form of political theatre."

Political passions are inflamed. "The massive increase in black-on-black violence this year is a reflection of intolerance of conflicting viewpoints," Kane-Berman says.

It has proved easier for ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela to sit down with De Klerk than with Buthelezi. There is still no real explanation for this, though it is plainly a symbolic event that could do much to cool the anger of the opposing sides preparatory to addressing problems on the ground. The FM [FINANCIAL MAIL] has noted in the past that these problems lie in land hunger as much as ideological conflict.

Meanwhile, there is too great a tendency to avoid responsibility for what is happening in the townships and to distinguish it from the actions of the Right, including the

infamous—and theoretically defunct—Civil Cooperation Bureau [CCB]. Thus, ANC spokesman Patrick Lekota charges that the perpetrators of rightwing violence include "all those... who seek to arrest the advance toward a democratic order," and he singles out the CCB, the Wit Wolwe—and the Inkatha.

Leftwing violence, however, "should be seen as the organised and disciplined activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe," which is acceptable because it acts to bring about a "democratic and non racial political settlement."

Such sentiments do not help matters. A formal ceasefire is one thing, getting the message to undisciplined "troops" is another. What everyone agrees is that the killing and destruction must stop. Here De Klerk—with the police and military to back him up—needs to act firmly. His problem, as Kane-Berman points out, is that he "has to make it crystal clear that police behaviour outside the common law will not be tolerated."

One hopeful sign, therefore, has been the arrest of 10 rightwingers at the same time as action was taken against ANC members and communists for allegedly plotting a coup in the event of failed negotiations. This certainly sent a message that the police will not go easy on extremist whites or the ANC and SACP. But the next step is to charge or release—which means that arrests must be based on accurate information. The security apparatus provides no confidence that it is able to trust its informants, or that it is clear on its own political status.

Are the ministers acting appropriately in these circumstances?

"I am being accused of unnecessary detentions and premature releases by both the Left and the Right," says Law & Order Minister Adriaan Vlok. "So I am satisfied that we are acting impartially, in the interest of all South Africans." That isn't reassuring enough.

In Natal, where the State of Emergency is still in place, an increased number of Defense Force troops has helped bring down the temperature recently. Fatalities in Natal were down 26 percent in the second quarter of this year, compared with the first 3 months, according to Race Relations.

But while massive security operations can put out the worst flames—particularly if they have the cooperation and trust of local communities—there remains the question of what comes afterwards. The situation in Natal is instructive.

The total number of security force members assigned to Natal townships now stands at 9,182-4,559 SAP [South African Police] members, including local policeman and the Riot Unit, many of whom come from outside Natal, and 4,623 SADF [South African Defense Forces] members, including national servicemen, Permanent Force

members, volunteers (probably Permanent Force members who are not white), commandos and Citizen Force men on camps.

An uneasy alliance exists between residents, police and troops. Some of the forces say they begrudge being called in to separate people in what they see as a "black war" and resent being taken away from their families and careers. Residents make repeated allegations about some units' methods.

Groups that monitor unrest in Natal warn continually that the increased security force presence is only a temporary solution and that when the police and army move out, violence will rise again. No one was able to put a stop to a recent series of shocking attacks on farmers in the Richmond area mainly on elderly couples.

In addition, as Kane-Berman says, "it's a sorry state of affairs when the army has to be used in residential areas in your own country. Where the choice is between violence and anarchy on one hand and the use of troops, reluctantly I have to accept to use of troops. But you can't leave it up to the army. The solution has to be a political one."

And the solution also has to come through the courts. When law and order breaks down, both in the sense of political violence and of crime, residents seek their own solution. Every participant in the peace process—not just the leaders at this week's historic meeting—has a role to play, particularly at grassroots level, through local structures and local negotiation.

But home-grown initiatives need over-arching symbolic support and a stable framework of law and order. A start needs to be made in Natal—which means that Mandela and Buthelezi must meet soon. This would be a meeting as important as that concluded so successfully in Pretoria.

*** ANC Urged To Adopt Economic 'Pragmatism'**
90AF0606B Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 3 Aug 90 p 25

[Text] The political implications of the deal that De Beers has done with the Soviet Union are probably more far-reaching than the immediate business ones, which, as we explain elsewhere, are substantial. For most businessmen they will be salutary—and ironic—after the events of the past week, among which was the relaunching of the ANC [African National Congress] affiliate, the world's newest (and probably last) communist party.

Simply put, the Soviets have seen fit to borrow resources from and take advantage of the extraordinary marketing skills of the world's most enduring and arch-capitalist cartel, of which even the United States is wary. It is a deal that is complex and one in which, clearly, access to skills is as important as the lending of resources.

Yet here in SA [South Africa], the country in which De Beers and its Central Selling Organisation have their taproot, the ANC in which there are an unknown number of influential Marxists, is threatening the nationalisation of the mines and other large businesses in the name both of equity and the acquisition of power.

It would be interesting to speculate whether, if in the next few years the ANC were to have its way with the government of this country, how the Soviets would feel about De Beers being nationalised. Our guess is that they would not be phlegmatic about any ANC dilution of existing CSO [Central Statistical Office] skills and management resources.

Indeed, in view of events in middle and eastern Europe and The Soviet Union's own internal economic problems, which are much more severe than in its satellites, it could well be that Moscow itself would not be prepared to countenance the degree of nationalisation which the ANC and South African Communist Party [SACP] espouse as their policy at present.

So while the ANC's Nelson Mandela may be reaching for the economic starts, he will get the diamond mines only over the body of a supine Russian bear.

Moreover, the launching of the SA Community Party as an entity separate from the ANC, in the face of protestations that they are historic allies with what are perceived to be identical aims and aspirations, might also be interpreted as encouraging. It suggests that, at some stage in the future, their interests and policies might in certain circumstances diverge. After all, Mandela claims that the ANC is not a communist party, though it is hard at present to see much difference in their declared policies.

The difference could be, however, that the SACP remains dogmatically Marxist as a matter of principle, regardless of the obsolescence of this doctrine and its manifest failure wherever it has been tried.

The ANC, in contrast, wants to use nationalisation as a means of levelling the playing fields after 40 years of National Party rule that despoiled blacks of their property, family life, education, participation in the wealth creation of the economy and aspirations towards participation in real government. But it has also argued that if another way can be found to redistribute wealth, then it is prepared to reconsider nationalisation.

The ANC's opposition to privatisation appears to be grounded in a similar point of view—that it will be modified or removed if another form of wealth sharing, or its illusion, could be put forward with sufficient political conviction.

The FM [FINANCIAL MAIL] is persuaded to this interpretation as we find it hard to believe that the ANC leadership, having itself experienced the bureaucratic inertia of a bloated public service waving an apartheid rulebook—and seen the destruction collectivism has brought to parts of Europe and Africa—could seriously

contemplate the application of similar policies here and be naive enough to believe the outcome would be different.

We would not argue the same for the generality of its membership. The masses expect the ANC leadership to deliver what amount to reparations—and in quantity. They do not understand that nationalisation can provide only an illusion of wealth distribution and that collectivism does more to despoil an economy than enhance its capacity to provide the essentials of civilised existence. After an apartheid education, it is hardly surprising that they know not what they do.

The only way forward in those circumstances is patient and persistent leadership and unflinching intellectual integrity—both on the part of the ANC and government. This won't be helped either by the ANC's adherence to a policy of violence and economic bravado in the changed climate of this country, nor the National Party government's reluctance to use security forces to curb all violence—and its gullible acceptance of faulty security intelligence.

The deal between De Beers and the Soviets is an example of economic and political pragmatism—no doubt mothered by some necessity on both sides. Its spirit is worthy of emulation by the political and economic protagonists in this country.

Angola

* Moxico Official on Displaced Persons Situation

90AF0550A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 12 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Moxico Assistant Provincial Commissar Fernando Rosario, by Joao Pitra; date and place not given]

[Text] The social sector of the province is what has attracted the most attention of the local structures of the government, not only because of its complexity, but especially because innumerable difficulties are prevalent in that sector. Many of these problems are difficult to solve at the local level. In order to clarify certain matters, ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency] correspondent Joao Pitra interviewed the adjunct provincial commissar of Moxico for the social sector, Fernando Rosario.

[Pitra] Comrade commissar, we are aware of the fact that the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (HCR) has decided to suspend the repatriation of Angolan citizens coming from Zaire. Can you comment on this matter?

[Rosario] The repatriation process requires good advance organization. Thus, we have repatriated Angolans from Zaire during the first phase, which ran from 20 September of last year to 29 May of this year. Now it is urgent to create new conditions, both economic and social, to insure the beginning of a new phase of repatriation. This is what is occurring at this moment, the results of the experience that we have acquired. In a single word, conditions are being created for a new and sound accomplishment of the process.

[Pitra] How many citizens in those conditions have been repatriated so far?

[Rosario] One-eighth of the 40,000 Angolans in Zaire who have already shown their desire to return to the light of the policy of our party and government. Let it be remembered that there are many Angolans living outside the country who have already expressed their desire to return to the fatherland.

[Pitra] Another no less troublesome situation is related to the people who have been displaced by the war. Lately, we have been witnessing a somewhat dizzying increase in the number of displaced persons as a result of the actions of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] bandits in the rural areas. What are the measures that have already been tried by the local structures aimed at alleviating the suffering of those citizens?

[Rosario] Today, no one in the world is unaware, and even our enemies know, that UNITA has always driven people out of their houses, has massacred people, has laid waste to cities, and has destroyed things, without designating a specific objective. So much suffering by the people, so much hatred in those who have watched their

children being burned and everything else. We always build up when UNITA tears down, faced with the flight of the people from the areas that the enemy is affecting. Similar to what is happening in all of our country's provinces, we have been receiving the displaced persons who find themselves under those conditions, even with the current problems. You must understand that there are difficulties involved in serving the homeless people as we would like to do. But within the limits of what we have, we are giving assistance in basic necessities, such as clothing, food, medication, and other things. With this moral fortitude, we are writing our history, sharing what we have with everybody.

[Pitra] The problem of children at the level of this province is really troublesome, given the large number of homeless children. What measures do you envision to preserve their physical and psychic abilities?

[Rosario] This is a task for all of us. This is the reason for the special workdays which have been set aside for some time to devote to the repair of the orphanages. I cannot fail to mention the aid given by our Cuban comrades before their departure from this province, the help of the Bulgarian Embassy, the USSR, and the Worldwide Lutheran Federation, which, to a certain extent, has minimized the difficulties that we have in this area. There are children who have had their legs amputated, for whom, even under our current conditions, the craftsmen's association has made prostheses. We need to solve many problems in the orphanage, problems which range from transportation to medical assistance, bed linen and clothing. The number of orphaned children that the nursery has taken in is twice its capacity, and this is because of the lack of other facilities or even the ability to enlarge the current facilities. However, we have to solve our problems by ourselves, even though for that purpose the help of humanitarian organizations is indispensable.

[Pitra] Comrade commissar, can you make an evaluation of the activities that have been carried out up until now by the representatives of the Worldwide Lutheran Federation in this province?

[Rosario] The Worldwide Lutheran Federation, represented by Mr. Sifas Zou, was the first nongovernmental organization to come into this province, in 1989. It appraised our support projects for the assistance program for refugees and people who have been displaced by the war, and it immediately gambled on helping make our ideas take shape. Our ideas were aimed not just at repatriating and reintegrating, but, more basically, at understanding these concepts.

Currently this organization has already opened its offices in this province, making it possible for it to monitor the activities that it is directing closely. Among these activities, its support for the farming and cattle-raising organization stands out. A hospital is being built, a second-level school and three first-level schools are being built in

the camp for repatriated persons, and the local government has benefitted in this area from the aid that has come from two non-governmental organizations: the Worldwide Lutheran Federation and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (HCR). Our party and government recognize the aid that these organizations have given to make this great program feasible.

[Pitra] In the wings, people are already talking about staging the first edition of the people's festival in the city of Luena, which leads us to believe that it is probably an accomplished fact this year, because, according to the slang expression: "The voice of the people does not lie." When is this event expected to be held?

[Rosario] I should officially confirm the staging of the first people's festival. But instead of being for the city of Luena, it will be for the province, in spite of the difficulties that the citizens of the municipalities may have in getting to the capital city. The event will take place this coming September, but you must not forget the possibility that the enemy may attempt to sabotage the festival. We are prepared to respond to that threat. The people want life, peace and jobs. Let us fight for that.

The provincial committee for the event has already been set up, along with its corresponding subcommittees. In addition to the people of the province of Moxico, other people of note will be invited to attend the event. This is what is being done at the moment.

* Drought Continues To Affect Southern Provinces

90AF0550B Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 13 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by Leonel Kassama: "Drought: The Scourge Continues in the South of Angola"]

[Excerpt] The drought is now a cliche, just one more statistic, a matter that is never dwelt on at too great length by the mass media. The needs of the regional market (Huila, Cunene, Namibe, and Kuando-Kubando) in 1988-1989 were somewhere on the order of 100,000 tons for a population estimated at 1,339,000 inhabitants, with an annual consumption of 75 kilos per capita. With the drought, there has been a loss of nearly 60,000 tons of cereal. In Huila and in Cunene alone, 400,000 head of cattle have died of starvation.

Perhaps that in itself may not be so significant when compared with the 1,000 people who have succumbed in the face of this natural calamity.

In peaceful times, with the economy operating normally and under favorable weather conditions, the province of Huila has the ability to supply all the other provinces that make up the Southern Front with food, and maybe even some of the country's other provinces by making large cereal surpluses available.

But all attempts aimed at trying to achieve satisfactory production levels for an agricultural recovery have collided with the drought which reached levels in 1988 and 1989 that have never been seen before, drastically affecting the production of cereal in the southern part of the country, on the order of 75 percent.

The present agricultural season does not offer very encouraging prospects, because the situation has remained constant. The rains have been unpredictable (they normally begin here in January), creating food needs.

Agricultural sources say that little more than 25,000 tons will enter the marketing cycle this year, which will result in a deficit of 60,000 tons. It is a picture that gives a good view of the gravity of the situation for the times that lie ahead.

According to available data, the region has 3.5 million head of cattle. A drastic reduction in this number has been recorded due to starvation.

It has already been said several times that it is important to revitalize the marketing process in the countryside, if possible, by increasing the ceiling for the acquisition of goods destined for bartering with the traditional growers.

It is a paradox that we should have to fall back on importing meat, when in the country cattle are dying by the hundreds of thousands. You have to see it to believe it. In Cunene, and even in Huila, among growers there is now a growing wave of border crossings into Namibia in order to barter there with various goods.

The case takes on some complexity. Families live on both sides of the border. There are even shepherds who go looking for grassy grazing areas and water on other people's land, so to speak.

It is significant that 100,000 head of cattle have died in Huila and 300,000 have died in Cunene, figures which, translated into weight, amount to 12,000 tons (a cow here has an average weight of 300 kilos). Now, what does that represent in terms of meat for the country? It translates into 5,160 tons, because experts say that there is a 43 percent rate of utilization of slaughtered cattle.

With so many cattle in the southern part of the country, the questions which arise with the regard to the absence, at least in the provincial capital cities, of a shoemaking industry worthy of that name are fundamentally relevant, in the measure in which they could take advantage of by-products such as hides, hooves, horns, etc., based on a promising economic calculation. [passage omitted]

And, speaking of the shoemaking industry, right here in JORNAL DE ANGOLA, a wire release from ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency] coming from Namibe reported the construction of a factory in that city. It all remained over there, however.

There are areas where the starvation situation continues to be troublesome. Starvation continues to mow down

human lives, and there is frequent information (in the municipal and communal commissariats) on the death of such and such a person. A walk through the over-crowded neighborhoods of the city of Lubango gives us a picture of the gravity of the situation. The poverty is appalling. Businesses never seen before are commonplace in several corners. Fruit for bread, a kid for three kilos of flour, a kilo of rice to feed a crowd. The city is overrun, so to speak, with adolescents selling cigarettes, pastries and other delicacies, and no one seems to be concerned about it.

"Cases of cholera have grown. We have noticed an extremely rapid development of infectious and contagious diseases, such as malaria, acute diarrhea, measles, and tuberculosis. These illnesses, associated with malnutrition and progressive under-nutrition, have victimized nearly 1,000 people in the province of Huila alone." Speaking here is the adjunct-provincial commissar of Huila for the economic and social sphere, Joao Baptista Kussuma.

As has been said, the situation is widespread, but that has not prevented mechanisms capable of organizing the situation from being created in order to bring the phenomenon under control. It was necessary to know where to start, because it was necessary to begin helping the victims of starvation immediately, with the little bit of aid that was arriving.

In the province of Huila, it was necessary to establish three levels of priorities. The municipalities of Chibia, Gambos, Humpata, Quipungo, and Lubango were established as first rank priorities; those provinces in the east and the west were given a secondary ranking; and third priority was given to those in the north.

The fact that the north produces more cereal, the east and the west cereal and some cattle, and the southern provinces are devoted to cattle-raising gave rise to the criterion adopted by the emergency committee to combat drought and starvation.

In Mozambique, the government for a long time has had to send teams to look into cases of embezzlement of aid from international organizations—aid which was intended for victims of natural calamities. And it seems that there has apparently been some involvement of officials who were in charge of managing those programs. In Huila—something which is almost unheard of—there have fortunately been no reports of embezzlement of any aid or even of inadequate distribution of products.

An extremely functional scheme was necessary so that the aid that is arriving would be channeled directly to the areas where the cases of starvation were the most critical.

Now that the "shock" cases, in which it was necessary to intervene immediately, have been identified, actions are now turning toward mapping out a coherent strategy. For now, the top priority is food and water, counting on donations, naturally.

The emergency committees, both in the municipalities as well as in the provincial capital, are as all-inclusive as possible, comprising people of different social classes (including traditional authorities), which guarantees that the aid is being consumed where it should be.

Besides, even recently we have seen trucks with food, heading from the port of Namibe directly to the affected areas, in an expeditious process.

With regard to water, the "hitch" seems to be the absence of pumping equipment. "Well, with the few resources that the province has been obtaining, we have begun to make them profitable and we have had to contact Hidrominas (the underground water company), with the goal of setting up some pumping equipment and repairing some systems that did not seem operational to us. That is how we have been solving some problems of supplying water to the people and to the cattle," said the adjunct commissar for the economic sphere.

In the northern axis of Huila, rainfall is nearly 1,000 millimeters, and there the government thinks that increasing the number of areas under irrigation would be ideal. This idea is of use mainly for the municipality of Matala and the main valleys of the region, while contacts with entities from agriculture, with the goal of making the so-called "Tchimpacas" (watering holes for cattle) profitable, are now at an advanced stage.

The idea is in fact enticing, but the lack of financial support threatens to undermine this whole undertaking, which would serve to better concentrate the cattle, with all the advantages that would arise from that, mainly with regard to assistance.

Urged to give his opinion on the attention of the central structures, Joao Baptista Kussuma stated that it has been punctual, right on the mark, and immediate, and he recalled the conference on the drought which convened in Luanda in September of last year which made it possible to launch support for emergency aid to the people who have been the victims of starvation.

As this government official stated, several international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, responded to the appeal immediately. All those problems were identified and would end up by being part of a single appeal "package" which was sent to the international community.

Joao Baptista Kussuma says that what is coming from outside is not sufficient. What is arriving is what is being produced here, on the land. Outside assistance either arrives late or there is lack of wisdom in organizing it, in what is thus a rather somber picture.

In spite of this, Joao Baptista Kussuma puts forward the hypothesis of creating a food bank at the same time that, if it continues not to rain, a reliable and sustained strategy would be enacted, offering incentives whenever and wherever possible to diversify crops (sweet potatoes,

manioc, feed sorghum, and corn) which are already traditional in that province.

"The introduction of the potato and the manioc, which in principle require little water, would be an idea to consider in order to extend the areas out a little farther to take advantage of this diversification of crops," he added.

In spite of this, the challenge has already been launched, and so it is urgent to get to work because the situation is difficult.

Agricultural sources say that probably only 28,000 or 29,000 tons of products are going to enter the marketing cycle. That is obviously not sufficient.

It has already been said that the food crisis in Huila has affected the majority of the population. If the people in the countryside can still depend on some production, the same can no longer be said in the cities. [Food] donations go from mouth to mouth.

The problem is the people's dependency on donations. The people consume the food, and then right away they are once again standing there with their mouths open and their eyes turned toward the port of Namibe, waiting for the next ship to come in with foreign aid.

We drew that picture for the adjunct commissar for the economic and social sphere in Huila, and he said: "The management of the aid requires an open and frank discussion between us, the consumers and the donor. That is what has been happening up until now, with the international community responding immediately, because it was necessary to intervene rapidly. All the aid has been distributed freely."

In that measure, the link between management of the emergency and the recovery projects should not be overlooked, since it is a question of a strategy capable of keeping the situation from becoming ever more dramatic.

Joao Baptista Kusuma goes on to state, based on a precise definition, that one can think about taking advantage of the donations and making them reproduce, with results being channeled toward the development of rural areas, specifically in the construction of health clinics and the improvement of schools and highways; in other words, creating a real social impact.

With those actions and because of the personalities of the nongovernmental donors, their actions perhaps will be continuous. That is the idea in Huila, when one speaks of the social impact from foreign aid.

The adjunct commissar of Huila revealed that the diverse aspects of the drought problem will be reviewed during the course of a meeting that will take place this coming October in Benguela.

The fact that the province of Huila is in the same corridor with Namibia suggests joint actions in the

major war being waged against the drought—the phenomenon that results from the imbalances of nature, desertification, and the massive cutting down of trees without replacing them through a replanting program.

We believe that the conference on the drought will give rise to collaboration between Huila and Namibia, leading to cooperation between two friendly and brotherly States.

* SONANGOL Announces New Oil Find

90AF0550C Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 18 Jul 90 p 2

[Text] SONANGOL [National Angolan Fuel Company], which holds Angola's Block #2 offshore drilling concession, has announced a new oil discovery in the Savelha 1 exploratory well, which is located 11 km off the coast.

The find has been flowing at a combined rate of more than 6,000 barrels of crude oil a day, ranging in density between 22 degree to 25 degree AP [as published], beginning with three areas at a depth ranging between 2,288 meters and 2,433 meters, in a cretaceous dolomitic deposit.

The well was drilled to a total depth of 3,273 meters in 22 meters of water.

The Block #2 Association is made up of Texaco, which has a 20 percent share, SONANGOL, which has a 25 percent share, Total Angola and Braspetro Internacional, each of which has a 27.5 percent share, with Texaco being the operator of the above-mentioned association.

The development potential of this find is being evaluated.

* FRG Agrarian Aid to Kwanza-Norte Continues

90AF0556C Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 17 Jul 90 p 2

[Text] Ndalatando—"German Agrarian Action," an FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] nongovernmental humanitarian organization that since March 1989 has assisted displaced populations in Kwanza-Norte Province, will extend its activities in that area for another year.

Local authorities recently requested that the organization extend its activities in that province so as to continue aid to some 40,000 displaced persons located in the communes of Cazengo and Golungo Alto.

In the first and single phase initially planned, which ended last March, German Agrarian Action anticipated supporting, for a period of one year, only 17,000 displaced persons, but that number has grown to 40,000.

For that reason, the provincial authorities requested that the humanitarian organization extend its activities in Kwanza-Norte for another year.

In the second phase of assistance to the displaced persons, German Agrarian Action's activities will primarily involve support to those populations for agricultural development, with a view to achieving food self-sufficiency.

The official on the Angolan side responsible for the said program, Angelo Correia de Melo, told ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency] that 230 hectares of land will be distributed and cultivated by the displaced persons, out of a total of 400 hectares budgeted within the framework of an emergency plan.

This month, he added, seeds will begin to be distributed to the population for planting, to reduce foreign food aid and permit them to ensure their own food supply.

In addition, 400 tons of corn will be distributed, which should arrive within the next few days to Kwanza-Norte Province, together with 240 tons of beans, an equal amount of dried fish, and 40 tons of salt.

It was mentioned that in 1991, when the assistance program to the displaced persons in Angola is terminated, German Agrarian Action will be replaced in its aforementioned operations by Angolan Development Action (AAD), which does not currently operate in the south of the country.

Several days ago, Party Provincial Committee Secretary for Kwanza-Norte Antonio Francisco dos Santos expressed his appreciation to Angolan authorities for the West German nongovernmental organization's solidarity, during a visit to the displaced persons' agricultural fields in the area of Kirima, some 20 km northeast of Ndalaatando.

* Cunene Attempts Recovery After Devastation

90AF0556B Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 17 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by Miguel Filipe]

[Text] Cunene. The number of reporters who have passed through here to witness and report on the violent battles some years ago in this area, in this province, between the South African army and the Angolan Armed Forces is, in fact, incalculable.

Since then, Cunene has become a part of history. Newspapers and radio stations from practically all over the world have described the situation firsthand. Today the war is over. I mean the war of aggression. In Ondjiva, Cunene's capital, there is a book in whose pages anyone can read the sad history of the last approximately 13 years.

A city destroyed by bombardments, silent, dark, built on deserted grounds, like a boat in the middle of a false mirage. A visibly reduced number of people now begin to return from the jungles and the areas where they had taken refuge in search of security, to live in the rubble and start life over again.

In truth, it is difficult to begin life again in Cunene. The local government does not have sufficient resources, and even then the task absorbs massive expenditures. No one knows for sure if further destruction will occur, such is the moment of transition between war and peace.

The population's standard of living is low, and worsened by the fact that the province has for the last four years been affected by an unprecedented drought, which has reduced agricultural production by at least 75 percent.

Hunger threatens the majority of Cunene's population. It is a serious problem. Currently, although the situation is not quite as alarming as before due to the government's solicitation of emergency aid, cattle constitutes the only "hard currency" for survival.

As a result, many cattle being taken out of Cunene to be traded on Namibian territory by locals. Local sources estimate that 200 or more heads of cattle cross the border daily. It is calculated, however, that the real number is actually double that amount, because cattle also cross other zones of the extensive border.

It is a situation that the local authorities say they want to put a stop to because, they argue, some day there will be no more cattle in Cunene. So the measure found to be most convenient is to prevent people from crossing the border with cattle, which is what one might call stopping the flow of blood but not curing the wound, because the cattle will continue to leave one way or another. The cattle-raising population lacks essential food, clothing and other products that Angolan industry and commerce do not provide.

The trade network in Cunene is paralyzed by a lack of products. Cattle-raisers need merchandise not only in quantity but in quality. Peasants, who hold the majority of the cattle in the province, want wine, spirits, beer (which they now buy in Namibia), clothing, fabrics and a series of products of varying utility.

What happens, according to the peasants, is that the government purchases everything, including cattle, at low prices. They give 50 kg (a sack) of sugar for each head of cattle. Now the peasants prefer to trade their cattle in Namibia because they get more there. That is why they do not mind traveling long distances to cross the border.

In Namibia cattle produce more for the buyer, since all cattle parts are used, processed and placed again in the trade network to circulate. Buttons are manufactured from the horns, the hide is utilized, etc., etc... There is also a great deal of interest in buying cattle from Cunene on the part of Namibians themselves.

I witnessed the contact that two South African traders living in Namibia maintained in Ondjiva with Provincial Commissioner Pedro Mutinde, where they discussed the traders' interest in purchasing cattle in exchange for rand (Namibian money) for the cattle to be processed in Namibia for subsequent sale of the meat back to Luanda.

The cattle sold in Namibia are the private property of locals, who need what they do not have. Cars are being bought from that territory. It was found that much of that money originates from the sale of cattle. That is another reality. Other cattle come from Huila.

The cattle situation has at least saved many people who do not even have the opportunity to travel through Luanda to other countries with sufficient money to buy what they need. And the Namibian border is one of the opportunities that has arisen for these people.

A recovery in the standard of living of Cunene's population could require a significant period of time. Everything has been destroyed, even the roads are ruined. An 800-meter bridge awaits reconstruction. People have lost all their possessions.

The Reconstruction Program for Southern Angola has interesting plans. They primarily involve the rehabilitation of Cunene Province's economic and social infrastructure. The European Economic Community (EEC) intends to finance rehabilitation of the infrastructure destined for agroranching activities that find fertile ground here.

There is a plan to reactivate the water captation zones for cattle grazing land, and for providing water to the people as well as the rehabilitation of vast agricultural areas currently underutilized because of lack of rain. In a conversation I had some months ago with EEC Ambassador to Angola Carlos Gil, he demonstrated the EEC's great interest in supporting reconstruction of this province and mobilizing various financial sources, since according to him that would be possible in Cunene because of the current state of calm.

According to the diplomat, such a program would only be implemented after the government defines the primary investment priorities. It is true that to reestablish the general situation in the province a shock treatment will be necessary.

The path considered ideal for agriculture, according to some specialists, is recuperation of a large quantity of wells and captation areas for underground water to support agricultural and cattle-raising activities. The water problem continues to be of concern. People travel great distances in search of water in the grazing lands.

Food donations continue to arrive. I witnessed one of the operations distributing corn from Australia. Each person had the right to receive 10 kg of corn. But all assistance from international organizations must be understood as a supplementary activity.

It would be an opportune moment, however, to legalize trade on the Namibian border. Luxury cars already travel Cunene's roads, something unimaginable 10 years ago. If that happened, merchandise of every type could appear in this region across the land bridge.

A supermarket is being erected just at the entrance of the community of Santa Clara, in the border region. A good sign.

Trade here on the border must not be looked ill upon and cannot be performed by timid people, as the government does now under the current situation. It should be promoted and its advantages benefited from.

In addition, it will be necessary to create the required technical and material conditions. All the commercial establishments should be rehabilitated and housing opportunities, which do not currently exist, should be created. Cunene could also be a tourist area. People would come from every corner of the country and beyond, to see the future city-museum.

And since reconstruction of a province should follow along global lines, it is sensible to think of other things. For example, here there is no intermediate educational institution. The shortage of cadres to ensure the operation of various sectors of activity has reached uncontrollable levels.

There are three schools for the third level, of which two operate provisionally in Huila province. The teaching situation in primary schools is quite discouraging. Because most of the schools have been destroyed, some students receive class under the shade of trees, without notebooks.

There are students who have not seen a teacher for years, just as there are health centers who until today have not experienced therapeutic examinations performed by a doctor. Local authorities cite a total of 800 teachers in the education sector, the majority of whom do not perform that role because of food shortages, lack of materials, etc.

These sources say that there are 356 primary schools. Of those, 166 are closed due to lack of teachers and materials.

The health situation is worse. Ondjiva Hospital is a large house, of which only a few walls are usable. There were patients interned in the rubble.

Eleven doctors and 137 nurses are working in Cunene. The mortality rate is high. It is calculated that two of every 100 residents in areas more distant from Xangongo, the provisional provincial capital, die every day. The cholera outbreak killed 48 people between January and May of this year, and another 120 died from various illnesses.

A digression should be made here on Chiulu hospital, which belongs to a Catholic church. It is the only hospital that is able to save lives, a consequence of its efficient equipment and its personnel's high training level. The average number of patients totals 100 per month, from Cunene, Huila, Namibe and Luanda.

The structure does not support that influx. According to the hospital authority, Finnish Sister Veronica Fitzgerald, there were 4,365 patients in 1989 interned with various illnesses. Even the corridors of the hospital served as recovery rooms for patients. "We cannot reject anyone," she said.

Within this dark picture, the government faces a challenge it cannot ignore.

In Cunene there is no important economic activity, nor even a little industrial activity. Efforts have not been spared, however. Anonymous heroes continue to write the history of these lands of Mandume.

*** Kwanza-Sul Affected by UNITA Blockades**

*90AF0556A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 15 Jul 90 p 2*

[Article by David Filipe]

[Text] Sumbe—UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] has strengthened its blockade of columns of civilian vehicles supplying the populations of the communes of Gabela, Waku-Kungo, Ebo and Conde with urgently needed goods, according to an official source in Porto Amboim.

During the current month, the support columns suffered unprecedented losses, and at this time workers, peasants and the rest of the population are facing serious food shortages.

The peasants, who are the rebels' main targets, say that UNITA is prepared to cut down even more human lives. For that reason, the majority of the population of the aforementioned communes is concentrated at the municipal headquarters.

UNITA activities are on a sharp increase, particularly kidnappings and attacks on the population and the mining of roads, as occurred on the Gabela road, where bandits ambushed a group of residents who were traveling by bicycle, killing 21 and wounding four in April, a young soldier, Cardoso Jose, told our reporter.

Concerned with the peasants' lives, Cardoso Jose also told us the following: "We will do anything to stop the enemy from continuing their hostile activities against defenseless populations and destroying economic objectives."

In addition to the military situation, the drought is also of concern to the local Party leadership and government.

The Conde Municipal Commission members meeting, which recently ended in that community, recommended to peasant association authorities that they proceed with the acquisition of materials necessary for the 1990-91 agricultural season.

At the end of the meeting participants noted the low supplies of goods urgently needed by the people, the lack of health agents in rural areas, and the lack of teachers.

The meeting, the third of this type during this year, analyzed issues related to agricultural trade, vaccinations for pregnant women, and the supply of potable water to the peasant population.

The meeting reviewed the degree of compliance with the objectives of the previous meeting, and outlined a work-plan to be executed during the second half of this year.

*** Future of Small, Medium Businesses Discussed**

*90AF0555C Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 22 Jul 90 p 4*

[Interview with businessman Jose Fernandes by Luis Pinto]

[Text] Because of the circumstances in which the country gained independence, the Angolan government has, among its many obligations, had to sell shoes, repair watches, and handle many other activities that would normally not be part of its responsibilities. The SEF [Economic and Financial Reorganization], however, would like to correct this situation and it is therefore now beginning, albeit timidly, to talk about small and medium-sized businesses (PME). This is what businessman Jose M. Fernandes is focusing on in this interview.

[Pinto] What is the position of the small and medium businesses (PME) in the national economy? What is their significance in the economy of a country like Angola?

[Fernandes] The PME are run on a personal level by managers or partners and they have a very small share of the market, but one which is very useful socially, because of the simple management methods and easy financing through credit.

The PMEs are very dynamic; we just need to create "economic awareness" and conditions to help them succeed and proliferate to "inundate" the market and promote the economic growth of a country. We just need to look at the example of Portugal today, where despite the proliferation of large firms, economic conglomerates, and hypermarkets, in an effort to curb the hegemonic market trend, the EEC has made a large amount of money available to modernize the PMEs as a clear indication of their strategic importance in any economy.

In Angola, where there are virtually no PMEs, because the financial mechanisms (commercial banks) which allow them to flourish are not there, it is highly advisable to take urgent steps to promote the establishment of these businesses, thereby freeing the state to conduct the major enterprises appropriate for a government.

It is obvious that the government was forced to "manufacture and sell shoes" because of the circumstances in which the country gained independence, which we are all aware of. At the present time, after a diagnosis of the Angolan economy, we know what we want and we have outlined a realistic program to overcome our problems.

The "remedies" include a policy whereby the government sector would form associations or partnerships and reduce its size. Now we just need to support and implement the measures recommended. Among these measures, the development of the PMEs is of the utmost importance and the required support must be provided immediately.

They will, for instance, occupy the place of the "agricultural complexes" which became so complex that it was impossible to manage them and which also just ate up the government's money. It is wise to recall that before these "complexes" were formed, small, family-run agricultural enterprises produced 700,000 tons of primary foodstuffs for the market, and although it is true that the war contributed greatly towards dismantling this system of production, it is also true that the solution decided on (the complexes) proved to be ineffective. The green belts project is a recent one, but look at the results already achieved despite the shortage of resources. We must look toward the future with confidence and trust in our real capabilities.

[Pinto] Small firms versus large firms. Which would you choose?

[Fernandes] They are both necessary. They must coexist.

I even believe that they are complementary. However, large enterprises require enormous management efforts and I think that in some cases it is a very good idea to split them up and set up a group of specialized firms, as this leads to effective management and control and consequently a higher return on the available resources.

I believe that this is the direction taken by many multinationals scattered throughout this planet.

[Pinto] What is the current trend in this regard?

[Fernandes] It is a recognized fact that there is still a certain megalomania found in some echelons of government administrative bodies. When an investment is planned in any sector of the economy, frequently the large firms are favored for major investments, firms that require enormous management efforts, high performance by their staff, complicated exploration, and long payback periods. Large enterprises should be reserved for exploration of strategic resources, and this seems to me to be advisable for the reasons I have already given. A group of similar firms. Let an Angolan businessman operate in the most varied areas of the economy, since for reasons we all know, the government was not and is not capable of conducting successfully the business that should be handled by PMEs.

[Pinto] What technology do the PMEs need?

[Fernandes] Intermediate, modern technology which is easily adapted to the level of development of our productive force and which involves investments with short payback periods.

For this, I think we need a careful, detailed acquisition study, in which we would weigh all the possible variables, and then select the most profitable ones from an economic and social standpoint.

[Pinto] What is the importance of creativity and a sense of risk in managing a PME?

[Fernandes] I think that this has a lot to do with the management skills and abilities of the business manager. The manager of a PME must have an adequate educational background so that he knows what is to be done. In our situation, it is important to give room for creativity, and appropriate orthodox methods must be followed at all times, even though in the beginning they may appear to be "outside the law." At times certain partnerships or associations lead to rather positive results. It is essential once and for all to end government control by oversight agencies, even for government-owned PMEs. The manager of these PMEs must feel as though he is the virtual proprietor of the enterprise and as though the control mechanisms are in fact the balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, or annual financial statements, where the skills of the government manager can be measured.

[Pinto] What is the importance of credit for development of the PMEs?

[Fernandes] You are talking about credit in general. Credit, as an economic category, actively influences the development of the economy. By helping to redistribute material and monetary resources on the basis of the principle of reimbursement, credit creates conditions for accelerating the circulation of money and physical assets and is also an economic instrument for regulating the money supply.

Since commercial credit results necessarily from financial relations between businesses, provided on a mercantile basis, I would prefer to speak of bank credit, or loan capital.

For the PMEs, this is a management tool. The use of credit to finance business investments requires the rational and effective management of the borrowed assets, as otherwise the debt would just grow, since borrowed capital has a price, which is the interest.

In an economy such as ours, which is trying to promote national businesses, bank credit will be a solution for the required inputs. We need to promote the practice of working with someone else's capital, as a way to absorb some of the surplus money and so that this capital can generate the added value needed for the economy to develop.

Therefore we need to promote the growth of a "class" of aggressive businessmen willing to take risks.

[Pinto] In what sectors should PMEs be established?

[Fernandes] In all sectors, except for those reserved for the government. In Angola, the macroeconomy needs a

boost, and I think that the direction to take is in fact to encourage small businesses, without paternalism, in a serious and responsible way. Let's put an end to tight control which takes away motivation, restricts creativity, and curbs initiative.

[Pinto] The computerization of the PMEs. A need and a solution.

[Fernandes] I said earlier that an PME should above all be a modern firm, and given the current situation and the rate at which productive and commercial activities are developing, an PME can only succeed if it uses modern management methods.

I advocate the need to use computers, because of the gradual increase in information to be processed. Data such as production, stocks, sales, investments, and taxes must be controlled in a detailed fashion and with minimal use of administrative personnel. The computer seems to me to be the cheapest and most effective solution.

In opting for an intelligent solution such as this one, the question arises as to precisely what data has to be processed by computer. I would suggest using the services of a data processing consultant, the cost of which would be included in the overall expenses for computerization of PMEs. This consultant would be hired to evaluate the needs of the company and its management, guide the user in selecting the appropriate hardware and software for the business, produce the software adapted to the specific needs of the business and to protection of the computer data, and finally study the work performed manually that is to be done on computer with a view to increasing the speed and detail of the information processed by the firm.

In selecting the computer, I believe that the consultant should be advised that the hardware must be adapted to the software required to carry out various functions appearing on a list, bearing in mind current needs and the anticipated expansion of the business, with the important proviso that the investment's payback period must be adapted to the characteristics of the objective pursued by the business.

In conclusion, I believe it is important to recommend software that will allow for an analysis of investments, preparation of budgets, charting trends, setting up and maintaining card files on clients, stocks, and inventory, word processing, personnel management and payroll, general and analytical accounting, and invoicing and stock management.

I think that I have answered your question, and although I am not a specialist in this area, I believe that the use of computers, which is currently relatively widespread, is the way to reduce the operating costs of a large, medium-sized, or small business.

[Pinto] The PMEs and the SEF?

[Fernandes] I was waiting for this question. I think that I have been rather repetitive during this interview, I have gone on long enough, and so I am not going to add much more. The PMEs are a result of the SEF. It is only possible to consider a massive start-up of PMEs because there is a program which has as one of its main lines the reduction of the size of the government business sector and a policy of partnerships with the private sector. It is obvious that mobilization of credit resources for PMEs, mainly in relation to the exchange component, will in some cases depend on other factors also recommended in the program, such as rescheduling the external debt, implementing of mechanisms for subsidized credits, and other measures which we all know. For this, the success of the proposed economic recovery program depends directly on the sense of patriotism and the serious, competent, and responsible commitment of all national economic agents, and on the responsibility, honesty, and constructive spirit of foreign agents, to achieve the stabilization and later growth of the Angolan economy.

In this context, it is important to have unconditional support for the efforts undertaken by the party and the government, and especially by our President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has worked tirelessly to mobilize and guide the laudable efforts that the nation expects of us. Thank you very much.

* Increasing Trade Exchanges With Namibia Seen

90AF0555A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 18 Jul 90 p 1

[Excerpts] From our agency in Lubango. Three months after gaining independence, Namibia is trying to conquer the Angolan market, with a focus on southern Angola, judging from the latest movements of official institutions and businesses from both countries.

The most recent reports refer to contacts between institutions in the cities of Lubango and Windhoek, the Namibian capital, with Horacio Reis, director of the tourist and sports complex, "10 de Dezembro," representing one side; the delegation of the other side has not yet been disclosed.

The exploration of the Namibian market, regarded as one of the cheapest ones, and an exchange of experience in various fields were the goals pursued by about 20 businessmen in the areas of commerce, industry, transportation, and tourism when they met last June in the neighboring country.

According to reports, Namibian businessmen are showing increasing interest in acquiring bricks and wood from Angola, exploring transportation, communication, and tourism systems, and repairing roads. The opening of a branch of the National Bank of Namibia in Lubango, which has already been decided and is just awaiting premises, gives substance to a type of cooperation which is claimed to be mutually advantageous.

The construction and agricultural sectors in Angola are also viewing this cooperation with renewed hope. Namibia is in fact going to sell prefabricated and other construction materials, and electric pumps, along with other agricultural material, including of course fertilizers.

The Angolans (or the people of Huila, more specifically), who have little to offer, are mainly interested in exchanging experience in the areas of trade with rural areas and in the cities, production of beer and refrigerants, the hotel business, tourism, and farm production. Firms such as Favel, which produces Metafus candles, iron furniture, and pressure cookers, and Saplas, which is involved in the production of plastic bags, are looking towards a market closer to home. And, when the road linking the two capitals is repaired, transportation will be entirely by land.

Businessmen from Huila are planning to make contacts with Windhoek's city council and the Namibian chamber of commerce to explore the local market.

We also learned of Huila's interest in having Namibian businessmen participate in an agroindustrial exhibition as part of the Lubango People's Festival next August, and arrangements are being made to this end.

Trade with Namibia: The Beginning of the 'Internationalization' of the Kwanza or Contraband in the Currency?

In an article with this title, the "Omukanda," a regional publication in southern Angola printed in Lubango, revealed that the kwanza has been used as a medium of exchange in the Republic of Namibia, where it has been introduced by Angolans and purchased by local merchants interested in moving to Angola.

[Passage omitted] This explains how Angolans with \$600 to \$700, as transfers of funds, are coming back from Namibia with small fortunes, including vehicles valued at over 10,000 rands and various household appliances.

[Passage omitted] If it is true that the illegal movement across the border, whether of cattle or currency, has a negative impact on the Angolan economy, it is no less true that the trade has not brought into the rural market products likely to attract the cattle farmers.

The southern part of the country, the arid part, has something in the order of 3.5 million head of cattle. This statistic is symptomatic.

Consequently, with the drought, the movement of cattle to the "other side" is favored, since the cattle breeders fear, and not without reason, that the food crisis for the animals will continue and that they will have to find quick solutions.

Although in more recent years the problem has been one of how to persuade the farmers to agree to marketing,

today the picture has changed radically, with cattle breeders frequently proposing tempting trades, such as a steer for a sack of rice.

From time to time steps are taken, but the problem is how to stop the movement across this long border with families living on both sides.

The authorities have thus decided to studiously ignore the situation, and so the kwanzas and cattle cross over, while in this country we are still importing meat, instead of goods to trade with the farmers in exchange for the cattle which are now crossing Angola's southern border by the hundreds.

*** Economic Situation in Cabinda Described**

*90AF0554A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 6 Jul 90 p 2*

[Article by Alberto Coelho: "The Municipality of Cabinda: the Life and the People"]

[Text] From our office in Cabinda. The scarcity of supplies of equipment and materials to businesses, production centers, associations of farmers, and agricultural cooperatives has considerably hampered the social and economic development of the municipality of Cabinda, according to information given to our reporter in that city by Cabinda's deputy municipal commissioner, Jose Manguali Tigre.

The province's geographical location is such that Cabinda is separated from the rest of the country by a narrow strip of land less than 50 km wide (Zaire River) belonging to the Republic of Zaire.

As far as transportation is concerned, it is linked with the rest of the country only by air or water. Because of this, the transport of various goods essential for the socioeconomic development of the municipality of Cabinda specifically and the province in general has always encountered major difficulties.

Cabinda has therefore been requesting a long-range port for some time, because the present one is in an advanced state of disrepair and represents an eminent danger to human lives, among other things.

Despite efforts undertaken by the provincial government to repair it, Cabinda port does not meet current needs, since only coastal ships can dock there, whereas ocean-going vessels must use pontoons to unload their cargo.

However, the province's development program includes plans to repair Cabinda airport, which generally enables TANANA [National Airport Operations and Air Navigation Company] and TAAG [Angolan Airlines], which are located there, to operate smoothly.

Covering an area of 2,257 square meters, the municipality of Cabinda includes the zones of Sede, Tando-Zinze, and Malembo, which are subdivided into 95 settlements and 14 districts.

The major natural resources of the municipality are precious woods, cocoa, coffee, manioc, bananas, palm trees, and salt. In its subsoils are found gold, radioactive minerals, phosphate, and large quantities of petroleum, among other minerals.

Its population, known to be very hard-working and revolutionary, is capable of greatly increasing its production, as soon as the major problem of a shortage of supplies of equipment and materials is resolved so that Cabinda can play a more important role in the country's economy.

According to the deputy municipal commissioner of Cabinda, the people are working hard on economic, social, cultural, and political tasks, with a view to accelerating implementation of the various development projects in the municipality.

"The people are highly committed to socioeconomic and political tasks designed to improve their standard of living. The people are engaged in productive work, as members of associations of farmers. In the districts and settlements, the people show a great interest in cleaning and beautifying residential areas, and in participating in public health programs."

As for the level of development attained in 1989 in some socioeconomic sectors of the municipality, Jose Manguali Tigre said that in the agricultural sector, defined as the basis for the country's development, there is much to be done, since prior to last year little progress had been made.

In his opinion, this situation was basically the fault of the bureaucracy existing in the sector, short supplies of materials and equipment to the farmers, and the lack of mechanization in rural areas.

As far as industry is concerned, the sector is facing problems of short supplies of equipment and materials, and transportation difficulties, which have presented a great obstacle to achieving the desired results. In the sector of light industry, which includes the Pau-Rosa and Mogno Complex, ORIX, Abilio de Amorim, Cabinda Industrial, Antonio Pereira Neves saw mill and carpentry shop, and the Ceramics, Aluminum and Rations Factory, its problems are generally attributed more to a shortage of raw materials for its productive development.

As for companies in the fishing sector, slight improvements have been made despite some problems stemming from the current economic situation. Expedicao Conjuntura, a subsidiary, performed at the rate of 104 percent in relation to its production goal, whereas the regional branch of ENATIP [National Enterprise of Equipment and Supplies for the Fishing Industry] ended the year in the red, despite efforts made to meet the sector's need for supplies of equipment and materials.

As for Edipesca, it is in a weak financial position as a result of the inefficiency of the means of production

used, which are regarded as obsolete, inappropriate pricing, and the zero return recorded by the fish curing centers.

Still in the fishing sector, there were some achievements made during the past year by small, private industries, and by semipublic companies, which recorded positive production balances.

Transportation and communications in the municipality remained static. The government sector had only 12 trucks, and their operations were rather limited because of a shortage of tires and spare parts.

In the private sector, a survey of the existing vehicles was conducted and they were distributed by routes, in an attempt to respond to the problem of transporting merchandise in various parts of the municipality.

As for telecommunications, the situation has not changed very much since 1988, as constant breakdowns in the telephone exchange and network continue to be reported.

For health coverage, the municipality of Cabinda has a hospital, two clinics (Primeiro de Maio and Lombo-Lombo), a maternal and child care center, four pharmacies, 12 medical stations installed in some businesses and institutions, and 34 health stations located in rural areas.

Last year positive results were achieved, despite numerous difficulties, which primarily had to do with shortages of materials and medicines to treat diseases commonly occurring in the municipality, such as measles, malaria, severe diarrhea, hausamiasis, respiratory infections, intestinal parasites, and anemia.

As for the educational sector, Cabinda municipality has six school districts: Tando-Zinze, Malembo, Sub-antando, Siamazi, Nto, and the central district.

There are currently 76 schools in operation with a total of 797 teachers, who are faced with various problems such as a shortage of classrooms and classroom furniture.

The municipality has a Literacy Center with 856 persons enrolled at the present time, distributed among 38 classrooms.

In 1989, the Center taught 4,799 citizens of both sexes to read and write, and conducted five seminars to train teachers from secondary and tertiary-level schools, as well as some workers from various work centers.

According to Jose Manguali Tigre, despite some difficulties, the local authorities have given their help to make this literacy program effective, since "everybody is urged to participate in a conscientious and organized way in this historic process in any place where the problem of illiteracy is present."

Activities in the social affairs sector have been the most effective in the communities of Tando-Zinze and Malembo, and in the zones of Prata, Chinzazi, and Yema.

SEAS [State Secretariat for Social Affairs] takes care of about 265 elderly people and 468 physically handicapped who spend their free time making brooms, baskets, and mats, in addition to participating in cleaning jobs.

Moreover, following the appeal made by the Immortal Guide of the Angolan Revolution, about 2,723 people who had taken refuge in the Republics of the Congo and Zaire have returned to the country under the policy for clemency and national harmonization.

The municipality's employment center received improvements in 1989 thanks to the reorganization carried out at the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. However, the greatest concern is the difficulty encountered in placing candidates in jobs, since they shun work in sectors to which they are channeled, preferring to work in the petroleum sector in search of better living conditions.

The sports sector in Cabinda is struggling with shortages of material, sports equipment, technicians, and trained personnel. Certain activities took place throughout the past year in the pioneer centers, including the creation of a school and instruction in mini-handball; 42 children participated in this activity. Physical education activities are currently at a standstill because of a lack of materials.

As for team sports, nothing was done because of a lack of sports equipment.

One of the major activities to be developed in the sector is the rapid repair of some sports arenas, since the few existing ones are in a state of disrepair.

For instance, in 1989 only the BNA [National Bank of Angola] sports arena was repaired, and it is currently being used to occupy the precious free time of some workers and students. At the Tafe municipal stadium, metal benches were installed and some repairs and painting done, and now the lighting needs to be done and the bathhouses restored.

With regard to sports activities in the settlements, our source said that sports need to be expanded into the countryside, since "our people living in settlements have never been given proper attention."

In reference to projects under the province's development program that have had an impact on the municipality of Cabinda, the road linking the airport and the Office of the Municipal Commissioner, running about 3.2 km, was repaired, as was the road from Manda-Fama to Cassango, and from there to the settlement of Futila, and four buildings and the provincial hospital were also restored.

Under the direction of the Office of the Municipal Commissioner, several projects of a social nature are under way and in their final stages (schools and health

stations) in the settlements of Zongolo, Chiazi, Chambuto-Rico, Buco-Mazi, Chinzaze, and Cungo, and the primary problem is a shortage of materials (cement and sheets of zinc).

With the combined efforts of the State Secretariat for Housing, Urban Affairs, and Water and the Office of the Municipal Commissioner, it was possible to renovate the old water supply systems in the areas of Subantando, Fortaleza, and Malembo, and some motorized pumps were placed in these places.

Among other projects approved in the economic and social sphere and included under the provincial development program are the construction of 250 housing units, 82 of which are being built in the Primeiro de Maio district of the city, with a temporary water system composed of a 400 cubic meter tank, which will be completed before the end of this year.

Another project to be developed this year is the reorganization of the people's committees in the districts and settlements. They form the foundation on which the power of the government in the country rests, and they defend conquests, organize the masses and meet their needs, and control and report irregular situations in the various areas.

The construction of a secondary school in the commune of Tando-Zinze and a few classrooms in suburban neighborhoods around the city of Cabinda, restoration of the water supply network in some part of the communes of Tando-Zinze and Malembo, the reorganization of associations of small farmers, and the improvement of conditions for supplying essential commodities to rural areas are further activities planned by Cabinda's Municipal Commissioner for this year.

In view of the conditions and natural resources in Cabinda, the primary activity of the people in the municipality is agriculture, and it is concentrated mainly in the community of Tando-Zinze.

There are 4,061 small farmers organized in the municipality, scattered among 32 associations of small farmers and farm cooperatives, which are facing problems of a shortage of supplies of equipment and materials.

Marketing in rural areas of the municipality is handled by ten economic agents distributed throughout the various areas of operation. This activity has been proceeding satisfactorily, despite some difficulties which still persist, mainly resulting from the fact that products for sale in rural areas are lacking in both quantity and quality, in comparison with the products being produced by the local farmers.

* Thousands Fleeing Drought in Porto Amboim

90AF0551D Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 17 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by David Filipe]

[Text] Nearly 10,000 people from the villages of Makulungo, Caio, and Denda, in the municipality of Porto Amboim, have taken refuge during the past month along the Longa River, driven there by the drought that is affecting those localities.

A source within UNACA (National Union of Angolan Peasants), who was contacted by JORNAL DE ANGOLA, said that the initiative for this resettlement comes from the municipal board of the Rural Development Station (EDA), due to the shortage of water and basic necessities that is causing the loss of human lives, in spite of some measures that have been taken.

Josse Safeca, director of the EDA in Porto Amboim, stressed that to solve the drought problem in the municipality, 70,000 meters of two and one-half inch tubing and 90 electric pumps are needed.

According to the director, if these conditions are met, the problem of starvation will be at least held in check, even without international donations, once marketable products appear in the countryside. Marketing there has been crippled for two years.

Information gathered from this official indicates furthermore that a plan for 7,000 hectares of land that had been prepared for the introduction of corn and cotton is being affected by the water shortage, which may jeopardize the current agricultural season.

"Due to the water shortage in the above-mentioned villages, the people have to go 38 km to get this precious liquid. There have been cases in which some old people and children have ended up dying along the road because they did not get enough to eat," Director Safeca said.

The municipal secretary of UNACA, Jose Antonio, added that this year the municipality has suffered an irrecoverable drop in production in the corn harvest and other agricultural products. He also asserted that four children are dying every day in those localities as a result of the drought and insufficient medical attention.

Starvation is a terrible social scourge that has taken on alarming proportions in Porto Amboim. For this reason, the authorities of the province of Kuanza-Sul are quite worried in view of the fact that similar information is arriving from the countryside concerning the spread of the phenomenon throughout almost the entire region.

Meanwhile, our reporter traveled to the Longa River and contacted the relocated people. In the conversations that we had with the peasants, we were informed that the water situation has been resolved, with just the problem of food and agricultural methods remaining to be solved.

"The government must solve as quickly as possible the matter of agricultural methods. We have great rivers and we can take advantage of the resources in those rivers that are needed to guarantee food supplies for our children," said one old man, Mualunga Seke.

This old man, who is also a cattle-raiser, told us the following: "If our animals remained in the villages, we ran the risk of losing the whole herd. Now, here in Longa, all the cattle have recovered, now that the pastureland is suitable."

The National Agricultural Mechanization Company (ENAMA) has done excellent work in Porto Amboim in helping the people and the animals. They have prepared five artificial ponds to supply the cattle with water and to irrigate production fields, only one of which contains water.

Even with the drought, ENAMA is currently busy preparing 12 dams and a total of 3,000 hectares of land for corn and cotton crops for the 1990-1991 agricultural season.

For this task, four existing farm tractors in the municipal garage have been mobilized. The rest of the tractors are standing idle due to a shortage of replacement parts and a shortage of manpower qualified to perform maintenance on them.

It has been learned that ENAMA in Porto Amboim will soon repair some tractors which will meet the needs of the associations of peasants and individuals, so that they can increase production in the countryside.

ENAMA's stock of machinery (heavy machines and implements) is empty, because the one existing unit has been allowed to go to ruin due to a shortage of accessories on the national market.

On a more positive note, it should be pointed out that two other machines of the T150K brand, which were not operational, have been repaired thanks to the creative spirit of some workers who made sure that these machines would be able to operate again.

The water problem is the responsibility of the water specialists. According to information from West African tribal chiefs, water can be found five meters underground in the areas affected by the drought.

The peasants who have been relocated along the Longa River do not have any fish, even with the presence of well known companies in the province. The children are being plagued by attacks of acute diarrhea due to their constant eating of grass.

Zeferina Chilombo, a peasant woman, is of the following opinion: "Nowadays, nobody takes pride in helping the government solve the people's problems, either in the countryside or in the city, and nobody can lie to us and tell us that the sea has run out of fish."

Even with so many lessons given by the peasants up until now, the planning system for foodstuffs and industrial goods for these people has never "escaped" from its rule of decentralization.

The drought is going to be challenged in Porto Amboim. The first impression that we got is the strength of the

people at work and their high morale. The conversations among the peasants offer good prospects for the harvest in August and September.

*** Coffee Revenues Register Sharp Decline**

*90AF0551C Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 17 Jul 90 p 3*

[Text] Since the beginning of the present coffee-growing season (October 1989), Angola has billed \$2.3 million (one dollar is equal to 30 kwanzas) as a result of coffee exports, said Filomeno Seitas, the secretary of state for the sector in Luanda.

In statements to the press that were made at Fourth of February Airport as he was saying good-bye to the secretary-general of the Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO), Arega Worku, the Angolan Government official stated that the country is still forecasting that it will reach an income of \$6 million by the end of this coffee-growing season, and he added that this amount is insufficient for the sector's needs.

When urged to voice an opinion about the revenues of the African continent, which holds a 23 percent share of the world market, Filomeno Seitas, the current president of the IACO, said that the African continent should have done more than \$2 billion worth of business by the end of the first semester.

"If we were in a normal situation, keeping in mind the normal prices of coffee on the world market and the tendency over the last five years, it should reach an amount valued at \$6 billion," said Filomeno Seitas, referring to the drop in the product's prices.

The secretary-general of the Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO), Arega Worku, was in Angola for three days on a working visit, during which he touched on matters related to the sector and the world market for this product with the Angolan secretary of state for coffee.

*** Luena's Fuel Cut Off, Water Supply Affected**

*90AF0551B Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 24 Jul 90 p 2*

[Article by Lucas Africano: "Fuel Shortage in Luena Deprives City of Water and Energy"]

[Text] The shortage of lubricating fuels, especially gasohol, has affected this city's potable water supply over the last six months.

According to a source close to the Municipal Board of Community Services, which was contacted by JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Luena, this situation is due to the paralyzation of the Benguela Railroad (CFB) and the main highway that connects the province of Moxico to the nation's capital. So Luena now depends on air transportation, in which priority is given to the armed

forces which, in their turn, are getting supplies to this sector for distribution to the people.

The same source went on to say that the quantity of fuel that it has received is not sufficient to run the two motorized pumps installed in the water impounding center.

According to the same source, for a long time they have been receiving between 10,000 and 20,000 liters of gasohol for 20 days. Our source added that this amount met the city's minimum needs of hygiene and sanitation, electricity and water.

Current supplies have been substantially reduced by between 2,000 and 4,000 liters, corresponding to three days, which is barely enough to illuminate the city for a few hours.

With regard to the water shortage in Luena, we are witnessing a growth in the number of merchants of this precious liquid, owners of cisterns who are selling it at the price of 1,000 thousand [as published] kwanzas per barrel.

In spite of the fact that this situation is by no means a novelty for any inhabitant of Luena, the truth is that during the rainy period, people find alternatives, because they take advantage of the rainfall. But the winter season brings difficulties, principally for the more disadvantaged people.

But the local people understand that these are the effects of the war of attrition that we have been suffering through for the last 15 years, and the people have confidence in a peaceful and harmonious tomorrow in which all the problems that affect their day to day living will be diminished.

Meanwhile, preparations have been under way in Moxico for several days to mark the first edition of the People's Festivals of the Province, in a climate which can be deduced from events and uncertainties, for while the city is dealing with the problem of canalized water, and just a few days away from the long-awaited festival, another problem has been added to this one: We are witnessing a considerable drop in power-generating groups that for a long time have contributed to supplying electrical power to the city, because a breakdown in the main electrical generating station has robbed the city of electricity, and there are no prospects of getting it back into service anytime soon.

In other matters, supplies of basic necessities reaching the people during the first half of 1990 have been negligible, in part due to the crippling, since December of last year, of the small fleet of trucks that linked Luanda to the province of Moxico, because the destabilizing activities of Unita have made the highway practically impassible.

Since that time, the province has had to get its supplies of foodstuffs and industrial goods by airlift, but these goods are not reaching the people equitably.

It is obvious that the goods that the province has been receiving, mainly industrial goods, are insufficient to satisfy the needs of everyone, but what we are seeing in the distribution of motorized equipment, bicycles, freezers, and stoves, is that there are people who are benefitting either directly or indirectly from a particular article twice a year.

The situation of commerce in Moxico has been worrisome for the last eight years, because the Benguela Railroad (CFB), the main outlet for products that the region had, has been out of operation that long.

In spite of the initiatives by the principal officials that have been carried out in local government in the past year, reality has shown that the situation has gone from bad to worse. The merchandise that businesses are receiving is not being sold in commercial establishments by the structures that were created for that purpose.

If that merchandise does appear there, it is destined to be bartered for agricultural products that are also being sold on the black market. Faced with this fact, the workers do not accomplish anything, with the exception of those who travel out into the countryside, at great sacrifice to themselves, where they acquire some goods with which they carry out the exchange.

The current officials of the Ministry of Commerce, when they exercise control over the private sector, have turned themselves into the owners of the respective commercial establishments, and it is their practice to pass on tickets to their family members and friends so that they be taken care of.

The marketing policy in the countryside has done nothing but cheat the people, because it is merely a justification for embezzling goods that are intended for the people.

* SONANGOL Announces Restructuring

90AF0551A *Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA*
in Portuguese 24 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] National Angolan Fuel Company (SONANGOL) will be converted into a holding company-type enterprise which will have several subsidiaries that will focus, at the very least, on the areas of production and research, distribution and aeronautics.

The restructuring program was presented yesterday [23 Jul] in Luanda by the director-general of SONANGOL, Joaquim David, during a meeting with the foreign oil companies that operate in Angola.

According to SONANGOL's restructuring document, the new firm will be made up of a board of directors of the holding company whose role it will be to approve the company's general strategy, its accounting reports, its pricing structures, and to nominate the director-general.

Further responsibilities of the future board of directors of SONANGOL will be to decide on signing contracts

and granting exploration rights, rescinding or modifying signed agreements, and deciding on maximum levels of production in accordance with the oil reserve policy established by the government.

The director-general of SONANGOL holding company and of the subsidiary firms in which the company has a 100 percent share will report to the board of directors, which will be appointed by the central government.

At first, SONANGOL holding company's subsidiaries will work in the fields of research and production, distribution and aeronautics, where there will also be boards of directors which will be presided over by members of the corresponding board of the parent company.

It is acknowledged that the subsidiaries overseeing the branches of distribution and aeronautics will be in operation by the end of the year, because the existing structures make such action possible.

The research and production firm will start up, some time after the start-up of the distribution and aeronautics subsidiaries, in one of the offshore oil fields, according to the director-general of SONANGOL, Joaquim David.

According to the document outlining the restructuring of SONANGOL, the creation of a group of associated SONANGOL companies, based on the principles of specialization and vertical integration of the businesses, is already institutionalized in the Angolan judicial order.

The subsidiaries will be constituted in terms of commercial law, but the big decisions that affect those subsidiaries—namely the defining of strategies, the pricing policy, the approval of accounts and budget—will be made by the representatives of the State in SONANGOL, the parent company.

In spite of the fact that the subsidiaries are private-law companies, SONANGOL's statutes place them, in fact, under the effective management of the holding company's board of directors, whose members will be named by the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Oversight [Tutela] and the Minister of Finance.

The restructuring of SONANGOL, according to what has been laid out, aims at perfecting management methods and *de facto* fulfillment, corporate objective, with the goal of turning it into a company patterned on the most respectable international levels.

Up until now, according to the commission that hammered out the document, SONANGOL has been operating with a "heavy" organizational structure, undisciplined and inadequate for the efficient fulfillment of the mission that the Angolan state has conferred upon it.

SONANGOL has 22 boards of directors, 73 divisions, four delegations, two subsidiaries abroad (one of which

is SONANGOL Ltd in London), financial shares in private-law companies, and associations with foreign oil companies.

Currently 5,157 workers are employed in this company, of whom 102 are engineers, 40 are economists, 11 are lawyers, four are architects, 33 are helicopter and airplane pilots, and 260 are mid-level technicians, among others.

However, SONANGOL's restructuring document says that such a project will only become effective with improvement in the rate of exchange, stability in the world oil market, and effective assimilation, on the part of the central administration of the State, of the new mentality that is being advocated by the program of Economic and Financial Reorganization (SEF).

Botswana

* Leaders Voice Concern at Campaign Tactics

90AF0537A Gaborone DAILY NEWS in English
13 Jul 90 p 1

[Excerpt] In their capacity as the Chairman of the Botswana Democratic Party and leader of the House, and the President of the Botswana National Front and leader of the opposition in the House respectively, the Vice President, Mr Peter Mmisi and Dr Kenneth Koma, met at the National Assembly on Wednesday 11 July 1990, to review and exchange views on the reports surrounding recent election campaigns in Mochudi and other related events in Lobatse and Mochudi.

Central to this exchange were the recent utterances reported in the media as well as verbally in the affected communities of both Mochudi and Lobatse.

The following is a text of a press release following a meeting of the two leaders.

The Vice President confirmed that he had been fully briefed on these events and was concerned that any silence by the leadership of the major political parties could be construed as indifference to these irresponsible utterances and occurrences which should be checked.

He expressed his concern about these recent events which are completely out of character with our democratic traditions.

In response the Honourable Dr Kenneth Koma confirmed that he was aware of these utterances as well as the concern which they have caused.

The two leaders noted with concern that amongst other things the utterances emanating from Mochudi tended to suggest that the Botswana National Front would consider flouting the law by defying the authority of the police.

Further more, they involved serious allegations of the Botswana National Front threatening to go to the bush in preparation for the overthrow of a lawful government.

They viewed in serious light the reports of irresponsible acts of obstructing the police in performing their duties during the Botswana National Front political rally at Mochudi following the announcement of the by-election results, and at Lobatse last week Saturday.

They also noted with concern the threats of physical harm directed at members of the government media by the Botswana National Front.

These events have, as a consequence, regrettably resulted in a tendency towards unwarranted militancy on the part of some political party supporters which cannot be tolerated in our democratic society. [passage omitted]

Madagascar

* Efforts To Stop Gold Drain Unsuccessful

90AF0564A London AFRICA ANALYSIS in English
20 Jul 90 p 12

[Text] Antananarivo—When a Malagasy citizen was arrested last month in Mauritius carrying 12 kg of gold, there were chortles of mirth among the citizenry of Madagascar. For the official figure for gold production in this island nation is just 3.5 kg a year.

Unofficially—and probably quite accurately—it is estimated that about 1 tonne of gold leaves the country each year. It is, beyond doubt, Madagascar's biggest illegal export. In fact, in terms of value, it is probably the country's biggest export. Yet it provides virtually no benefits locally.

The gold is merely the means by which a few wealthy families manage to accumulate foreign, hard currency, bank accounts. In fact, the buying and selling price of gold at the official exchange rate often equals a loss for the smugglers who have the costs of shipment to bear. But the metal is bought—in rough ingot or dust form—in Malagasy francs and sold for dollars and other hard currencies.

Currency Checklist

Selected Countries	Official		Parallel	
	£	£	\$	(to £ and US\$)
Algeria dinar	15.24	8.45	70.00	45.00
Angola kwanza	53.15	29.91	3,200.00	2,000.00
Botswana pula	3.29	1.83	—	—

Currency Checklist (Continued)

	Official		Parallel	
Burundi franc	305.50	169.34	350.00	220.00
Cote d'Ivoire CFA franc	500.12	277.22	n/a	360.00
Djibouti franc	307.00	170.17	—	—
Egypt pound	4.89	2.71	5.00	3.00
Ethiopia birr	3.69	2.04	7.00	5.20
Gambia dalasi	15.00	8.31	n/a	n/a
Ghana cedi*	597.25	331.06	—	—
Kenya shilling	41.10	22.78	50.00	35.00
Liberia dollar	1.80	1.00	6.50	4.00
Libya dinar	0.51	0.28	1.40	1.00
Madagascar franc	2,288.50	1,268.56	2,880.00	1,800.00
Malawi kwacha	4.95	2.74	7.00	4.50
Mauritius rupee	27.10	15.02	—	—
Morocco dirham	15.20	8.42	—	—
Mozambique metical	1,709.20	947.45	5,050.00	2,400.00
Nigeria naira	14.13	7.49	16.30	8.00
Seychelles rupee	9.50	5.26	12.00	7.00
Sierra Leone leone	288.00	159.64	—	—
Somalia shilling	738.00	409.09	2,880.00	1,800.00
South Africa rand*	4.76	2.63	6.00	3.75
Sudan pound	20.75	12.50	51.00	32.00
Tanzania shilling	347.50	192.62	550.00	340.00
Tunisia dinar	1.59	0.88	—	—
Uganda shilling	782.84	433.94	1,000.00	620.00
Zaire zaire	1,056.00	585.36	1,320.00	825.00
Zambia kwacha*	70.05	38.83	120.00	75.00
Zimbabwe dollar	4.44	2.46	10.00	5.00
n/a not available, *second tier,—no parallel market				

NOTES: A new law in Ghana enables the authorities to confiscate assets of drug traffickers.

As Mozambique's metical has continued to slide, the parallel rate for the currencies of neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa, has not kept pace. R1 buys M900, a substantially lower premium than that for other currencies.

There is concern in Nigeria that the current stability in the foreign exchange market there may not hold for long.

The parallel market in Sierra Leone has been particularly hit by a shortage of bank notes in circulation.

Zambia's parliament was recently told that it cost \$9m to print K5.5bn worth of new currency notes last year.

Kenya's finance minister, George Saitoti has announced that the World and African Development Banks would

be financing the establishment of an export processing zone authority to oversee the free zones in Mombasa and Nairobi.

Botswana's loss is South Africa's gain as shoppers from Zimbabwe head south rather than west following the weaker currency. While a Z\$1 can often be traded on an equal basis with the South African rand, Botswana's pula has become so muscular that Z\$1 buys barely 75 thebe.

All the figures are from the best available sources: the parallel rates are listed for guidance on the state of national economies, and subscribers to AFRICA ANALYSIS are reminded of the risks involved in illegal currency dealings.

[end of NOTES]

With a thriving parallel market providing a 30-per cent return on desirable cash, the gold trade is booming. Although local street wisdom has it that some of the

main beneficiaries of the trade are very close indeed to the government of President Didier Ratsiraka, the government has been making strong moves recently to curb or at least control the traffic, so far to no avail.

Madagascar quite simply needs capital for investment, and locally mined gold seems a perfect answer. It was for this reason that the gold trade was recently liberalised, with official markets being held in villages on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Saturdays, when government buyers offer the market price for the metal. There have been few, if any, takers.

Most of the peasants and illegal diggers and traders involved in the business are suspicious of the official markets. They prefer to retain their anonymity.

In response, the government has now stepped up surveillance at airports and seaports, in the hope of apprehending couriers carrying gold out of the country. This has so far proved as unsuccessful as the official markets.

* Maharanga Creates VTF Party

90AF0596A Antananarivo MADAGASCAR TRIBUNE in French 1 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by "RJA:" "Tsihozony Magaranga Creates a New Party"]

[Text] Of course, the desert crossing must have been short for the ex-CSR [Supreme Revolutionary Council] Tsihozony Maharanga, who, of course, is also former president of the ADM (Democratic Alliance of Madagascar), which had an ephemeral existence...

So, it appears from a communique signed by Mr. Tsihozony Maharanga that, following a constituent assembly held at Ambalavao-Isotry on 18-20 July, he has just created a new party, naturally, called "Vaboaka Tompon'ny Fahefana" (VTF) meaning, literally, "people holding the power," along with about ten former members of Tsihozony's VSM [MONIMA Socialist Group—MONIMA stands for National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar].

The same communique explained that this new political party, whose registered office is at Anketa II (Toliary) lot XC-1 and whose general secretariat is at Ambalavao-Isotry (Antananarivo-Renivohitra), is governed by Ordinance No. 90-001 of 9 March 1990 concerning the multiparty system.

It should be added that the VTF has a statute and rules of procedure to coordinate its actions quite effectively. However, no mention whatsoever is made of the political or socio-economic principles inspiring it during the present situation.

With this "new born," the number of legally constituted political parties now reaches around thirty. More are awaited...

* Ramahatra Seeks Indian Business Expertise

90AF0597A Port Louis L'EXPRESS in English 8 Aug 90 p 5

[Text] India with its vast experience in industrial development could be of great assistance to many less developed countries in the Indian Ocean and in Africa.

This was stated by the Prime Minister of Madagascar Ramahatra when the leader of the 70-member Indian entrepreneurs, exporters and businessmen delegation Ram S. Debra called on him in the Madagascar capital of Antananarivo Sunday on the eve of Indo-Madagascar conference.

The Prime Minister wanted Indian businessmen to assist entrepreneurs of his country in globalising their manufacturing activities. They would also like to know the relevant marketing and distribution system, the Prime minister said.

Mr Ramahatra told Mr Debra that he would welcome Indian businessmen to join hands with their Malagasy partners to produce goods with added value and earn more foreign exchange for the country.

The Indian delegation is in Antananarivo to attend the Indo-Madagascar conference.

Mr Ramahatra told Mr Debra that India-Madagascar business cooperation could promote exports from his country.

Mr Debra suggested to the Prime Minister that one third of the products manufactured in these joint ventures could be used locally, a similar quantity could be purchased back by India and the remaining exported foreign exchange.

Mr Debra also extended an invitation to Malagasy businessmen to visit India so that they could see for themselves the manufacturing and export capabilities of India.

The Madagascar Prime minister welcomed both these suggestions and said that his government would provide appropriate support to the proposal of Mr Debra. He informed Mr Debra that Madagascar has liberalised policies for investment and encouraged foreigners participation. They would, however, like to know the liberalisation policies followed in India.

Discussions were also held about the possibility of cooperation in emerald and tourmaline mining, housing and construction activities. Another point that emerged at the meeting was that since Madagascar has plenty of raw hides and skins India could use its technology to set up export oriented units in Madagascar to manufacture a variety of leather products for exports to hard currency markets.

Mozambique

* Machungo Discusses Economic, Social Issues

90AF0540A Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
26 Jul '90 p 8

[Part III: 26 Jul 90 p 8]

[Text] Today we publish the third part of the interview given by Prime Minister Mario Machungo to the Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] Party newspaper VANGUARDA, which since the 21st of this month has been included in our editions at irregular intervals. In this interview, Mario Machungo takes an analytical approach to the national economic situation in light of the imperatives of the Economic Recovery Program (PRE), which has been in place in our country since 1987.

[VANGUARDA] How does Mozambique hope to escape the economic crisis as long as unbalanced terms of trade persist at the global level, where underdeveloped countries such as ours sell primary materials at low prices, and purchase merchandise from developed countries at prices that are constantly rising?

[Machungo] For the developing countries to be able to participate in the international economy and benefit from the comparative advantages their countries offer as possessors of abundant natural resources, it is necessary to implement a New International Economic Order as well as find a solution to the foreign debt question. This involves a struggle that has mobilized and concerns the developing countries. Mozambique, which ranks among the lesser developed countries, views declining terms of trade with particular concern and for that reason is pushing its partners in the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and the nonaligned countries for a change in the current international economic order.

Our country's effort at the international level must be complemented by domestic and regional activities that will lead to changes in the current economic structure.

At the regional level, within the framework of the SADCC [South African Development Coordination Conference] and the PTA [Preferential Trade Area], we must solidify the economic integration of the countries in the region, based on the planned utilization of our countries' resources for collective development. We must promote trade relations to participate in the vast market the region offers, and establish institutional bases that will favor mobilization of the region's savings, capital mobility and private sector development in our countries.

Thus within the SADCC framework we must promote the coordination of economic policies for solidifying the integration process: we must perfect and intensify the construction of economic, financial, technical-scientific

and social infrastructure, which will create the appropriate environment for private sector intervention and development.

Coordinated activities are required at the domestic level, including:

- diversifying the export base, increasing the export of products with greater value added;
- increasing the production of food by taking advantage of the country's existing potential;
- strengthening economic relations with other countries in the region and intensifying South-South relations, including importing appropriate technology;
- developing the industrial base;
- creating conditions for the development and intervention of the domestic private sector in the economy and promoting private enterprise.

[VANGUARDA] The government, along with the PRE, has been accused of not being a popular government because it no longer protects the workers and the people in general. For example, it is said that the government does not enforce the laws it approves, particularly on professional and retroactive careers. It is said that there is no protection for the peasants against usurpers of land, and of consumers against the arbitrary pricing of goods and services on the part of State enterprises and institutions. One example has it that Maputo Central Hospital has approved and applied a fee of 1,000 meticais for treatment of the sick, apparently without authority to do so, and another example is the prices charged by the water companies. What do you have to say on this subject?

[Machungo] There are two issues in this question: one, that of the role of a popular government, and two, that of legality.

What has occurred in the past has been to confuse popular democracy with the Benevolent State. In the Benevolent State the government is conceived as an entity providing for the needs of the citizen, replacing the individual in the search for solutions to satisfy his needs. The individual's work and merit is irrelevant. The State gives, it provides everything.

Popular democracy, on the other hand, is democracy exercised by the people and in the interest of the people, and it is the people who establish the rules governing individuals or organized groups of citizens on how they should act to achieve their economic and social objectives. This is the basis for the law and the people's rights, and it can formally or informally incorporate the practice of customs commonly accepted by society.

What happened in the past was that the administration was assumed to be a Benevolent State. The PRE attempts to create the conditions so that, within the framework of a popular democracy, the State can guarantee respect for the rights and duties of citizens as they are democratically established by the people.

Our objective is for our state be a state of law. In this context, a great effort has been made toward developing the institutions charged with enforcing respect for the law, and fighting oppression, abuse of power and corruption. Efforts must also be taken to promulgate antitrust laws to prevent the concentration of wealth among a handful of omnipotent local bosses.

It is clear that this is a complex and difficult process, not only with respect to the inadequate functioning of juridical institutions due to the lack of human and material resources, but because citizens do not take recourse to the proper authorities in defense of their rights.

The case of Maputo Central Hospital. We have to remember that the Frelimo Party V Congress outlined a blueprint for creating special clinics. The Ministry of Health is the State body with the authority to implement those directions. Beyond that, the objective behind the decision to apply the 1,000 metical fee was to rationalize the use of the Health infrastructure, penalizing those who do not utilize the normal assistance channels.

Regarding the fees charged by the water companies, consumers should control their consumption of water through the use of meters, and use the pricing tables approved by the Council of Ministers. Complaints should be filed for any charges not corresponding to actual consumption, and no one is required to pay for what he does not use. It must be noted, however, that the prices fixed by the government are not sufficient to cover the costs of water production and distribution; the consumer should adopt a habit of saving a resource as precious and scarce as water, and know that in order to obtain it in a state fit for consumption, we have to expend considerable resources.

[VANGUARDA] There have also been accusations that there is excessive luxury in State sectors. In a situation where millions of people suffer from hunger, people complain that there is no reason to have large salary disparities, luxury cars, banquets and expensive trips in the State sector.

[Machungo] In the context of a reality in which the role of market laws is growing, there is strong pressure on the scarce and most precious resources in the country, officials with training and experience. Competent cadres often abandon State service to work in the private sector or international organizations, and they even emigrate.

This situation mandates that the State create minimally competitive working conditions for its cadres, under the threat of not being able to ensure the efficient operation of the State organizations and the economy's public sector, with all the consequences that would entail.

The proliferation of automobile models is a consequence of a lack of money, since it is only possible to purchase vehicles on the basis of donations and loans that are often tied, which does not give us the freedom to choose

car makes. However, measures are being taken to avoid repeating the abuses that have occurred in the import of public sector vehicles.

In addition, the dependency on financial and material assistance from the international community, which unfortunately characterizes our country's reality, requires frequent trips abroad. Contrary to what is believed, these trips have allowed us to procure resources without which it would have been impossible to maintain the current level of provisions to the people, supplying the economy and maintaining the war effort.

The statements on banquets are completely unfounded.

[Part IV: 27 Jul 90 p 8]

[Text] With the insertion of this fourth part, we today conclude publication of the interview granted by Prime Minister Mario Machungo to the Frelimo Party newspaper VANGUARDA on the country's economic and social situation, after the 1987 implementation of the Economic Recovery Program that is currently in force.

[VANGUARDA] What is the government's economic interpretation of the parallel market and how does it intend to resolve the problem?

[Machungo] The parallel market (black market) is a phenomenon that should not surprise us if we consider that we are in an open economy facing great shortages, with a largely unsatisfied demand and with scarcity of funds to import the whole range of products the market lacks. This situation is worsened by the fact that there is not yet a trade network capable of better utilizing the funding resources made available by the "Market Fund" for the import and sale of essential products.

The economic liberalization initiated by the PRE has, in this sense, provided opportunities for easy enrichment for some individual persons and businesspersons who manipulate the market, practice smuggling, divert products from the NSA and social institutions, and utilize the black market, selling at speculative prices products that are becoming scarce in the controlled market. These individuals thus reap the benefits of the large gains that this type of market affords, because there the vendors are not under the authority of accounting and controls and they therefore pay no taxes or fees.

The parallel market, however, should not be confused with informal trade, which is practiced by some families as a means of subsistence or to complement the controlled sector.

By its nature, the parallel market cannot be effectively fought by administrative or repressive mechanisms, but rather through the elimination of the disequilibrium at the origin, or through control of the product source, when acquisition is illegal. Setting up restricted areas with minimum hygiene levels is one of the measures being considered to regulate informal trade and protect public health.

In the final analysis, the parallel market will diminish significantly or even disappear when the structural imbalances in the economy are eliminated. As long as there are shortages of a product or service and it is decided, for political or social reasons, that its distribution should be performed by administrative mechanisms, then a parallel market will arise, with the prices practiced there cancelling out the effects desired by the administration, intensifying the social tension that the administrative distribution of that scarce good or service was intended to avoid.

[VANGUARDA] A short time ago the government approved the principle of "Free Zones." What are they, and what is their purpose?

[Machungo] More specifically, the government approved the principle of the creation of Industrial Free Zones, which are territorial enclaves that are considered outside the country's normal customs territory. Within these enclaves, the investing firms, primarily foreign industrial enterprises, enjoy privileged treatment with respect to importing intermediate goods, taxes on corporate profits, supply of infrastructure, and exemptions from the application of industrial legislation normally applicable in other areas of the country.

The objectives of the free zones are:

- Promotion and development of a base of industrial and agro-industrial centers and units aimed primarily toward exports;
- Promotion of increased exports of products manufactured and/or assembled in Mozambique, with a minimum domestic added value, to be fixed;
- Attraction of international cargo and sea traffic for Mozambican ports;
- Creation of employment for Mozambican labor;
- Generation of revenue for the OGE (State General Budget) by charging taxes on profits of the activities undertaken in the free zones;
- Development of complementary external economies;
- Transfer of technology and "know-how."

[VANGUARDA] There are those who say that the country is gradually mortgaging itself to the multinational corporations...

[Machungo] In Mozambique the possibility of foreign capital participation in the domestic economy is established as a constitutional norm, with details fixed in the Law of Direct Foreign Investment and in the respective regulations. The approval of that law and regulation, the measures taken under the framework of the Economic Recovery Program and the signing of bilateral agreements with some countries protecting investments have created an environment favorable to foreign investment in Mozambique.

In this context various projects involving foreign direct investment have been authorized with or without the

participation of domestic business, including enterprises of a transnational character.

We cannot have any illusions that it would be possible to exploit the natural resources in which our country is rich, to the benefit of the country's development and the Mozambican people's well-being, without the participation of enterprises that have capital and "know-how."

Given our enormous financial and material shortages, the official assistance that we receive is not sufficient for development, making it necessary to also attract capital from the multinationals.

To the extent that we eliminate the budgetary and balance of payments deficits, we will have to redirect official aid toward development and concessional operations, assigning special priority to building economic infrastructure to create the bases and the conditions for domestic and foreign private investment in the area of material production.

Unfortunately, those who spread the idea that the country is being mortgaged to the multinationals, inspiring a retrograde nationalism worthy of the old-fashioned political bosses, present no alternatives on how we are to develop our country when we consume more than we produce, that is, when domestic savings that should finance investment have been negative and when forecasts point to a worsening of that trend. To face up to total consumption and the investment necessary for economic recovery we have taken recourse to external financing and donations.

In addition, successful experiments by some of the so-called "newly industrialized countries" such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand reveal that the secret of their success is based on the adoption of correct economic policies in which they combined the initiative of the domestic business class with that of the multinationals. The world is today in the midst of an unprecedented acceleration in technical and technological progress that has introduced profound changes in the processes of production and in products, shortens distances, brings countries and men even closer together. The countries that close themselves off run the risk of becoming definitively backwards. We need to attract new technologies to increase cotton productivity, which today is at extremely low levels (200 to 300 kg per hectare); what we say for cotton is also valid for sugar cane, copra, millet, and beans, to cite some examples in the realm of agriculture.

It is clear that in this process it is necessary to observe what has been established by the current laws of the RPM [People's Republic of Mozambique], whether one refers to the Law of Direct Foreign Investment or to legislation relevant in each case, including the protection of the natural environment.

[VANGUARDA] What are our economy's prospects for the next few years?

[Machungo] In the next few years the government will continue its efforts in favor of economic and social recovery, hoping to achieve an average annual growth of 6 percent in total production.

It is also our objective to continue measures to reduce economic disequilibrium. It is thus hoped that the inflation rate will be able to be stabilized at a level of around 10 percent in the next three years, as well as a gradual reduction in the balance of payments and the State budget deficits.

Over the next few years the Program for the Recovery of Priority Districts will also be put into execution, which will have great impact on agrarian production recovery and rehabilitation of the social infrastructure in the rural areas, as well as on normalization of the population's living conditions.

It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that realization of these objectives continues strongly dependent on the financial and material assistance of the international community, as well as the evolution of the process to achieve peace in our country.

In conclusion, we should be conscious that improvement in the living conditions that we hope for will not be achieved in the short term. It will only be with hard and disciplined work that we will slowly create the economic and social progress that we desire. We have to produce a sufficient amount to stop having to depend on foreign countries for food.

The PRE, as its very name suggests, is a Program for Economic Recovery. With the recovery program completed, which presupposes the reactivation of the productive capacity destroyed, allowing us to attain the 1973 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) level, we will then be able to initiate the process of changing the structure of our economy for us to balance economic and social development.

Seychelles

*** China Lends 6 Million Rupees for Development**
90AF0599A *Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION*
in English 7 Aug 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] China is to provide Seychelles with a R6-million loan, without interest, to fund development projects, equipment and technical cooperation.

The loan will be provided under an agreement for economic and technical cooperation which was signed in Beijing on Saturday by Planning and External Relations Minister Danielle de St Jorre and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Zheng Tuobin.

The signing followed separate talks between Mrs de St Jorre—who is on a week's visit to China accompanied by her first secretary Alain Butler Payette—and Prime Minister Li Peng.

Another meeting was held with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen the same day.

The Ministry of Planning and External Relations said in a press statement yesterday the five million renminbi (approximately R6 million) loan was repayable over ten years as from the year 2000.

The Ministry said Prime Minister Li stressed the importance his country gave to developing and consolidating its relations with Africa.

"There are no conflicts of interest," he was quoted as saying. China's relations were based on a "genuine and sincere" desire to promote cooperation and goodwill among nations, he added.

The meeting with French Minister Qian Qichen touched on a broad range of international issues, the Ministry said, including ways of increasing cooperation between the two countries.

Mr Qian congratulated Seychelles on its progress, saying its development had "attained a level that can be envied by many countries".

"We are much attached to cooperation between China and Seychelles and will continue to contribute to your development efforts as much as possible," the Chinese Foreign Minister was quoted as saying.

The French press agency AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE reported on Sunday that Mr Qian also expressed China's support for the campaign by Seychelles and other Indian Ocean countries to turn the region into a zone of peace (see Monday's *NATION*).

With Mr Zheng, Mrs de St Jorre reviewed current cooperation between the two countries, with both sides agreeing there was no need for constant consultation to resolve bottlenecks in certain projects.

*** No Shortages Expected Dealing With Oil Embargo**
90AF0599A *Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION*
in English 10 Aug 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] Seychelles will not face a fuel crisis despite the international embargo on its main supplier Kuwait, the islands' petroleum company said yesterday.

The Seychelles Petroleum Company (SEPEC) told SEYCHELLES NATION alternative arrangements were being made to ensure the country had all the fuel it needed.

Seychelles was importing nearly all its petroleum from Kuwait until the Gulf emirate was invaded by Iraq last week.

The United Nations Security Council responded on Monday by imposing a mandatory economic and arms embargo against Iraq, mainly to prevent it and occupied Kuwait from exporting oil, the single commodity on which their sources depend.

Gulf sources reported that by Wednesday no oil was leaving either Iraq or Kuwait, which together provided four million barrels per day, equivalent to 10 per cent of the world's oil production.

However, international oil industry sources said yesterday there was no sign other big Gulf producers were opening their taps to fill the huge gap left by the shortfall.

A Seychelles Petroleum spokesman told **SEYCHELLES NATION** yesterday the Republic was, however, in no danger of running out of oil, no more than any other non-producing country.

"Present stocks are adequate to meet the usual demand until the end of September and alternative sources of supply have already been activated," he said.

The first consignment from Bahrain was expected to arrive on Sunday, while another was due later this month, he said.

Seychelles has imported 120,000 tonnes of petroleum products—gasoline, kerosene, gasoil, fuel oil and avgas—from Kuwait per year following an agreement signed in early 1986.

Fuel tops Seychelles' imports in value, averaging 200 per cent of the annual imports bill. More than half of it is sold to foreign ships and aircraft.

Lubricants are bought from Italy and Singapore.

The SEPEC spokesman said Seychelles should experience no difficulty in securing its petroleum requirements.

He said there were large stocks of refund oil all over the world, though it was more convenient for Seychelles to import from the Gulf or the Red Sea.

Zambia

*** Union Wants Voter Registration for Referendum**
90AF0593B Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English
18 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) has appealed to the referendum commission to open fresh registration of voters for the forthcoming referendum to enable more eligible people to take part in the exercise.

ZCTU chairman general Cde Frederick Chiluba who was speaking at a Press conference in Kitwe yesterday said the union would make a written appeal to the commission since the labour movement was an interested party in advocating a multi-party system.

He said recorded figures showed 2.6 million people voted in the 1988 parliamentary elections and 1.2 voted "yes" for the reelection of President Kaunda while Zambia's population was now nearly eight million.

A lot of people in the 1988 elections had shown apathy towards voting while a large number of them had not reached voting age of which they were not automatically required to register as voters.

Zambia had not conducted a referendum for the past 20 years and if the registration of voters was carried out, close to five million would register and vote in the referendum.

Earlier ZCTU secretary general Cde Newstead Zulu said although the time factor for referendum was short it was wrong for the commission to take it for granted the two million who had registered in 1987 could determine the future of nearly eight million people.

It was a well known fact thousands of people had shown apathy in registration in 1987.

People who had not reached the voting age in 1987 were now eligible but would be left out because they had not registered at that time.

* Miners' Union Supports Multiparty System

90AF0593D Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English
13 Jul 90 p 1

[Excerpt] The Mine Workers Union of Zambia (MUZ) has reiterated its support for a multi-party system of government to curb monopoly of power, national chairman Cde Jonathan Simakuni said in Kitwe yesterday.

Opening the union's first quarterly supreme council meeting at Katilungu House Cde Simakuni said MUZ's support for a multi-party system of government was aired at the union's last biennial conference early this year.

"Now that the machinery for the forthcoming referendum is in motion it is our conviction that monopoly, be it in economic, social or political sphere, inhibits progress because of the lack of competition leading to bureaucratic inertia and red tape," he said.

Cde Simakuni said whatever the outcome of the referendum, it was the desire of MUZ to be put on record that the union opted for political pluralism which will guarantee checks and balances of power for elected leaders.

"We desire a smooth transition period complemented with greater economic reforms with greater democracy which will ensure the respect for republican constitution and human rights for the people," he said.

Cde Simakuni told delegates that it will be beneficial for all to conduct the national referendum in a free, fair and democratic environment "so that at the end of it all we

will be part and parcel of a landmark decision to determine our future destiny on the basis of the African charter for popular participation in development," he said.

He accused some party and government officials of trying to discredit the MUZ leadership by claiming that the leaders were elected on tribal lines and were supported by a foreign organisation.

He said it was surprising and shocking to learn that some of these allegations were being fanned in the corridors of high party and government institutions.

He challenged purveyors of such allegations to come out in the open and substantiate their claims. [passage omitted]

Multiparty Supporters Form Campaign Committee

90AF0592B *Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
20 Jul 90 p 7

[Text] A group of multi-party advocates yesterday announced formation of a campaigners' committee and immediately called for a dignified campaign to ensure national satisfaction after the referendum.

Making the announcement in Ndola at a Press briefing, multi-party campaigners' committee chairman Cde Elias Kaenga said the formation was in preparation for the campaign which kicks off next week.

Cde Kaenga who could not release the names of all members of the committee named former chairman of ZUFIW [Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers] Cde Benedicto Chikoti as secretary and Cde Chisala Mukunto as treasurer. The briefing at Steps restaurant was also attended by a supporter Cde Henry Kalenga.

Cde Kaenga said the committee had been formed after consultations with other wings supporting the re-introduction of multi-partyism including the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and some churches.

The committee is billed to spearhead the formation of district and branch groups throughout Zambia.

Cde Kaenga who only named the Catholic Church as being in support of multi-party politics said a Senior Christian Workers Association (Ndola branch) had on July 15, passed a resolution advocating political change.

His committee had made representations to the referendum commission in Ndola requesting it to consider updating the voters roll and polling agents of both one-party and multi-party should be recognised and respected while ballot boxes should be securely under the eyes of the two sides instead of being taken to "peculiar and suspicious places."

"We have written to the commission to appeal for a new registration of voters in order to cover the young ones who have attained the voting age and those who did not register because of apathy."

He called on "volunteers" to write to the committee to ease formation of committees and lining up of multi-party agents at the polling stations.

"There is already what nears to perfect coordination between all the multi-party organs. Our responsibilities include that peace prevails and harmony between men and women in the two opinions of our society regarding the future of our country is ensured."

Those who stood for retention of the one-party system "are our brothers and sisters. They will remain so at the end of the referendum."

Party politics "will come and go but the goodness of man in relation to himself as a community will remain."

He appealed to civil servants to have no fear in making their choice between multi-party politics or retaining the status quo as courage would ensure a stable government.

Commenting on regulations of the commission released on Monday by its chairman deputy Chief Justice Mathew Ngulube, Cde Kaenga said his committee was satisfied that the intention of the body was to ensure justice and fair play prevailed.

*** Multiparty Allies: End State of Emergency**

90AF0593C *Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
21 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] A large gathering of prominent multi-party advocates demanded the immediate re-registration of voters, the lifting of the State of Emergency and called for international observers to ensure the forthcoming referendum "is free and fair."

A cross-section of intellectuals, former politicians and businessmen strongly felt the ballots of the 2.6 million registered voters would not represent opinions of eight million Zambians.

"I do not consider 2.6 million voters as a true reflection of the eight million population of this country. Whatever action is required to rectify this situation must be undertaken as a matter of urgency so that those unregistered voters may have a chance, indeed the right to participate in this historic event of their lifetime," said Mr Arthur Wina, former finance minister, and chairman of the first session of the conference.

The conference was held at Garden Motel, on the outskirts of the capital.

The referendum commission, to which they were reacting to, said last week there would be no fresh registration and that only those who voted in the 1988 election would be eligible to vote in the October 17, referendum.

The meeting was attended by Mr Vernon Mwaanga, Mr Andrew Kashita, Mr Elias Chipimo, Mr Frederick Chiluba, Mr Mundia Sikatana, Mr Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, Dr Remmy Mushota and many others.

"Intimidation, victimisation or threats to individual security arising from opposing views will not only be counter-productive but can also rebound on any perpetrator of such a crime."

He said opinions were swelling in favour of multi-party politics.

"The arsenal for retribution is available in both camps, and must not be opened because the consequences can be untold."

Mr Chiluba said unless some pre-conditions were met, the multi-party group was fighting a losing battle.

Dr Mushota, tore down Article 26 of the Zambian constitution, which says guaranteed human rights under the State of Emergency could be ignored or set aside under the State of Emergency.

Mr Simon Zukas, once a staunch supporter of UNIP [United National Independence Party] publicly apologised to the nation for supporting the one party system from the freedom days. He said multi-partyism was the inevitable alternative.

The referendum, charged Mr Chipimo, had the signs of being fraudulent. UNIP leaders had started campaigning against the multi-party system even before the referendum was announced.

Mr Sikatana said the multi-party group should be careful how it worked out its strategy because the number of people who abstained but are registered would still be counted as "No" votes under the referendum.

Mr Mbikusita-Lewanika said the Government and parastatals were overwhelmingly flooded with appointees who were not accountable to the people and were incapable of functioning efficiently.

Economic management measures were not designed to be accountable to the people. The economics of Zambia, under one party, were dictated by external institutions.

"The one party system is incapable of managing the economy. It is not participatory, it is exclusive. If we can't control the economy, what is our politics about?"

"Under one party, economic liberalisation is abandoning the people. It is social irresponsibility. It is like cutting off the wings of a bird and beating it to fly."

Dr Angel Mwenda talked of petitioning over the State of Emergency and the voters' roll.

Multi-party democracy offers a credible alternative to one party rule because it introduces an important element of greater accountability to the people by their government.

Multi-party involved more people and increased the search for democratic solutions to Zambia's problems, Mr Mwaanga said his paper titled "Can the one party reform itself: Multi-party options and prospects" to the two-day national conference on the multi-party option.

* **Free Access to Media Promised for Referendum**

90AF0593A *Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
17 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by Hicks Sikazwe]

[Text] The referendum commission last night announced regulations to govern the plebiscite set for October 17 and assured both advocates of multi-partyism and those campaigning for the retention of the status quo that they will have free access to the public media.

All persons who registered as voters in parliamentary elections are eligible to vote in the referendum and those who have since shifted to other areas will vote in their present localities upon obtaining a certificate from the district referendum officers.

In a nation-wide radio and television address, commission chairman Mr Justice Mathew Ngulube said in Lusaka the guidelines will be ready at the Government Printers by next week and advised campaigners to get copies to avoid breaching the rules inadvertently.

"These rules, you will find, are in no way intended to prevent or muzzle free debate. On the contrary, they are designed to promote and secure that the debate is conducted in an intelligent, objective and orderly manner.

"Such things as intimidation...violence, threats and other dirty or offensive tactics likely to engender breaches of public peace, chaos or confusion will not be allowed and would be punishable as offences."

Any citizen would be free to campaign either alone or in collaboration with others holding similar views. Those who want to campaign on radio or television will be expected to make their own arrangements, at their own cost, although it was the intention of the commission to arrange for some broadcasts to be organised at its cost and allotted equally to both sides.

The regulations will provide for two kinds of public canvassing: In written or oral statements. A statement will be in written or printed form addressed to or intended for consumption by the public by way of campaigning in favour or against the one party system.

Such documents should, among other details, bear names and addresses of the authors, printers and publishers while the statement should concern itself with debating for or against the demerits or merits of a one party or multi-party system as political models.

Campaigners would be free to criticise either of the systems.

"Either system's advantages or disadvantages can be criticised or praised as the campaigner wishes, but attacks on identifiable or specific persons are not allowed," Mr Justice Ngubule said.

He cautioned against use of foul language in the debates.

According to the regulations it will be an offence to defame, publish or utter seditious and provocative or incite hatred, public disorder or breaches of the public peace and laws of the land.

It was imperative that written campaign literature was responsible and mature. The commission discouraged persons campaigning in written form from pursuing a deliberate path of destruction and upheaval.

The debate was expected to be relevant and to the point at issue and if any campaigner was in some doubt whether his document would flout regulations he was free to seek advice from the commission or the district referendum officer.

The responsibility for, and cost for, disseminating written statements, would rest upon the campaigner on production of the document.

A written document could be publicised by distributing it to the public, or reading it over radio and television networks or inserting the statement as an advertisement in the local Press or reading it to a public meeting in any lawful method.

All public meetings for campaigns would only be arranged and supervised by the commission or district referendum officer on its behalf.

He assured campaigners that an equal number of meetings would be scheduled for speakers on each side of the debate.

He said the meetings would be convened and presided over by the district referendum officers or their authorised deputies. A public gathering called under the regulations may be disallowed or discontinued on the authority of the commission or a district referendum officer.

The meetings could be stopped on grounds of violence. Police would attend the meetings to maintain law and order.

A voter was expected to produce a national registration card and a voter's card. The district referendum officer who is the district executive secretary of the voter's

current place would issue certificates on October 12 and 13 which would allow those who have shifted to other areas to vote in new areas.

The motion for the referendum would be: "Do you support the reintroduction of the multi-party system?" The symbol for 'no' would be a foot and that for 'yes' would be a hand with index finger raised.

Mr Justice Ngulube appealed to all voters to make an effort to cast their vote as the destiny of the country lay in their hands on October 17, a date which would decide Zambia's political future.

He added: "The commission appeals for maximum cooperation from all citizens so that the nation can emerge with pride, at the end of the exercise as a people who will have enjoyed and practised true democracy comparable to any."

"Remember that whatever comes out of this referendum we will always continue to be one nation and one people with a shared common past, a common present and a common future," he said.

* Areas of Support for Single Party System

* North Korean Praise

90AF05924 Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
14 Jul 90 p 5

[Text] A visiting administrator at a highly reputed political academy in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has hailed UNIP's stand against the re-introduction of multi-politics in Zambia.

Vice principal for Kim Il Sung higher party school Cde Yun Jong Guk told Party Secretary General Cde Grey Zulu when he called on him at Freedom House yesterday that the country's opposition to multi-partyism was a step in the right direction.

A two man delegation from DPRK that has been in Zambia for a week toured the President's Citizenship College in Kabwe and conducted some lectures on party organisation.

Cde Yun praised the Party and Government leadership for relentlessly supporting liberation movements in Southern Africa and taking a keen interest in the reunification of the two Koreas.

He was hopeful the two Koreas would be re-united within the 1990s.

Earlier, Cde Zulu said Zambia and the DPRK shared common views affecting the international community.

Cde Zulu was pleased to note that the two political colleges had maintained very close links.

And DPRK will soon start offering scholarships to Zambia in fields of politics and economy.

Cde Guk said the central committee would ensure that Zambia got as many scholarships as possible.

Speaking when the team called on the Provincial Political Secretary for Political, Legal and Ideological Committee Cde Joseph Musole, Cde Guk said Korea would offer 30 scholarships every year and hoped that this would be done in the near future.

He said the warm relations that exist between Korea and Zambia would ensure that the issue of scholarships affords no problems adding that other arrangements would be made for Zambia to participate in a one month course for Party officials.

Cde Guk added that it was in light of such unity that Korea totally reject multi-partyism which some people were advocating in Zambia saying it would only bring separation and reduce people's power.—Times Reporter/ZANA.

* Air Force Reaffirmation

90AF0592B Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
18 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] The Zambia Air Force (ZAF) has reaffirmed its support for the one-party system and warned that change for the sake of it could spell political suicide for the country.

Welcoming President Kaunda at the opening of the sixth ZAF annual political seminar at Lusaka's Mulungushi International Conference Centre, air commander Major-general Herbert Simutewe said in Lusaka yesterday the one-party system had been tested for the past 17 years and had been found a suitable model.

"The one-party system has not only been suitable but has helped the country remain stable for a long time."

Gen Simutewe who condemned the recent rioting and looting during disturbances over mealie meal prices, also dissociated the ZAF from the attempted coup master-minded by Zambia Army Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe.

He noted that acts of violence and thuggery would not solve Zambia's economic problems.

"Let us rally behind our leadership. Zambia is known for its wisdom," he told the gathering attended by Party Secretary-General Cde Grey Zulu, Secretary of State for Defence and Security, Cde Alex Shapi and several senior Party and Government officials.

He hailed the Party and its Government for allowing a referendum to take place in which Zambians would decide whether to revert to multi-party or retain the one-party system.

On the coup attempt he noted that the incident was regretted in the armed forces. The ZAF also endorsed the economic measures taken by the Party and its Government to revamp the economy.

Digressing from his prepared address President Kaunda cautioned former politicians against criticising a system they had once built.

While Zambia upheld freedom of the Press and freedom of speech, it was just fair those who were in the system criticised constructively.

It was not good for former leaders to go to the University of Zambia to incite students, he said adding one day they would differ with the students and the "young men" would apply a similar stance.

Cde Kaunda defended the appointment of defence personnel in politics as a show of participatory democracy.

The President expressed surprise at the gross misinterpretation of the current reforms in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc by some Zambians.

"To them all these socialist countries have lost faith in socialism and are opting for capitalism, hence they contend, it makes no sense for Third World countries to cling to an 'ism' that is being discarded by nations that started first on that path."

It was surprising some Zambians had decided to oversimplify the reforms in Eastern Europe by distorting the concept of the whole issue.

Cde Kaunda noted that while the Soviet Union was for the first time introducing a market economy at macro-level aimed at principles of private enterprise, Zambia has been pursuing a mixed economy since independence.

"We have always had State enterprises, cooperatives, private and individual companies, the Soviet Union and other Eastern socialist states are changing their constitutions so that presidents can be voted into power by the majority of people."

* Party Officials Instructed

90AF0592C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
19 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] The referendum commission yesterday held a briefing session for Copperbelt based referendum officers in Ndola at which their roles were spelt out.

The meeting which was closed to the media other than the Zambia Information Services (ZIS), was attended by district referendum officers and Zambia Police officers.

Referendum commission chairman Deputy Chief Justice Mathew Ngulube on Monday spelt out the various procedures to be followed during the campaign period which starts next week.

He stated in a nation-wide radio and television broadcast that the advocates of the multi-party system and those in favour of the retention of the one-party system will be free to hold public meetings to explain their views.

The referendum to decide the nation's political future takes place on October 17, 1990.

Party leaders in Lusaka Rural have been told to go flat out to politicise the people on the need to retain the one-party system during the forthcoming referendum.

Opening the second full council meeting for Lusaka Rural at Chongwe on Tuesday, area governor Cde Noah Sikapande said the district had many multi-party advocates and it was important that people were told in advance where to mark their X when voting.

Meanwhile, outgoing Lusaka Rural district Women's League chairman Cde Melania Chipungu has appealed to workers and councillors in the area to accept self-criticism if they were to achieve better results at work and in their private life.

Cde Chipungu, who has been appointed secretary for administration for the Women's League national executive committee at Freedom House, was bidding farewell to councillors and workers during a reception in Chongwe.—ZANA.

* Debt Relief of \$2.9 Billion From Paris Club

90AF0589B Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
23 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] (Zana)—Zambia, burdened with an external debt of \$7.2 billion, has received debt relief amounting to \$2.4 billion from its donors, Finance and National Planning Minister, Cde Gibson Chigaga, has disclosed.

Cde Chigaga who returned yesterday from the Paris Club meeting and the consultative group for Zambia meeting which were both held in Paris said \$1.9 billion of the \$2.4 billion debt relief constituted arrears to the Paris Club countries.

He also said \$0.5 billion of the amount was in current debt service up to the end of 1991.

The minister who explained that the Paris Club meeting was meant to have Zambia's debts rescheduled, revealed that France had agreed to cancel one-third of its loan to Zambia while repayment of the remaining two-thirds would start in 1999 and finish by the year 2005.

This means that France has given the country a nine-year grace period.

Belgium, Brazil, The Netherlands and the United States have given Zambia a grace period of 14 years before it can start repaying its loans to them beginning in the year 2005 and ending by 2016.

Austria, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Britain have also given Zambia a grace period of nine years and reduced the interest rates to the loans while Japan would reorganise the development loans and commercial credits to Zambia.

The minister said the next stage was to sign bilateral agreements with the various countries so that the terms of relief are embodied in bilateral agreements as well as in the agreements signed after the Paris Club meetings.

Cde Chigaga who led the Zambian team to the talks said the rest of Zambia's debt of just over \$1 billion was owed to non-Paris Club countries who would also be approached soon for debt relief.

The consultative group also confirmed the availability of \$500 million from the donor community for Zambia's economic reform programme which Cde Chigaga said would be disbursed by December this year.

The amount is \$50 million more than was pledged at last April's consultative meeting.

Cde Chigaga who described the two meetings as very successful disclosed that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had devised mechanisms to deal with the arrears of about \$1 billion and \$200 million owed to them by Zambia respectively.

He explained that the Washington-based IMF had devised the accumulation of rights approach which means that Zambia will carry on with its programme while amounts of money will be credited to its account which will eventually clear the arrears and enable the institution start funding projects in the country.

The World Bank will begin sourcing funds from a number of existing resources meant to assist countries that are adjusting their economic structures and Cde Chigaga said that this had been successfully done for the 1990 period.

He also said the resource gap of \$300 million that was needed had been covered and debt relief had been obtained for 1991.

Cde Chigaga added that there would be another consultative group meeting either in December this year or January next year where Zambia expected to secure further pledges and funding from the international community for 1991.

And the minister said the international community at the two Paris meetings showed tremendous goodwill towards Zambia.

He said the donor community adopted a positive and constructive approach to Zambia's economic restructuring programme and thus appealed to Zambians to respond to the goodwill by ensuring that they worked hard.

Zambia's ambassador to Paris, Cde Mainza Chona, who also arrived with the Zambian delegation said the donors were encouraged by the political changes that were taking place in Zambia and welcomed the holding of a nationwide referendum to decide on the type of political system Zambia should follow.

Coupon Value Increased With Commodity Prices
90AF0589D Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
6 Jul 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Any help offered in the current economic hardships is very welcome. The government's upping of the coupon value from K30 to K42 will therefore go a long way in making it possible for the householder to afford the commodity.

Although the current increment, if one can call it that, may not seem fantastic on face value, the coupons trail has left empathy in its wake, typical of concern for wellbeing.

When coupons were introduced, the value was K10, lasting from January to July 1989. It was increased when mealie meal prices went up to K13 up to August of that year, at the expiry of that issue, the value came up to K21.

From that value the coupon has been worth K30, which will go up to K42 next month. Coupon values have been appended in appreciation of the need to cushion the economic hardships of the workers who could not afford the increasing cost of the staple food.

It is, however, crucial to understand the context under which these subsidies have been made and continue to be effected until 1992 when these subsidies may be phased out in line with the recovery programme. President Kaunda emphasised in Luapula on 21 June that this was a painful but unavoidable decision.

Zambia has not been spared of independence birth pangs, neither did the country escape the strangulating oil prices of the 1970s, compounded by falling copper prices. The catalogue of economic realities that beset the country is well documented.

At independence, health care services and education were made free as a blanket offering. These have slowly been phased out in view of varied economic factors.

Such an approach may enable all Zambians to bring to the fore the saying of doing for one's country more than one would want one's country to do for one. Under what circumstances the country should deliver certain goods to one is also important to consider.

The spirit of receiving in good faith what is extended is also noble if the goals set out in the new economic recovery programme under the Fourth National Development Plan (1989-1993) will materialise.

It is to be hoped that delays experienced by rural workers, most of whom cannot eventually cash their coupons, will be considered and ironed out.

The Premier's concern over this matter and his assurance that this will be looked into is thus welcome.

However, while these coupons offer respite, the final tally points towards hard work, high productivity in all sectors of the economy by all as a long term solution.

*** District Councils Unaccountable, 'Ill-Trained'**
90AF0589A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
23 Jul 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Is the present set-up of local government (district councils) really able to deliver the goods to the people? Or rather is decentralisation which came into effect by Act of parliament in 1980 working effectively?

The columns of this newspaper, both in direct and editorial reportage, are full of articles related to the performance of district councils since the civic functions changed from that of being led by mayors to district governors (chairmen).

We have pointed out time and again that it is not the system, that is decentralisation, that has been at fault but that it is the type of leadership that contributed to the malaise that has led councils to the moribund and collapse stage they are at today.

There is no council in Zambia which can claim that it is not facing problems. Why?

The answer is not far to seek. It lies in the political, management and financial leadership of the "civic centre."

The governor is not answerable to the people of the district for they did not put him there; the district executive secretary does not have to be necessarily a lawyer or a qualified administrator like his predecessor the town clerk and the financial secretary is but a mere invoice clerk without proper authority over fiscal matters.

Given such a position against the required personnel establishment of a district council it is manifest that the problems that councils are facing are certainly of their own making.

We have argued before in this column and elsewhere and now we have been vindicated by the Minister of State for Decentralisation Cde Michael Sata that overstaffing and misplacement in councils are not only counter-productive but also dire economic resource wastes.

It is not administratively and economically reasonable to equate the postings in a council like Lusaka, Ndola or Kitwe to the staffing in Kabompo, Chadiza or Kaputa.

Whereas a commercial and development secretary in Ndola runs Misundu farm, a uniform factory, a fleet of minibuses and other enterprises his counterpart in Lukulu is nothing but a mere gobbler of rent and rate payers' funds.

It is therefore welcome that the office of the Prime Minister, under which decentralisation falls, has decided to abolish a number of posts in councils which do not deserve them.

In Zambia's prevailing economic straits we would go further and suggest that for rural district authorities to operate economically their personnel members should be drastically reduced.

*** Political Peace 'Vital' to Economic Progress**

90AF0589C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
16 Jul 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Many people must have heaved sighs of relief over the weekend as news filtered through from Paris that Zambia's major creditor nations had agreed to ease the country's crushing debt burden.

By this measure the donor community has expressed its full backing for the austerity programme which Zambia embarked upon some years ago and is ready and willing to support the implementation of numerous steps designed to achieve the ultimate goal—economic recovery.

Run-away inflation and the huge Government deficit are some of the major problems which the State is struggling to overcome and the economic indicators at present show that the situation can be controlled as long as the austerity programme remains on course.

Zambia's inability to meet fully her debt service obligations has been a major bone of contention with creditors,

hence the efforts currently underway to try and secure some form of debt relief as the country struggles to restore economic stability.

We are confident, therefore, that with sufficient goodwill from both creditors and donors, Zambia would not experience much difficulty in overcoming the present economic woes.

A word of caution, though, should be voiced. Debt rescheduling, when the modus operandi is finally agreed upon by each of the creditor nations, will only solve a small portion of the problem. The bulk of the burden still rests on Zambians themselves.

There is simply no substitute for hard work. The old saying "there is no sweet without sweat" is still as true today as it was when it was first uttered.

It should further be borne in mind that no economic recovery can take place in an atmosphere fraught with political strife or instability. It is necessary, nay a must, for all Zambians to work towards the maintenance of the prevailing peace and tranquillity.

We have said it before in this column: that Zambia has enjoyed unparalleled political stability which is the envy of many of her allies and foes alike.

Many African countries are presently caught in what may rightly be described as death-traps. No political solution is in sight to many protracted conflicts that have robbed the continent of millions of lives.

Zambians should therefore be wary of those agitating for political experiments that may plunge the country into chaos. They must seriously weigh the pros and cons of the changes being advocated.

Benin

*** New Scheme To Defraud Government Described**

90AF0522B Cotonou *LA NATION* in French
20 Jul 90 pp 1, 3

[Editorial by Salomon Videhouenou: "New Form of Defrauding Treasury"]

[Text] On the door of certain government bureaus, you can read the sign: "Do not insist on immediate service. We only receive callers after 1100."

If you come at 0900, you are very bold. If, despite the sign on the door, you push it open, at times there are only empty tables and chairs to greet you. Very often they take the trouble to leave empty briefcases in the office, naturally to make the office director or chance visitors believe that they are on duty. If, by accident, you find someone in these bureaus who has not done what the others have done and if you ask him for someone to handle your case, he will answer: "He is at a working meeting with the director. Do not insist. Come back at 1100." And if you come at the time indicated, the bureau is still empty. Then, if you find someone in the corridors, someone who knows you and who works in this office, he will whisper to you: "Come back at 1900." This time, at 1900, the office is full. Everyone is there. That is the period for overtime. You do not make a joke of it. You have to fight even to get a job of this kind. This stratagem, which makes it possible to collect two salaries, consists of making the minister believe that you are overwhelmed by your work. This makes it necessary to keep employees working additional hours which, naturally, will be paid for.

This is a form of fraud. There is no other word for this kind of subterfuge. And this kind of fraud enjoys sovereign impunity. The paradox is that in a country where the number of public servants is considered excessive and where people are asked to retire voluntarily, they talk about a shortage of personnel that requires overtime payments. At times overtime payment is larger than the basic salary of the person receiving them.

If you ask these indiscreet officials, they will answer that they are working more than all of the other employees.

So they consider themselves the salt of the earth and do not hesitate to demand that they be given certificates of merit. The payment of overtime is a vice that is very much in style in our country. And, over the long term, fashionable vices are considered virtues. So, stop the scandal, either by quantifying the work, that is, by demanding to know the number of "cases" handled each day, or by providing our government services with computers. The salaries paid in one year would make it possible to acquire this kind of equipment. Everyone would find his answer in that way.

*** PCD Said to Be Out of Touch With People**

90AF0522A Cotonou *LA NATION* in French
25 Jul 90 pp 1, 5

[Article by Ephrem Dossavi-Messy: "Democracy or Anarchy? Dahomey Communist Party (PCD) Is Provocative..."]

[Text] People used to talk about them. The people criticized their campaigns of inciting people to ignore their patriotic duties. People have gone to see the damage caused by their thugs in the village of Sita in the Commune of Game-Houegbo, Djakotomey subprefecture. Then these thugs show off by talking with masks over their faces and go so far as to provoke and even declare war on Renouveau Democratique [Democratic Renewal party]. These are the hard-line members of the Dahomey Communist Party [PCD] of the People's Convention who still surprise people with their logic. Their thought process has not always been that of the people. At a time when the people are rejecting socialism, our brothers support the communism rejected by the world and by the European countries, which have experimented with it unsuccessfully and do not hide this fact.

Listen and draw your own conclusions from the following speech delivered in Djakotomey by Kpatounkpa Sebastien, a member of the PCD, to the MISPAT party there, aimed at calming the people in view of the growing insecurity.

He stated: "You think that you have come as a matter of urgency to resolve the problems of the masses. The masses have come to hear you. How can you resolve the problems of the masses and what hope have they in view of the civic tax? Just recently, they have been brutalized. The people in the countryside have had their bicycles torn away from them and confiscated. They have gone, then, to the gendarmerie. The masses want to know what these civic taxes are. So why brutalize them, why collect civic taxes? You have not answered them. In your view these taxes must necessarily be collected, come what may. And to do that you have recommended that action be taken for that purpose. In any case, five minutes, like time on parole, are not enough, because we have a number of remarks to make.

"The PCD was never invited to this meeting. Nor has the People's Convention. I have been invited as an individual, but my organization has not been invited. Let the press know this: the People's Convention is not represented here, and still less the PCD. I am here in the capacity of a man named Sebastien. I am a communist, a member of the PCD. I am a member of the People's Convention. However, I am speaking in my personal capacity.

"Regarding the thefts in Sita, I think that the statements made by Fiacre Hounnou have been understood by

everyone. Djoko Pierre, the leader of the Adja Tado-Houe region, has also made a statement. We are waiting for another statement by Fiacre Hounnou in connection with that.

"Regarding the civic tax, we have been deceived. They have laughed at us. They have stated at length what they have done. We are not going to try to demonstrate that the civic taxes are nothing. What do they amount to in the payment of salaries? We also know that it is the delegates, the mayors, and the subprefects who make a big thing out of the civic taxes, who steal the money to build beautiful villas. No one can deny here that they have stolen money, or at least that they wish to deceive the people once again. What is certain is that they have come down to legitimizing the use of force to require the people to pay the civic tax.

"What is clear is that the masses who are fighting are not here now. The people are in the streets, in the houses. Suddenly, what you are doing here is idle boasting, because the masses continue to fight. They are dismissing the mayors, they challenge the management of communal production units (such as the OCBN [Joint Benin-Niger Railway and Transport Organization], SONICOG [National Company for the Glyceride Industry], SSS [Save Sugar Company?], and SOBEMAC [Beninese Construction Material Company]). There is no question about that. They have called for violence and have incited the people to revolt. We are used to that. The PRPB [People's Revolution Party of Benin] has said more about this, but who has beaten up autocrats? It is the people. It is the People's Convention. They are all revolutionary democrats. Let them stay away, let them tell us today. (applause—Editor's note).

"The minister says that he is not afraid of the PCD. Certainly, he is not afraid of it! Because Kerekon always said that also. And why did he send people to disperse our meetings if he is not afraid of the PCD? Why does he make difficulties for us, arrest people, beat them up, and kill them? Why did they kill Remy Akpokpa Glele, Serge Gnimedi, Luc Togbaclia, Maurice Dansou, etc? That is not fear. In any case, the people are continuing their struggle for emancipation and will be victorious (strong applause from the other members—Editor's note).

"What is certain is that I have a message to send to the men under arms, since they have recently been asked to help in maintaining order. The army has always been at the service of the dominant power in the country. Under the autocracy there were abuses. Fortunately, not all of the soldiers took part in these abuses. However, unfortunately, some of them have played an exaggerated role.

"Today they call on them for help in brutalizing the people. I think that the transitional government that is asking them for help is in a process of change and will finally disappear. Who will then come to power? It would no longer be the transitional government that would continue to protect them. That is clear. Look at the condemnation that the Renouveau Democratique

party has heaped on the army. What is certain is that we will ask the men in the army to refuse to execute criminal orders and to refrain from firing on the peaceful people. These are the same people who crushed the autocracy that is resuming its struggle against the Renouveau Democratique party. That party is just the renewal of the bureaucracy. The new bureaucrats in question do exactly like the PRPB and come to intimidate the people. They will not get away with it.

"Soldiers of the people! Remember that your fathers were farmers. Remember that you have sons and daughters in the universities, in the lycees, and in the colleges. Soldiers of the people, do not fire on the masses. In any case the communists are not afraid of death for having decided to fight against the autocracy. They offer themselves as candidates for death."

The foregoing is a statement by a member of the PCD, made in the presence of the minister of the interior, public security, and territorial administration [MISPAT]; of the prefect of the Department of Mono; of several subprefects; and of members of several development associations. It should be taken seriously. Is that a provocation or an insult? The MISPAT party has heard the statement with calm and firmness. Power must be in the hands of the law. And we should not confuse democracy and anarchy.

* Zinsou Discusses Candidates' Age Limit

90AF0510A Cotonou *LA GAZETTE DU GOLFE*
(National Edition) in French 24 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by Jean-Claude Enagnon on a press conference given by Emile-Derlin Zinsou, former president of Benin; first paragraph is *LA GAZETTE DU GOLFE* introduction]

[Text] What age should one be to seek the Benin presidency? The question has now been raised seriously. President Zinsou discusses it.

Since the question of the age limit of candidates for the presidency was raised in the Constitutional Commission at the time of the National Conference, it has never ceased to be a controversial subject. Apparently this involves a conflict between political generations. However, in reality, that is the least of the matter. Not only is the age group over 70 excluded but also is the group between birth and 40 years of age.

In any case, this is what has resulted from the distribution among the people of the draft constitution, according to the High Council of the Republic. Apart from the fact that this distribution of the draft was rather hasty, this consultation with the people concerned three questions, and particularly the age limit for presidential candidates. However, if it is still necessary to say this, we may recall that since the time of the National Conference this draft is intended to prevent former Presidents Maga, Zinsou, and Ahomadegbe from seeking another presidential term.

Instead of engaging in a sterile debate, the young political adversaries of the former presidents should rather emphasize their popularity or their action programs in connection with their race for the presidency and let the sovereign people elect the candidate of their choice, whether old or young. The Constitutional Commission should therefore stand away from this subject.

On 21 July former President Emile-Derlin Zinsou held a press conference in the conference room of the Directorate of Customs and Indirect Taxation. Under the theme: "Democracy, Liberty, and a State of Law" the conference, originally scheduled to begin at 0900, started late, due to technical problems. Before going into the main part of his subject, Emile-Derlin Zinsou expressed his apologies over the delay to the group of journalists and Zinsou supporters in the room.

In effect the constitutional debate under way in Benin concerns the former presidents in one way or another, particularly since the release of the results of the well-known campaign for distributing the draft constitution to the people. After quoting a part of this draft constitution, and particularly its preamble, former President Zinsou pointed out the contrast between the principles set forth in it and the age limit of presidential candidates that the HCR [High Council of the Republic] tried to impose in the name of a vague concept of the people.

Former President Zinsou asked: "Whose constitution is it? Have we just been fooling around for some days at the PLM Aledjo Hotel? Have the eminent members of the HCR been laughing at the people?" The former president asked himself this question, as he saw himself as unjustly affected by the age limit for presidential candidates. Answering his own question, he said: "No." Everything leads us to believe that it is only in the southern part of the country, principally in Cotonou and Porto-Novo, cities considered particularly active politically, that the provisions aimed at limiting the age of presidential candidates have been suggested. In the northern part of the country the "people" have answered the question in the negative, almost unanimously, whereas this is not the case in the South. Should we therefore blame the constitution? Zinsou said: "Blaming the constitution is like accusing a thermometer because it reads 41 degrees when you have a fever." His indignation seemed justified by the fact that the age limit for presidential candidates is an attack on the rights of man that the Constitutional Commission is supposed to support.

Speaking in a sometimes poetic tone, the former president asked under what principle contained in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, the African Charter of the Rights of Man and of Peoples of 1981, or quite simply in the name of what principle of law was it intended to exclude a citizen from being a presidential candidate because of his age. In Emile-Derlin Zinsou's view, although he is fighting against the age limit in question, it is not because he wishes to become president again. He said that the fight belongs to all of us, because

if we accept the first violation of the rights of man today, it will be too late to fight against another violation tomorrow.

In mentioning an interview that he previously granted to a European reporter, Emile-Derlin Zinsou said that he had finally dared to reverse roles by asking the reporter's view about the age limit. According to our European colleague, in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, the question is inconceivable. However, in Africa it is possible. The former president concluded: "Well, I do not want my country to be part of such an Africa."

On the basis of all of the evidence, democracy in Benin should try to get out of the rut of the "pseudo-democracies." At the very moment when a decision is being made to exclude former presidents, they are being offered a kind of "resting place" where they would be a source of advice. At least that is the position that they are given today. In the view of the speaker the president of the Constitutional Commission, in the course of a debate in the High Council of the Republic, had the honesty to reply to a question from Joseph Keke by stating that the question involved excluding former presidents from the race for the presidency. Keke said: "It is said that they asked" the people. However, he continued, I know of villages where only three or 23 people were asked out of the hundreds living there. And we know what questions were asked. For example, "Do you want the president to be between 35 and 50 years of age?" In Emile-Derlin Zinsou's view, if a referendum were held on the question of the age limit, public opinion would have been against it, and Zinsou said that he himself would have been inclined against it because he is a democrat. He said: "I ask those who say that the people have spoken not to use this as an alibi." In fact, why should we seek to limit the age of presidential candidates to 40 to 70 year olds, whereas even those who are 25 years old today have considerable political training? Therefore, the question deserves to be reviewed in the name of democratic principles.

The press, which is naturally against the age limit for presidential candidates, did not ask enough questions. Considering that this age limit for presidential candidates is contrary to the rights of man, Maurice Chabi, of LA NATION, the national daily newspaper, asked why former President Zinsou had not reacted earlier when it was proposed to submit the question to the people. According to Zinsou, he had already opposed this action in the course of a debate in the High Council of the Republic. However, his temporary absence during the debate seems to have contributed to the result. Furthermore, former President Hubert Maga, who was much annoyed, said: "Ask the people, and you will see." According to Zinsou, if now they came to him to propose a law aimed at excluding the PRPB [People's Revolution Party of Benin], he would vote against it. Asked what he planned to do if the age limit for presidential candidates remains in force, he replied that he would use all legal means against it, both within the country, as well as

outside it. In short, he would raise the subject with human rights and other organizations.

Elsewhere in his remarks Emile-Derlin Zinsou stated, in reply to a question, that he will be president of the UNDP [National Union for Democracy and Progress] until the forthcoming congress of this political party. Many other persons attending the press conference expressed their concern and asked questions on various subjects. In the absence of a question on the debate concerning the choice of political system, former President Zinsou said that he favored a presidential system, which makes it possible to avoid arguments about the relationship of the various powers.

*** Lemon Discusses Economic Reforms, Kerekou**

*90AF0546A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE
in French Jul 90 pp 120-123*

[Interview with Idelphonse Lemon, Minister of Finance, by Jean-Christophe Martineau, Mamadou Barry, Dominique Hoeltgen, and Jean-Baptiste Placca: "Lemon The Manslayer"; first paragraph is JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE introduction]

[Text] Benin's minister of finance calls a spade a spade. Affable and warm, Mr. Lemon is equally frank about his dossiers—waste, cogovernment with Mr. Kerekou—which he knows like the back of his hand.

After 15 years in exile, Idelphonse Lemon took over Benin's Finance Ministry in May of 1990. A jurist by training and a university classmate of Senegalese president Abdou Diouf, Idelphonse Lemon began his career in 1961 at the International Bank for West Africa (IBWA). He then joined Credit Lyonnais Bank, to which he remained loyal, because he directed its African subsidiary, the Dahoman Bank Company, from 1962 to 1974.

After Benin's banking system was nationalized in 1974, Lemon took refuge in the Ivory Coast, where he became an adviser to Minister Maurice Seri Gno Leba, following him to his different positions. Those moves led him, over the last few years, to handle rescheduling of the Ivory Coast's debt.

In Paris briefly to negotiate with the World Bank, the finance minister sketched the broad outlines of the Beninese transition government's program in his interview with JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] You are a finance minister forced on a president who sentenced you to death. How did you end up in that job?

[Lemon] I left the country in 1974 when the Dahoman Bank Company, of which I was general director, was nationalized. During my exile, I was sentenced to death twice in absentia, in 1976 and 1977, for my affinities with President Emile Derlin Zinsou. Every time there was a coup attempt, I was decreed, without being consulted, to be one of the participants.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Were those accusations groundless?

[Lemon] I was a sympathizer, it's true. I considered the Kerekou state undemocratic, and anything that could be done against it had my sympathy, even though I did not actively participate. Amnesty was declared at the beginning of 1990 and I returned to Benin to take part in the national conference. We named a prime minister, who solicited my services.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] In what kind of shape did you find Benin's economy?

[Lemon] When we arrived, the year just ended had been marked by general economic sluggishness. The GNP [gross national product] was 551 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs. The predicted growth of 2.7 percent was only 0.6 percent. The cotton sector, our principal resource, showed a deficit of about 5 billion CFA francs.

After three months of transition government, we based our estimates on a 5-percent increase in GNP. By setting up a new accounting system in the tax division, we recovered 1.7 billion in taxes in January, 2.8 billion in April, and over 3 billion in May. We opted for an equitable and reasonable policy of economic liberalism, with priority given to the private sector.

With this in mind, we cut the tax rate on industrial and commercial profits from 40 to 38 percent for legal entities and from 40 to 35 percent for individuals. The former rates were confiscatory, and we decided to make small and medium businesses a fundamental component of our development strategy. That is why we also scaled down the tax on domestic sales from 9.5 to 5 percent.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIQUE] You inherited a structural adjustment program. How has it done?

[Lemon] I was amazed to hear the president boast of having set up a structural adjustment plan (SAP), because the latter is the sign of an ailing economy. Before we took over, the main sticking point of the SAP was the absence of popular support. The people were weary of Marxist-Leninist drabness and were hungry for a truly democratic regime. We created the conditions conducive to accomplishing the program. Schooling has resumed, and there have been no more strikes in state financial institutions.

We must limit total state salary paid out to 35.6 billion CFA francs. We are trying to achieve this by implementing a program of voluntary departures from the civil service. We planned 3,000 as part of the SAP and have already put into effect 751, at a savings of 1.7 billion CFA francs. We had gotten to the point where salaries were eating up nearly 103 percent of state resources! Totally unacceptable!

As for the banking world, remember that it was mired in insolvency; it is rebuilding itself with the installation of several small banks: Ecobank, Bank of Africa, Financial

Bank, International Bank of Benin. We are also thinking about persuading the National Bank of Paris (BNP) to set up shop in Benin with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft (Deg), the German equivalent of Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CFEC).

We must also collect 4 billion CFA francs in tax revenues for the SAP to succeed; in three months we have already boosted collection from 1.7 to 3 billion.

We also have a huge job to do restructuring public companies. Seven years ago the state managed 150 of them, founded without capital appropriations. The companies resorted to bank loans, then went bankrupt, and the state took over their debts. That dug the budget deficit deeper. The companies then strained the bank treasuries that, poorly managed, failed with a portfolio of 100 billion CFA francs in bad debts.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] What will the National Solidarity Bank's role be?

[Lemon] It has a specific vocation and will serve primarily small and medium business and industry. During the national conference we decided to marshall the resources of the diaspora. There are 2 million Beninese abroad. If we succeed in convincing just 2,000 of them to give us 200,000 CFA francs each, we will have the capital necessary to form a bank. We hope to manage this in less than a year.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] What is the country's current debt level?

[Lemon] The debt volume is only 266 billion CFA francs, with a debt service ratio of 38 percent. We are more concerned about the domestic arrears that total 79 billion. They cast doubt on the state's credibility, and suppliers hesitate to count the government among their customers. Small and medium businesses suffer the most.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Benin's economy has always been heavily dependent on Nigeria's. Since the naira was devalued, the CFA franc has become less financially attractive to Nigerians. What is the situation today, especially at the borders?

[Lemon] When the naira wasn't worth much, people preferred to sell their cacao in Benin to get CFA francs, which they used to purchase nairas on the black market and then took into Nigeria. This traffic is fading, but fraud still exists. Benin's vocation as a forwarding agent has considerably diminished, except in the direction of the landlocked countries, Burkina and Niger. Customs fraud is our greatest problem. It is a reality. We will have to do some cleaning up and set up a certain number of systems. We are going, for instance, to sign some contracts with the General Surveillance Company, or Veritas. We are going to beef up the antifraud brigade and cut staff positions. For the big thieves are the customs officers themselves.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] That's a very serious accusation!

[Lemon] In the interior of the country, you see big houses. To whom do they belong? To customs officers, that's who! And when you compare the cost of these villas to the salaries of their owners, the disproportion is phenomenal... We have planned 14 billion in customs revenue for this year and we hope to actually recover it.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] You have to repay salaries for the last three months of 1988. Weren't you able to convince the Beninese to write them off?

[Lemon] No. I'm not in favor of that solution. Money-lenders told us: "Chalk it up to history." Personally, I think we can find a way to pay them. My concern during the second semester is precisely that: to find the means of reimbursing at least one month of back pay. I think if they are given that, people will be more open to negotiations for staggered payment of the balance.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] You have a delicate task to accomplish: repatriating assets abroad. Where do things stand?

[Lemon] We would like to bolster the audit commission by providing them with auditing firm help. Certain friendly powers, such as France and Switzerland, have offered their assistance. We have just put out an international arrest warrant for Cisse. [Editor's note: Mr. Kerekou's "marabout"]. And we are trying to repatriate the deposits we know of. We have already uncovered relatively sizable sums abroad in bank accounts whose holders we know. A former bank director, for example, managed to abscond with 2 billion CFA francs, but he is now ready to return them to us.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Cisse was not Beninese, but he was in your country under some guise. He had to be working for someone...

[Lemon] [Laughter] He had a diplomatic passport with the title of state minister, although there was no decree naming him. But the person he worked for has said that, if it really turns out that Cisse committed crimes, he will have to be punished. If he has accomplices, it is up to Cisse to denounce them during the judicial proceedings.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Aren't there other people in the former government who also embezzled public money?

[Lemon] Everyone will be examined. The audit commission has already made public a list of 15 names.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] What are Benin's short-term financial needs?

[Lemon] We have a gap of 35 billion CFA francs that we are trying to make up. We have a total of 27 billion CFA francs for the first phase of the SAP.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] You are still enjoying a grace period, but certain issues are likely to put an end to it. Which are the most explosive?

[Lemon] Payment of salaries at real indexes. Five years ago, there was a decree that abrogated former administrative decrees. There were reclassifications, promotions, and shifts in civil service categories, without financial consequences for state workers. Certain categories of civil servants deserve some attention. I am thinking in particular of student administrators. The latter are "PhD students" who, for the last eight years, have been working for the state. They make less than 50,000 CFA francs, do not benefit from social security, and do not contribute to retirement plans. Finally, there are the "deflationary policy victims" of the public-sector companies. Over 200 state workers were removed from now defunct public companies and want to be reintegrated. Do we have the money to pay them when the agreement signed with the IMF prohibits us from recruiting new permanent state workers? What makes it worse is that the number of civil service workers increased from 7,000 to 43,000 between 1982 and 1989.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] You are a member of a transition government. Will everything come to a halt in six months?

[Lemon] Our role is to point the way. If we do it well, those who replace us will be forced to follow our lead.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Will you run for election?

[Lemon] No. But I belong to a political group that is campaigning. Personally, I am watching from a distance. If by chance my group captures a large share of power, it may want to retain me in government.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Hasn't the former party in power greater chances of winning than the others?

[Lemon] Oh, no! The PRPB (People's Revolution Party of Benin) has scuttled itself and changed names. Its leaders are perfectly aware that they are extremely unpopular... What's more, the Beninese think we are really very nice to them.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] You have said it is possible to be Marxist and serious. Are you saying that the others were not?

[Lemon] No. Leftist parties in general preach virtue. But that particular party had used the government as a source of prebends.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Aren't you afraid the soldiers will abort the democratic process?

[Lemon] No. I believe first and foremost in the determination of the people. Things could very well have broken down during the national conference. Rumor has it that Kerekou came with two speeches and that he didn't dare

read the harsher one. In the street, people were ready to fight. They were ready to sacrifice themselves.

If there were a coup, I think that because of our friendships abroad it is highly likely that we could count on an intervention.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Is that really a good thing?

[Lemon] International law should be modified. We should create a right to intervene in internal affairs when some go too far.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] What kind of relations does the government have with the president of the republic?

[Lemon] Every Tuesday we hold a cabinet meeting, which the president does not attend. All our decisions go through the next day without any problem. So far, Kerekou is playing the game.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Does he have a chance of surviving the changeover?

[Lemon] I don't think so. He can always run in the elections. But it would be better if he did not. The Beninese want him to leave, and they want all his ministers to be judged.

Ghana

* Ireland Board To Help Electricity Projects

90AF0634F Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC
in English 21 Jul 90 p 9

[Article by E.G.K. Deletsu: "ECG, ESB Sign Consultancy Services Accord"]

[Text] The Electricity Corporation of Ghana [ECG] and the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) of Ireland yesterday signed a consultancy services agreement in which the latter will assist the former in the rehabilitation and reinforcement of transformers and distribution stations in the regional district capitals throughout the country.

Mr E.A.K. Kalitsi, Managing Director of ECG, signed for the corporation and Dr Patrick John Moriarty, Chief Executive of ESB signed for the board.

The total amount involved in the project which is \$125 million will be provided by the World Bank and friendly countries including Austria, India and Britain.

Under the agreement which covers a period of 3 years, the ESB will provide technical services in the fields of engineering and also provide other services in accounting, training and exchange programmes.

Mr Kalitsi recalled the good working relationship which had existed between the two organisations and for the past 4 years and described it as complementary and useful.

Dr Moriarty on his part, said the ESB has made great strides since its establishment 5 years after Ireland won its independence in 1922.

He said the board had since then been playing a leading role in the agricultural and industrial development of his country adding that he valued the cooperation between the ECG and ESB and expressed the hope that this cooperation would be further strengthened.

*** Energy Board Reports Oil Losses Reduction**

90AF0634C Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC
in English 11 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by Ayikwei Armah]

[Excerpt] The Ministry of Fuel and Power has succeeded in reducing oil losses by 18,000 metric tonnes within the first half of this year.

The success followed the setting up of a 14-member oil loss control committee last year to study the petroleum industry and establish a systematic basis for reducing losses at all stages of operations in the country.

The study was necessitated by the ineffective marine transportation of petroleum to and from the Tema refinery, processing at the refinery, road tanker delivery systems, final stages of produce distribution and receiving terminals and retail service stations and reseller outlets.

Mr Alexander Dwamena, Assistant Programme Officer of the National Energy Board (NEB), disclosed this to the GRAPHIC in Accra yesterday.

He said monitoring of pipeline integrity, ship-out turn performance, refining stage tank calibration, road haulage security and measurement accuracy and calibration of dispensing pumps were responsible to the success in the reduction.

However, the 18,000 metric tonnes reduction represents only 1 percent of the 6.5 percent that the NEB had planned to achieve in reduction, the officer said.

Mr Dwamena said that the remaining 5.5 percent represents the Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) which had been burning away and which the board had planned to divert for home consumption.

He said that the aim of the board was to introduce a comprehensive oil loss accounting management and control system at all the stages of operation. [passage omitted]

*** Half-Year Earnings From Gold, Diamonds Up**

90AF0634B Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC
in English 10 Jul 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Siisi Quainoo]

[Text] Ghana earned more than C2.4 billion (6.6 million dollars) from the sale of gold and diamonds by the Precious Mineral Marketing Corporation (PMMC) within the first half of this year.

The amount represents 9213.39 ounces of gold and 122,437.05 carats of diamonds sold within the period.

A source close to the PMMC who disclosed these to the GRAPHIC during an interview in Accra yesterday said the amount earned so far is higher than that earned in the whole of 1989. Ghana earned nearly 5 million dollars last year.

According to the source, the average price of diamond per carat this year is approximately 30 dollars as compared to 12.37 dollars last year.

"This is because the corporation now buys better quality diamonds from small-scale miners," the source stressed.

The source pointed out that there is every indication that the country could earn even more during the second half of this year.

This, the source explained, is due to the fact that, the peak period is normally between August and December where there are a lot of weddings and engagements.

The source said it came to light during a seminar organised for licensed gold buying agents on Wednesday, 4 July, that some foreigners were using Ghanaians as frontmen to obtain licences to purchase gold and diamonds, which they eventually smuggle out of the country.

This problem, the source said, needs an urgent attention since it goes against the economy of the country.

He called on the government to institute stringent measures to curtail the problem.

Senegal

*** Reporting on Casamance Separatist Movement**

*** Interview With Military Governor**

90AF0565A Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
13-19 Jul 90 pp 4, 5

[Article by Jean Meissa Diop: "The General's Two Hats"]

[Text] Some of the money that was used to finance arms purchases by Casamancan separatists came from government coffers—in an abortive attempt to make a deal with the movement. The "merchandise" first showed up during the attack on Seley, and matters have escalated murderously since then—most recently with Wednesday's attack on two transport vehicles, an attack that left two dead, while more weapons were stolen from the Ziguinchor courthouse the same day. Thus a storm

continues gathering in Ziguinchor, despite the superficial calm, which until recently appeared to have returned to the region. In this uneasy atmosphere, Gen. Dieng rules with an iron hand, velvet glove notwithstanding. His position: "No dialogue with terrorists."

Obtaining an interview with Brigadier General Amadou Abdoulaye Dieng, military governor of the Ziguinchor region, proved less difficult than we had feared, given his heated criticism of the independent press—whose attitude toward what he calls the "alleged torture" in Casamance he found quite offensive—and his sarcastic characterization of a Dakar journalist.

This man, whose acid tongue belies his friendly-looking face, readily granted us an interview. Dieng is the new chief of government of a region that suddenly became ungovernable under the onslaught of grenades and machine guns. That is why the general was asked to come out of retirement to restore order. He knows the terrain well, having served there previously. The mission is also a familiar one: he was among those who tried to maintain law and order on 29 February 1988. But Ziguinchor is not Dakar, and the "interlocutors" and their arguments are different. In the south there is bloodletting. The general-governor understands these differences, and he takes them into account in his words and actions. And little by little we begin to put together a picture of the regional commander, a man who acts like a proconsul but talks like a peacemaker. It is a contradictory position, but the general seems to be managing the paradox well, as head of a military cabinet that governs a region where one quickly grows accustomed to seeing security men with rifles slung across their chests.

The rebels doubtless see him as a Senegalese Duke of Alba, sent to their "country" to crush an irredentist movement convinced of the "justice" of its cause. The general and the rebels do not speak the same language. Because this giant of a general believes—as one might expect—that "Senegalese territorial integrity is sacred." There can be no concessions to those who threaten it. Nevertheless, he calls for a dialogue—which is difficult to arrange, since his interlocutors dare not identify themselves. What guarantees can he extend to those who might agree to lay down their weapons in response to his offer—when he can simply arrest them if the talks break down? His answer: "It is impossible to extend the hand of friendship to those who have their rifles aimed at us or hide grenades in their pockets. It is up to them to put down their grenades and confess their crimes. Before throwing themselves on the mercy of the courts."

Bloody Thursdays

The weapons first appeared in the region during the attack on the customs station at Selety. The real authors are therefore those who provided the rebels with arms. The military governor confirms this, but adds that "Selety was one of the objectives assigned to the terrorists. It was a well-planned and coordinated action, like the ones that followed. They always took place on

Thursday evenings. The attacks on Gao Plaza, on Nia-diou, Laty, and Bignona were perpetrated with the objective of destabilizing the administration, striking fear in the population, and first of all forcing people to call them 'northerners,' which is incorrect."

Thus, "Selety was not the only place where weapons were smuggled in. You don't have to kill customs officers at Selety to transfer arms across our northern or southern borders. They are so permeable that anyone could bring in a kilogram of explosives or an automatic pistol."

The authors of the attacks are undoubtedly militants of an "MFDC" [Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance] oriented toward tribo-religious militancy. "That is why we must now speak of two different MFDC's. The first has remained true to its principles. It goes back to the time of the Emile Badianes and Ibour Diallos, who were Senegalese at heart. I remember seeing Emile Badiane cry at a performance we gave of a piece by Lat Dior. I was an officer, and the audience included President Senghor, Amadou Cisse Dia, and Karim Gaye."

Diabone Case

The general thinks the new MFDC "arose from very recent problems, from a problem over land that was confiscated from some people, who were rather frustrated. These people, among them Leopold Sagna and Sidy Badji, are well known to us. The problem could have been resolved very quickly at the time, but the matter dragged out too long. So the result is this situation, which we deplore. I think there is certainly a basis for discussion of this issue, and I am sure my recommendations will be accepted by the head of state, who has authorized me to hold talks with these people."

As for the rest, he continues, "I know people in the armed wing, whom I believe are members of the original MFDC, who will very likely be allowed to go back to their homes if they have done nothing since the amnesty law went into effect. Let those who have committed criminal acts have the courage to put themselves in the hands of the law. Nobody in this country has been sent to the firing squad without a trial. Besides, there is the amnesty law, which proves the nation's clemency."

Has it been proved beyond doubt that Ankiling Diabone was one of the MFDC leaders? "It upsets me greatly to think about that boy's case. I am an avid sports fan, and we were on very good terms. He came to see me here twice. He was at my house the night before his arrest. But he has been compromised. He has shown a frivolous disregard for his responsibilities as a public figure, as a government employee. One would expect someone of his keen intelligence to have better judgment. I repeat: it makes us all sick to see him implicated in this affair. If one is inclined to excuse him, one might say he was irresponsible, not so much a threat as the victim of threats."

Amnesty Manipulated?

Was he involved in plotting? "I really cannot say," answers Gen. Dieng. "But I know that his name is found on the separatist movement's organization chart. He attended MFDC meetings. He said that when they discussed it he was not there, and let it be known that he was not in agreement. But he never denounced them, and—even more damning—he attended other meetings. He was of a high enough level and sufficiently experienced not to be taken in by illusionists."

That is also what Gen. Dieng holds against both Amnesty [International] and, at a different level, the independent press. "It is the same thing—taking as gospel what an international organization says. The organization's source of information is a separatist by the name of Ansoumana Abba Bodian. I know him well. When he was arrested, the government generously gave him a chance and expressed its desire for a dialogue, despite all the serious charges hanging over his head. He was told: 'We are going to let you go free. Go to your comrades, tell them to lay down their arms and go back to their homes. We are ready to discuss the indemnities you demand.' Then he was given money to carry out this mission. He threw away this opportunity. He went off and purchased arms to use against the Senegalese people. That is Amnesty's source of information."

To conclude, he said, "we ask the independent press to get out in the field to help us normalize the situation, and we ask it to be constructive. Also to identify those who want to block normalization in Casamance, who are only trying to throw more oil on the fire."

* Defections Within Ranks

90AF0565B Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
13 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by special correspondent Abass Camara: "Defections in the Ranks of the MFDC" (Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance)]

[Text] The situation is gradually clarifying in Casamance, where calm is being restored, despite occasional talk about arrests and brutalities perpetrated by the police and soldiers. At all events, the progress toward normalization has led some people to believe the dissolution of the separatist movement is imminent.

In fact, following the sensitization and education campaign undertaken in the villages by the (PS-PDS) [Socialist Party-Senegalese Democratic Party] deputies' group set up in the aftermath of the meeting called by Robert Sagna, and in wake of the governor's promise that those involved with the movement could go back to their homes and jobs without fear of reprisals, many people have left the movement. Large numbers of members and sympathizers of the MFDC are presenting themselves to the prefectures, the rural government

seats, and the village chiefs to show their receipts and other documents establishing their membership in the separatist movement.

Others, at Diouloulou, resigned on the spot when the deputies brought their sensitization campaign into town.

Rebels out in the bush have taken advantage of the opportunity to return to the fold. Villagers at Diembering reportedly opposed the rehabilitation of local MFDC members, holding them responsible for the excesses committed by the army in the village, the arrest of almost its entire population, and the 13 June sentencing of several arrestees to hard labor for their activities. Meanwhile, the governor continues to remind people that the amnesty offer is valid, and the personal safety of everyone who takes advantage of it to resign from the movement has been guaranteed. But this impression of calm, which seems to be spreading in a satisfactory manner, is sometimes belied by sporadic arrests that appear to be part of a settling of scores between different factions and clans within the PS. Especially the militants in Robert Sagna's faction, who are the object of denunciations orchestrated by their adversaries in the "B" faction.

Last Thursday, for example, six people from various ethnic groups were arrested (others are still being sought). The police searches produced nothing. At the police station they were asked, among other things, about their ties to the separatist movement, their political affiliation, which PS faction they support and the name of the candidate for whom they voted in the last elections. When they were released later in the day, police officers told them to get back to work, following the denunciations of their adversaries in the opposing faction. The same thing has also happened at higher levels

Also, it was learned that last Sunday at about 0500 hours Ankiling Diabone was moved to Dakar from the Elinkine military base. It has been established that he was not in fact the auditor of the MFDC. His name was reportedly proposed to the executive board, without his knowledge and over his protest, by Bertrand Diamaconne, also known as "Adahoume," younger brother of Father Diamaconne. It has been rumored here that the latter has been transferred to Kedougou.

* MFDC Sources of Revenue

90AF0565C Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
17 Jul 90 pp 10-11

[Article by A. Barry and S.F. Lo: "Unexpected Hardening of MFDC" (Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance)]

[Text] Seley, Nyassia, Djibonker, Diouloulou, Pambos, Manpolong, Gao Plaza, Djibock: so many wounds, and all of them opened by the Casamancan separatists. The sites still bear the scars of this tragedy, which has stunned and shocked the Senegalese people.

But now it is the separatists who are feeling insecure. All the same, the region and the entire nation have been plunged into mourning for the innocent victims: 10 dead, 112 wounded.

The cycle of violence began in 1982, first with harassment actions carried out against the security forces, then the assassination of constables. After the events of 1982, the authors of the attacks withdrew into the jungle. Their arsenal at the time consisted of no more than a few rifles. Then they began to organize and in 1985 created the military wing of the MFDC. Its name, Atika, means "fighter" in Diola. The political wing is to all appearances led today by Father Diamacoune Senghor. His title: supreme chief.

This individualistic and charismatic priest has been a separatist for quite some time. Nevertheless, according to several sources, it was only in consequence of a dispute with a Ziguinchor political official that he committed himself to armed struggle. The father bases his political claims on agreements supposedly signed between France, former president Leopold Sedar Senghor, and Emile Badiane. Historians dispute the veracity of these accords.

Before the recent attacks, Atika was a small force of about 300 persons trained by men who had once served as noncommissioned officers in the French and Senegalese armies. Its strong points were mobility and knowledge of the terrain. The fighters were trained at Sihalibe Diatta's camp. Atika had about 30 Kalashnikovs, as well as offensive and defensive grenades manufactured in the Warsaw Pact countries.

Late last year, Atika was for the first time wracked by internal dissension. The malaise was such that the political wing decided to restructure the organization. But the dispute is believed to have started over a matter of embezzled funds. The father reportedly took things in hand and decided to establish an accountability office to be headed by Ankiling Diabone. Nevertheless, efforts to prevent a schism were futile, since military leaders like Sidy Badji continued to challenge Diamacoune's authority. Sidy Badji broke away, taking with him about 100 combatants, some Kalashnikovs and some grenades.

Sihalibe Diatta and Maurice Diatta took about 200 men and the majority of weapons. Many defections followed this schism. More than a few guerrillas returned to their villages. The MFDC then launched a vast recruitment campaign among members of the Diola ethnic group (students, former soldiers, illiterate peasants, dissidents, members of a political party faction). People were signed up in several different ways.

There were some who came spontaneously in response to the MFDC's campaign. Their reason: they did not want to be forgotten when "Casamance wins its independence." Movement activists intimidated some into joining, while ethnic solidarity and the lineage system on which authority within the ethnic group is based also played a part. Many people made financial contributions

to support the war, sometimes without even realizing it. The fund raisers told people the money collected would be used to pay for transporting food staples donated by NGO's [non-governmental organizations] in the area. Contributions of 500 CFA [African Financial Community] francs were solicited from peasants, while workers and officials were asked for 1,000 to 5,000. Management of the funds was one of the primary causes of last year's crisis. Several cases of embezzlement were brought to light.

The series of attacks in May and June may be explained by the hardening of one of Atika's wings—a hardening all the more difficult to understand inasmuch as the government has tried on several occasions to make contact with guerrilla leaders to persuade them to recant and make their contribution to development, the real challenge of the day. The amnesty law passed in 1988 is one expression of the government's willingness to seek a peaceful settlement.

Paratroopers on several occasions have surrounded the separatist camp. Just when the commandos were about to storm the camp, orders were given to lift the siege. The encirclement of the separatist camp occurred back in February. Ansoumana Aba Bodian was arrested several months ago. He had promised at the time to do the honorable thing. He had even convinced the authorities he was going to "put his brothers on the right track." To do so he asked for some money, which was given to him. He even met with one of the country's top leaders. Ansoumana Aba Bodian went back to the bush and then headed for London.

Maurice Diatta, one of the ringleaders of Atika's hard-line wing, was seen several months ago in Oussouye, hard at work and apparently quite sure of himself. "The MFDC has forced the government to resort to force," he often says, referring to the Ziguinchor authorities.

The government seems to have been well-informed about MFDC's activities. It has known the names of the guerrillas for years. Until the recent violence, it had opted for persuasion rather than force. Since then, however, it has adopted a carrot-and-stick policy. For the government, the only uncertainty now is the exact source of the arms purchased outside of Senegal with contributions from the movement's members. Investigators are following several leads. Mauritania is one possibility.

* State Policy of 'Carrot and Stick'

90AF0565D Dakar *LE SOLEIL* in French
19 Jul 90 p 10

[Article by A. Barry: "MFDC's (Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance) Collapse"]

[Text] Independence for Casamance! But for whose Casamance? The concept actually means little to our interlocutors in the region. It is simply a vague concept used by the separatists. It is all things to all men. In fact,

it seems to be a vehicle for expressing a yearning for something quite different from independence per se.

The word itself strikes fear in the hearts of the overwhelming majority of the region's inhabitants. Those who defend separatism are much less numerous. But why have the people of Casamance, who know the MFDC combatants so well, kept silent these past few weeks? The fact is that the guerrillas succeeded in terrorizing the people. So the region was frozen into silence.

But today the other side seems to be afraid, since the government has taken action. Now that the sensitization campaign and military deployments have separated the MFDC combatants from their base of support, it is obvious they have lost the battle.

Dozens of [MFDC membership] receipts have been turned in. A number of guerrillas have gone back to their homes. Most leaders of the movement's political wing are behind bars. Of course, it is difficult to put an end to Atika's [military wing of MFDC] terrorism, but for now the security forces have the situation in hand.

Is it just a temporary lull? It is difficult to say. All indications are the government is determined to find a lasting solution to the crisis. It has adopted the old policy of carrot and stick. In other words, it will not give up an inch of territory, although all other political demands are negotiable. But before anything else, Atika must lay down its weapons. Thus it is possible that at some point in the future the government will enter into talks with Atika's moderate wing, reportedly headed by former army commander Sidi Badji. A dialogue with the extremist wing does not seem to be on the immediate horizon, for the simple reason that it is apparently "tribo-religious" in character. According to some sources, that wing has been responsible for the most violent attacks. It goes without saying that the state will leave the fate of the authors of the violence and/or their leaders to the courts.

On the other hand, an ordinary MFDC member or sympathizer is in little danger from the mere fact of having been recruited into the movement. While some of them knew what they were getting into when they joined, a number of militants were deceived or constrained to purchase membership cards. Statements by arrestees clearly show that the movement made up for the failure of its voluntary recruitment efforts by using various ruses to obtain money and combatants.

But one of the lessons of the Casamance crisis has been that Senegalese who belong to different political groups can nevertheless join forces for the common good. The tour of the deputies' group (PS and PDS) [Socialist Party and Senegalese Democratic Party] in defense of a common cause is a first in the history of modern Senegal, one that deserves recognition. This "Casamancan perestroika," as one member of the deputies' group called it, has been warmly welcomed by the people. This initiative by the region's deputies was instrumental in isolating the separatists, and Senegal's fledgling democracy will be the

beneficiary. Perhaps, as one deputy suggested, this initiative will break the ice, and eventually all the country's political groups will start communicating with one another.

* Land Distribution A Grievance

90AF0565E Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
19 Jul 90 pp 10-11

[Article: "Minister Moctar Kebe Says Peace Is Imperative"]

[Text] "Only a tiny minority of Casamancans are calling for independence." The firm tone and blunt words express Minister Moctar Kebe's concern to correct a mistake that crops up in discussing the problem of separatism. A native of Fouladou (Haute Casamance), Koida's top political official rejects any implication that his region is pro-separatist.

That is a rather significant statement, given Koida's geographic and demographic size following the partition of Casamance. In terms of land area, the Koida region occupies 21,011 of the 28,350 square kilometers that used to be known as Casamance. Also, it contains 593,199 of the 991,236 persons who inhabit the former territory.

But the minister insists Casamance is more pro-Senegalese than ever. "Casamance is the most Senegaled region of Senegal," he boasts, basing his assertion on the unique cosmopolitanism of the southern part of our country. Its ethnic diversity is simply incompatible with tribalism. According to Mr. Kebe, the mix of cultures is one of the great strengths of this region, where it is common, for example, to see a Diola of Fulah origin, and vice versa.

What underlies the senseless demand for separatism, according to Minister Moctar Kebe, is the refusal of a small part of the Ziguinchor population to accept some of our country's fundamental laws, including the law regulating allocation and use of state lands. The legislator's view of it is quite different from the perspective of the Diola peasant, in whose eyes the principle of land inheritance is sacrosanct. Moreover, the arrival of large numbers of small farmers from northern Senegal has affronted Diola traditions, to the point that any allocation outside the tribe is seen as expropriation. These frustrations were exacerbated, according to Mr. Kebe, by the fact that the judicial officials were not from the local area.

Such facts, misinterpreted over the years, gradually sowed the seeds of the current rebellion—a reaction condemned by Minister Moctar Kebe, who believes the solution was (and still is) to be found in dialogue rather than in brandishing the banner of some illusory Casamancan independence, an idea that fortunately does not enjoy wide acceptance.

"The situation is especially painful, coming at a time when the government has just initiated major projects

that could help Casamance overcome its economic and social backwardness," says Mr. Kebe, adding that the projects completed in the last 10 years in this southern part of Senegal provide a tangible demonstration of the government's concern for Casamance. According to Mr. Kebe, the man standing behind all this investment is President Abdou Diouf, who as prime minister showed himself to be Casamance's biggest developer. All the roads and bridge construction, as well as the big economic projects that have spurred the current growth in Casamance are incontestably the work of Abdou Diouf, who planned to do even more once he became president.

As Kebe sees it, everyone should strongly condemn this separatist attitude, which is in complete contradiction with the obvious fact that no African country is capable of developing itself in isolation within its existing geographic borders. "Peace is an imperative for Casamance," says Moctar Kebe, who is shocked that such desperate acts can be committed in a country where freedom of expression is guaranteed. The money now being sunk into providing security for the population could instead be used to finance the region's development, he said.

"I urge my countrymen to stop the violence and frame their demands in terms of national development," he concluded.

* Data on Military Leaders

90AF0565F Dakar *LE SOLEIL* in French 20 Jul 90 p 6

[Article: "Profiles of Guerrilla Leaders"]

[Text] Sidy Badji, Leopold Sagna, Maurice Diatta, Ansoumana Bodian, Father Diamacoune...their names are already widely recognized, albeit few Senegalese know much about their past, what position each occupies in the MFDC [Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance], or which military unit he commands.

Sidy Badji is a former soldier in the French army who was a sergeant at the time of his discharge on the eve of Senegal's independence. He reportedly served in Indochina and North Africa. Born in Diatock, in the Biouf area from which many of the separatist troops have been recruited, he was living in the Lindiane quarter of Ziguinchor. A Muslim, he is known among the guerrillas as "General"...

Lamine [as published] Sagna is a Catholic. A native of Djilapao (his wife is from Afignam), he served as a corporal in the commando group based at Ouakam. Shortly before retirement he was posted to the southern zone, at the Ziguinchor garrison. He took retirement in 1981. Like Badji, he was living in the Lindiane quarter.

Aliou Badji, who was considered the real "ringleader," was a staff sergeant. He is dead.

Thus most of them are retired professional soldiers who ran into problems when they tried to get land and return

to civilian life. That was what gave rise to their discontent, which took on a political coloration that led them to espouse the path of separatism. They were not pursuing independence at first: they were just expressing their discontent. Only later did they meet up with Father Diamacoune and become guerrillas.

At one point, Sidy Badji is even believed to have expressed the desire to return to the army. This was no longer possible, however, since he had reached retirement age without the educational credentials required for further promotion.

It was this group that filled the ranks of Atika, the movement's armed wing. For quite some time, Atika's arsenal consisted mainly of bows and arrows and hunting rifles, and it went up against the army only when it ran into military patrols.

Sidy Badji was their leader during that period. He was more moderate, probably because of his age. Moreover, he was advised by a "committee of elders." In 1986, disputes led to a schism. Sidy Badji stayed with the people from Biouf and Casa. Leopold Sagna and Jean Marie Tendeng left with those from Royaume de Bandal. They followed Maurice Badji, a supporter of Diamacoune. The latter never reached an understanding with Sidy Badji, who was much closer to Ansoumana Bodian, a man regarded by many outsiders as the "conscience of the movement."

The recent radicalization of the movement arose from this schism. The Maurice Badji group apparently had a great deal to do with it. Analysis indicates—despite the fact that most of the groups are independent, do not coordinate their operations, and initiate their own actions in the field—that there is still a fall-back sanctuary, and a small nucleus of individuals who make the major decisions. Looking at the most recent operations, it is evident that messages have been sent to the field. But it seems increasingly clear that the vice is tightening around the main elements that have already been identified.

* Cease-Fire Precedes Talks

90AF0565G Dakar *LE SOLEIL* in French
21-22 Jul 90 p 10

[Article by Ibrahima Ndiaye: "Arrests Will Stop When the Violence Stops"]

[Text] "The arrests cannot stop so long as the violence continues. The violence must stop if the arrests are to stop." That is the view of Mr. Robert Sagna, who in addition to being minister for equipment, transport, and housing is an important political leader and president of the Ziguinchor municipal council. He also chairs the select committee responsible for coming up with ideas on how to bring peace to this southern part of Senegal.

The minister, who received us yesterday in his office, talked at length about the problems currently besetting this southern region.

As soon as the violence broke out, the minister brought together prominent citizens and village chiefs from throughout the region to sensitize them to the need to combat this scourge.

Anxious as he was to spread the word to all Casamancans, Mr. Sagna also organized a meeting in Dakar of all the village associations. This led to the (12 June) establishment of the select committee, whose aim is to engage everyone in a dialogue to restore complete cooperation at every level, so as to ensure they are *of* working in the same direction. Also participating in the committee is the deputies' group created in response to a suggestion that Mr. Sagna made to deputy Pascal Manga. The latter in turn met with his colleagues. The minister had already made contact with PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] deputies Marcel Bassene and Moussa Dielhiou.

Since then the group has made a series of tours [in the countryside] and submitted a report to the committee. Meanwhile, other positive steps are also being taken; 15 village associations have already met and drawn up plans of action.

At least one committee representative must attend each meeting, to ensure that everyone gets the same message.

It has been decided that starting in August all the associations will go back to the grassroots level to conduct sensitization campaigns.

But the actions taken to date have already begun to bear fruit. And Mr. Sagna is pleased with the results. In his view, broad consciousness-raising was the essential first step. He believes, however, that there are also many individuals ready to repent their mistakes. "Many people say they were threatened or tricked, or influenced by peer pressure to join," explained the Ziguinchor municipal council president, immediately adding that "others joined the movement of their own free will and dragged innocent people in after them."

Katanga, Biafra

Regarding the deputies' tour, Mr. Sagna gave us to understand that the best results have been achieved in Oussouye department, where many [membership] cards have been turned in. Nevertheless, coordination problems have surfaced in the departments of Bignona and Ziguinchor. "There were communications problems. But with the new round of group visits to the field, things will soon be running smoothly," Sagna said.

Turning to the problem of separatism, the minister said categorically: "We cannot sanction any infringement of our territorial integrity, especially since separatism has never shown itself to be a constructive influence anywhere in the world." He cited the examples of Katanga, Biafra, the Basques in France, the Bretons, and the Corsicans.

Unacceptable Idea

In his view, Casamancan secession is unacceptable, because the arguments advanced in its behalf are spurious. "Since independence, much progress has been made in the southern region," he said. "Naturally there have been disputes and demands, but Casamancan independence is no solution."

Next, explaining the causes of the rebellion in Casamance, Mr. Sagna said land problems were among the issues that poisoned feelings to the point of violence. "But the solution to the land problem," he went on, "is not some kind of independent Casamance."

He believes Casamance is not alone in having land problems, and other regions must also cope with unusual situations.

"Yes, we have our problems, but we can resolve them within the framework of the Senegalese nation."

In fact, officials have been trying for five years now to resolve the land problem, which involves the settlements of Tilene, Colobane, and Kanjalan, in Ziguinchor. Corrective steps have already been taken to restore the land to the people from whom it was taken.

Turning to another aspect of the question, the minister described steps taken by the government to improve the youth employment situation in Casamance. "In the hotels, the head of state has given firm instructions that wherever applicants are equally qualified, priority shall be given to local residents," said Mr. Sagna, noting also that the Casamancans themselves have other responsibilities, which they are carrying out.

Cultural Problems

Mr. Sagna said much infrastructure has been put in place to improve Casamance's links to the rest of the country. In that connection, the minister—who just returned from Germany—disclosed that a new boat will soon be put into service to connect Dakar and Ziguinchor. "We cannot solve all the problems at once, because Casamancans must also be involved in Casamance's development," said the minister for equipment, transport and housing.

The difficulties are more of a cultural nature, Mr. Sagna believes, because the sociology of the southern region is insufficiently understood.

There have always been misunderstandings between the north and the south. Ignorance has led to cultural insensitivity, but Mr. Sagna says it is up to Casamancans to make themselves understood, appreciated, and accepted: "The other Senegalese must be brought to discover our customs and values." The minister also said Casamancans need to invest in their own region, since the state cannot do everything.

The minister expressed concern about external exploitation of the Casamancan separatist movement. He said

Casamancans who accept outside assistance are unpatriotic and are in fact guilty of sabotaging their region's development. "Political leaders in Casamance are the first to oppose separatism. We do not agree with the separatists, and we will never accept their ideas," Mr. Sagna emphasized.

As the minister sees it, however, the solution is in consciousness-raising, because once the people are sensitized the guerrillas in the bush will be isolated, and their isolation may induce them to lay down their arms. In fact, they are already experiencing supply problems. That is why they are attacking people, even their own relatives, and robbing them.

Exceptional Vigilance

The minister also said exceptional vigilance is needed on our borders to prevent more weapons from being infiltrated into the country. "We need the strictest controls," he said. The minister also informed us that the select committee has demanded an end to torture and abusive treatment.

The minister admits he has never actually met a separatist. "I am not personally acquainted with the leaders of this movement. I know Jean Marie Tintin, but that is all... We are in any case ready to establish contact with them to begin a dialogue," said Mr. Sagna, adding however that "they must lay down their weapons; otherwise, the government will step up its counterinsurgency efforts."

In fact, the violent tactics of the separatists have served only to increase their isolation.

The minister, who stays in touch with the military governor of Ziguinchor, said he appreciates the appeal made by the latter, as well as his readiness to lend a helping hand.

* Reader's Solution

90AF0565H Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
13-19 Jul 90 p 5

[Commentary by Boubacar Diop (Bouba), assistant lecturer in the faculty of arts at Dakar's C. Anta Diop University : "Taking a Clear Position"]

[Text] I would like to give my views here on a problem that I believe epitomizes the major contradictions that are wracking Senegal. I am talking about the violence in Casamance. A critique of Landing Savane's contribution (see WAL FADJRI No. 214) gives me the opportunity to put forward two propositions:

- first, it is a Casamancan problem and must be treated as such;
- second, the situation has deteriorated to the point where there is a risk of "Lebanonization": an escalating cycle of police repression and indiscriminate terrorist attacks against civilian populations and military targets alike.

Before considering Landing's proposals, we need to examine these two propositions.

The real question is why the demand for independence has won more support in Casamance than Senegal's other regions.

I do not think history alone can explain the phenomenon. I recall the contribution of an American investigator who in a recent issue of the TIMES pointed out that history could as easily be invoked to justify the independence of certain Soviet republics as their current status in the USSR. The author noted that history could also justify the secession of a state from the United States. These historical examples do not mean the issue is irrelevant. To the contrary, the author was urging that regional wishes be respected. We will come back to this idea as we examine the various solutions.

The heart of the problem is the uneven development in different parts of the country, along with the frustrations this has entailed. Natives of the Saint-Louis and Senegal Oriental regions could have been expected to feel the same way. So it is absurd to claim that historical contingencies alone explain the the difference in attitudes. I believe history could even justify Casamance's integration in a Mali Federation. It all depends on the historical period one chooses: ancient, modern, or contemporary. I once said, in a debate on the Western Sahara issue, that history gives the Tunisians as good a claim as the Moroccans and Mauritians to the Atlantic littoral, since the Carthaginians were the first to establish storage sites in the region.

The real root of the problem is that over and above its marginalization (a phenomenon that has afflicted other peripheral regions as well), Casamance is uniquely isolated because of the existence of Gambia—that is, because of the Senegambia problem. I believe the Casamancan problem will be with us so long as the Senegambia problem remains unresolved.

Two facts need to be emphasized in the increasing rush of events:

- the army is taking more and more (presumably unlawful) reprisals against innocent victims. It is to be feared there will be more and more Voulay-Chanoines, acts of senseless violence comparable to those committed by the French colonial army in Africa;
- the pro-independence militants (if they are in fact proven to be the authors of the attacks) are acting in a counterproductive way. They are targeting innocent people—worse still, educators, the sick, worshippers at religious ceremonies. And scores have been settled among the Diolas. This is what leads me to ask whether those responsible understand the consequences of their actions.

The army and those give the orders—the politicians—should realize there is no military solution to the problem. By the same token, the separatists, or whose

who think they are acting in their interests or with convergent goals (I am not excluding a connection with the situation in the subregion), should realize that one of the results of the senseless violence could be to set religious or ethnic communities in Casamance against each other in a way that could eventually spread to other regions of Senegal (attacks against Christians, animists, etc.). And on this our position must be perfectly clear.

The instances of torture, the crimes of which the Senegalese army stands accused (see the information provided by FAGARU [not shown], the organ of the LD/MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party], and Amnesty International), are as reprehensible as the attacks against peaceful citizens. These actions, far from advancing the search for solutions, serve only to poison the atmosphere. But it is up to the government—not the separatists—to take the initiative in the search for answers.

What steps Should Be taken?

First, the issue needs to be addressed as a political problem, discussed openly and directly with the separatists.

Second, within the framework of these initial discussions, the debate should be broadened, made nationwide in scope, inviting Senegal's other political movements and our neighbors to participate. Why not?

Third, the discussions should cover all aspects of the problem: economic, cultural, institutional, etc.

Fourth, every promising avenue should be explored, including procedures for consulting the people themselves at both the regional and national level. If the political parties come up with original and liberal ideas, they must be considered. I know, for example, that the political platform of the RND [Democratic National Rally] includes the popular election of regional governors. People must be willing, in this debate, to move forward on decentralization—not only at the bureaucratic level, but also in terms of economic, cultural and political structures. The path of Jacobinism stands discredited by history: allocation of cabinet positions by ethnic-religious quotas will not solve the problem. The pressure groups in Dakar cannot come up with durable solutions, or carry them to a successful completion, all by themselves.

Fifth, we must intensify—or, where appropriate, initiate—indoctrination about peace at every level of the educational system, formal and informal.

Finally, we must understand that the future belongs to larger groupings of nations: pan-Africanism must be revived. The president himself reiterated this recently in an interview with Senenn Andriamirado in JEUNE AFRIQUE. But how can we participate in these larger groupings, when we are not even able to solve our own domestic problems?

Postscript: As I write these concluding lines, the arrests are increasing, and well-known personalities have been picked up: Father Diamacoune, the athlete Ankiling Diabone, etc. All this can only serve to increase popular resentment. I know that when Father Diamacoune was in Thies prison he was visited not only by his Casamancan brethren but also by other Senegalese friends, by many people. I know too that Casamancans were not the only admirers of the athlete Ankiling Diabone. In other words, escalation of legal or illegal repression is not the right path. The solutions must be political, social, economic, and humanitarian.

* Report on OCI Conference, COMIAC Session

* Agenda Items

90AF0421A Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
14 Jun 90 p 5

[Articles by Seynabou Diop: "The Experts Report"; and Mouhamadou M. Dia: "The Ummah Faces the Challenges of Information and Culture"; first three paragraphs are LE SOLEIL introduction]

[Text] This morning, chief of state Abdou Diouf will preside over the official opening of the third session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OCI) and Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs (COMIAC).

He will be accompanied by Dr. Al Ghabid, OCI secretary general, who arrived in the Senegalese capital yesterday from Jidda.

The 13 member countries of COMIAC: Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, the Republic of Guinea, Iraq, Morocco, Gabon, the Maldives, Palestine, Oman, Sierra Leone, and Indonesia, will be present. Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan have also been invited.

Experts Report

The third session of the Islamic Conference Organization Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs began its work yesterday afternoon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Several delegations attended the session scheduled to plan for the coming OCI summit conference to be held in Dakar in January.

Verses of the Holy Koran were recited at the official opening of the session, which will set up the committee bureau, following which the head of the delegation from Kuwait welcomed the delegations attending. Next, the representative of the Sultanate of Oman nominated a number of individuals for the bureau, then thanked the government of Senegal, headed by President Abdou Diouf, for the warm welcome.

The proposals adopted named Senegal as president; Kuwait, Bangladesh, and Palestine as vice presidents; and Guinea as reporter.

Cheikhna Sankhare, representing the Senegalese delegation, expressed the deep honor he felt at being named to preside over the meeting of high officials who would plan the work of the OCI Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs.

A report was then given on what decisions had been made and action taken, as well as on technical plans, the program, strategy, and progress compared with objectives set forth, before defining new objectives.

In conclusion, the representative of the OCI secretary general told his colleagues what a fine occasion the meeting was for the Islamic family to discuss certain issues.

The delegations attending also approved the agenda and set up the committees.

Work will continue at 1000 hours today at the CICES [International Center for Senegalese External Trade], presided over by the chief of state.

Challenges of Information and Culture

Starting today and running until Saturday, Dakar will host the work of the third session of COMIAC, presided over by President Abdou Diouf from the time of its creation at the Taif summit conference in Saudi Arabia in 1981.

COMIAC, which held its two previous sessions in our country in 1983 and 1985, is a dynamic organization in the process of performing the task entrusted to it in the key sectors of information and culture. The need for the *Ummah* [community] to meet the challenge in this field so vital to its survival and development is clearly perceived by all leaders of the Islamic world.

In terms of the session beginning today in Dakar, it will first take up three major issues: first of all, that of the structure of COMIAC, rationalization of its work, and the establishment of a fund for information and culture.

The latter is of cardinal importance because the financial equation is the major obstacle in the path of the implementation of fruitful cultural and communications policies. A well-endowed fund used wisely to promote the cultural production of Islamic countries and the development of their communications networks, without forgetting international cooperation, will be a basic instrument for achieving OCI objectives.

Next, the third session of COMIAC will take up matters more specifically relating to information. The OCI's information plan will be discussed. OCI Secretary General Ghabid will present a report on the analysis of the OCI information plan and program of action (taken from the general plan) for the fiscal year 1990-91. Another report on the first meeting of the ministers of information and a report on the activities of the follow-up committee of the first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Information held in Jidda in 1989 will also be submitted to participants.

Cultural Affairs

The committee will also examine the situation of Islamic institutions specializing in information, particularly the International Islamic Press Agency (IINA) and the Organization of Islamic Radiobroadcasting Companies (ISBO). Finally, the session will look at cultural affairs. A series of reports on the implementation of resolutions and decisions of the first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Culture (held in Dakar in June 1989) will be discussed, along with those on Islamic universities such as those set up by the OCI in Niger and Uganda.

The committee will examine detailed reports on Islamic institutions and cultural centers and the activities of subsidiary organs and specialized institutes affiliated with the OCI. Among the problems on the agenda is also the unified calendar of the Hegira for the beginning of the lunar months and the unification of Islamic holidays.

Work will therefore be on two levels: information and culture.

It should be noted that in addition to the 13 members of COMIAC already named, three countries: Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan, have been invited and will take part in the work. This is so because Turkey is president of the OCI Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation. Egypt will soon host the Islamic Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Pakistan is president of the Islamic Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation.

* Opening Session

90AF0421B Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
15 Jun 90 p 5

[Articles by Modou Mamoune Faye: "The Communications Stakes"; and Mouhamadou M. Dia: "Driving Force"]

[Text] Yesterday morning at CICES [International Center for Senegalese External Trade], President Abdou Diouf officially opened the work of the third session of the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs (COMIAC), in the presence of Dr. Hamid Al Gabid, secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OCI), members of the government, and diplomats.

The importance of communication and culture were emphasized by the chief of state. In most countries in the Islamic Ummah, "information and communication (are) essential to training (and) the task of national construction."

They also bring people together, Abdou Diouf said, and "are a factor of understanding (...), making it possible to prevent the hatred and intolerance which are at the root of so many conflicts."

Very often, President Diouf said, our (Islamic) countries pay the price for the action of media that may "heighten

tension, poison bilateral relations, or stir up quarrels." However he continued, "what one very often has is less the fact of conveying information than it is the misunderstanding of situations described."

It was to meet such challenges facing the entire Muslim community that the OCI decided to set up the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs, with structures such as the International Islamic Press Agency (IINA) and the Organization of Radiobroadcasters of Islamic Governments (ISBO).

The chief of state stressed that their objective is to promote information that will reflect our situation and take our aspirations into account. However, to do so, emphasis must be placed on production within the Ummah through actual "written and audiovisual information programs" that would be effective protection against "deculturation and the danger of mimicry necessarily brought by ignorance."

Many efforts have been made by nations belonging to the OCI to develop this sector of information. Dr. Hamid Al Gabid, secretary general of the Islamic Organization, said this in order to face the many challenges shaping up on the horizon: challenges arising out of development, scientific and technological challenges, challenges created by the dislocation of our social structures, and so on.

In his words, information has a cardinal role to play to "counter campaigns orchestrated by forces hostile to Islam."

Scarcely two years after its creation, the OCI adopted and in 1970 accepted the principle of the creation of an International Islamic Press Agency and a few years later, in 1975, the establishment of the Organization of Radiobroadcasters of Islamic Governments.

For this same purpose, the first session of COMIAC (headed by Abdou Diouf since its creation in 1981) drafted an Islamic information strategy. Several other types of action have also been taken through various conferences of ministers of information and culture from OCI members.

In addition, Dr. Al Gabid said, an important document titled "Information Strategy of Islamic Countries" was drafted in October 1988 at the first conference of ministers of information and culture of OCI countries held in Jidda.

Concrete accomplishments are many (such as the Islamic Solidarity Fund, the Islamic Organization for Education, Science, and Culture, the Islamic History Research Center, universities, Islamic institutes or centers, and so on), but "a great deal nevertheless remains to be done," according to the OCI secretary general. "If we want to enter the next millennium on a solid footing," he continued, "education, formation, and training will require our complete attention and interest."

The ambassador of Kuwait (the country now president of the OCI) also emphasized the importance of information needed by Islamic countries in order to "preserve their cultural identity."

The choice of Senegal to host the Sixth Summit Conference of the OCI expresses, in his opinion, "the esteem and consideration that the Senegalese leaders and people enjoy in the Islamic community." This summit conference (to take place in January 1991) will, in his opinion, mark "a turning point in cooperation between all Muslim countries."

This "profound and sincere attachment" of the Senegalese to Islam and Muslims was also hailed by Dr. Al Gabid, who said: "It bears testimony to Senegal's dynamic action in favor of Islamic causes and pays homage to President Diouf's qualities as a statesman of great vision and wisdom, a man and country selected by his peers to assume eminent missions" within the OCI.

Before the speeches, participants in the meeting heard a recitation from the Holy Koran by a young Senegalese student. Committee work is under way and will come to an end tomorrow.

Driving Force

"To promote information reflecting our circumstances and taking our concerns into account...information as an effective tool of development": This is the challenge that President Abdou Diouf encouraged the countries of the Islamic Ummah to face yesterday as he officially opened the third session of the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs he has headed since its creation in 1981. In his speech, the chief of state emphasized the cardinal role of the media in the world today as cultural vectors and means of education and training for the vast majority of the people and the young in particular. He also emphasized that the media can have a harmful effect, as our countries, frequently the victims of the meddling presentation of events concerning them, have bitterly observed.

As a result, the mobilization of Islamic countries is necessary to develop their means of information and step up their production of cultural radio and television programming so as to stimulate cooperation in the field within the Ummah, the primary purpose being, first and foremost, to promote mutual understanding among Islamic countries, whose strength resides in diversity. Defending the cultural identity of every country strengthens the Ummah, a fertile crucible where different cultures mingle and sublimate the universal message of Islam, for Islam is the religion of tolerance, peace, and universal brotherhood. The vocation of the OCI, which includes peoples from all continents, is to cultivate dialogue. It is a structure of planetary dimensions whose essential role is to encourage the full and complete participation of Islamic countries in the building of a new free, peaceful, brotherly world. Such a noble objective requires that we bring about the failure of those seeking to denature the Koranic message, whoever they

may be. There are those who wrongly view Islam as a boogeyman and those who seek to "use it for unavowable purposes." In other words, constant vigilance is required in order to defend and elucidate the Koranic message.

The battle is indeed one of communication and cultural development. The third millennium just ahead will be religious. The fall of regimes based on a materialistic ideology is one indication of this. Islamic renewal is another, but it is up to Muslims to give a positive orientation to the innovative energy of Islam to provide a fraternal affirmation of their presence on the world scene.

On the border of universal civilization, the specific cultural and spiritual values carried by the Holy Koran, the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (PSL), the writings of the many Muslim scholars and Islamic secular traditions constitute a fabulous heritage from which all mankind should benefit.

The Ummah can therefore not crawl into a shell. It is in fact open to the entire planet and Islam, which constitutes its glue, addresses itself to all men, transcending all divisions and all barriers, whatever their nature. One can therefore see that information and culture play a driving role. Muslims are aware of this and must act accordingly, "arming themselves to the teeth with wisdom" and tolerance.

* Diouf: Aid for Islamic Media

90AF0421C Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
15 Jun 90 p 6

[Speech by President Abdou Diouf to third session of COMIAC]

[Text] I shall begin by giving thanks to All-Powerful God, who has enabled us for the third time to organize a session of the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs [COMIAC] over which I have the honor of presiding.

Next, I should like to express my pleasure at having with us in Dakar the different members of this committee who, by their presence, bear witness to their commitment to joining with us in achieving the objectives that the Ummah as a whole has assigned us.

I wish them all a warm welcome to the land of Senegal.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Secretary General:

The Sixth Islamic Summit Conference will be held in Dakar in January 1991, *in sha Allah*. Only a few months from that great rendezvous, I deemed it useful to summon our committee to analyze progress on the mission assigned to it since 1981 by the summit conference of Makkah Al Moukkaramah.

You will recall that at our second session in October-November 1985, I asked the honorable delegates to work to strengthen and expand cooperation in the fields indicated by the Mecca Declaration.

Two series of recommendations were adopted at the conclusion of our work relating to information, on the one hand, and culture, on the other.

I now realize that the heads of the different sectors quickly set to work and that a series of meetings took place and produced important results.

At the outset, those results could already be appreciated at the first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Information held in Jidda in October 1988 and at the first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Culture that Dakar hosted in January 1989.

I shall only return to the subject to say that the international context instructs us to consolidate those results.

Actually, the third session of the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs is being held in a special environment: the proclamation of the State of Palestine, profound changes under way in the East Bloc countries, the independence of Namibia, the initiation of a dialogue in South Africa between the Pretoria government and the African National Congress (ANC), transformations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and so on.

We can only rejoice at these events, but the speed with which they have circled the globe and the way in which some of them—the ones that concern us the most directly—have taken place show us one more time the importance of information and communications as well as how far we still have to go in this field.

This is why I should like to seize the opportunity of this opening ceremony to give you a few ideas in order to emphasize the role of the media in achieving the objectives of the committee and, more generally, those of the OCI [Organization of the Islamic Conference].

I would like to say straightforwardly that it is a primary role, inasmuch as information and communication are essential to training and, in most of the countries belonging to the Islamic Ummah, the task of national construction. They bring peoples closer together and deal with the regulation of life in society.

Factor of Understanding

Although I may be restating the obvious, I would add that they also comprise a factor of understanding between nations and peoples and therefore make it possible to avoid the hatred and intolerance that lie at the root of so many conflicts.

Unfortunately, we also realize with every passing day that the media can aggravate tension, poison bilateral relations, and stir up quarrels. And yet, what is very often in question is less the fact of conveying information than a misunderstanding of the facts described and it is usually our countries that pay the price.

The need to put an end to such a situation or, at least, reduce the consequences and, in a more positive way, our desire to achieve a better mutual knowledge of our

peoples, have led us to set up the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs, the International Islamic Press Agency (IINA) and the Organization of Radiobroadcasters of Islamic States (ISBO).

They are also at the root of our decision to bring together our ministers of information and culture.

These are all important steps, but in addition, we now need a global vision on a par with the scope of the challenges of this era of fleeting happenings and scenarios, as well as equal to the ambitions we have for our peoples.

Revitalized and more coherent, the structures we have set up must enable us to succeed. I am particularly thinking of the IINA and ISBO, our two institutions specializing in information and communication.

Concerning these two organs, I would note that thanks to the support of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, they are beginning to get a new wind and handle their mission, but their consolidation requires the efforts of everyone. This is why, while expressing our most sincere thanks to the servant of the two holy mosques, King Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, I issue an appeal to member states that have not yet done so to pay their back contributions to the IINA and ISBO budgets.

In this way, the latter will be able to more effectively promote information reflecting our situation and expressing our concerns.

Effective Tool of Development

I repeat: This information will constitute for us an effective tool of development if judiciously used.

This presumes the conception and execution of both written and audiovisual Islamic information programs. As if there were any need to do so, it stresses the overriding need to develop production within our Islamic community, use such production to pull down the barriers that still exist between our peoples, and, in particular, help us get to know and understand one another better.

Obviously such programs would also be the best possible protection against deculturation and the danger of misandry that necessarily accompany ignorance.

My dear ministers and Mr. Secretary General:

The Islamic Ummah has never been a community turned in on itself or a community exclusively turned toward the past. On the contrary, the values of the people comprising it espouse the fundamental aspirations of man and open it to the future.

It is not an easy task to have the fact accepted but it is comforting to observe, on the heels of the 20th anniversary of the OCI, that the latter increasingly stands out as a crucible of cultures linked to one another by a common religion and as a system of bilateral or multilateral

relations between modern states. In fact, our organization, which is enjoying a second youth, is now perceived as a force with which one must increasingly reckon.

However fortunate it may be, this evolution is not irreversible and must not prevent us from continuing to seek ways of strengthening our cohesion which, one can never repeat often enough, depends on better mutual understanding.

There is cause for optimism and I should in particular like to express my pleasure over the interest that all member nations have in the execution of a cultural strategy plan for our community and the drafting of statutes to govern the various standing committees we have set up. However, our community will only respond to the hopes placed in it if we speak the same language, meaning if information and communication are shared, if the cultural identity is accepted and respected and if, beyond what is contained in legal texts, the action of institutions is effectively organized in a coherent dynamic.

This is why I deem the institution of a true cultural community between the members of the OCI to be one of our priorities.

Participants in these sessions of our committee must look at the document concerning the proposed Islamic cultural community that we wish to shape and the premises for which have already been outlined.

New Cultural Dynamic

The spirit of this plan is now known. It is an overall program or better, the general configuration of a program aimed at instituting a new cultural dynamic on the same scale as all our institutions, organs, and centers.

It is up to each of the participants to evaluate the possibilities and chances, in a word, the destiny of our complex and moving system. The process will be derived from the wager and the act of faith, but hope and determination must be equally present, along with the spirit of organization and method.

It must lead to increased support for cultural institutions, thematic systems for their activities, and the creation of a fund to maintain the momentum gained if we wish to have a vital cultural community. In this process, we have the backing and support of all member states expressed at the highest level.

I recall in particular that the summit conference in Kuwait City, whose success we still vividly remember, unreservedly passed the projects I submitted to it, projects aimed at broadening the field of our action.

I happily note that the different plans of strategy worked out since that time move in the same direction and all seek to obtain a better identification of the Islamic cultural space, an intensification of exchanges of men, ideas, and knowledge, and a greater popularization of Islamic information and education, amidst solidarity

and mutual respect. They all contain wide-ranging cultural programs whose execution would help the organization we are setting up and our countries individually.

It will be up to our committee to manage them.

I therefore ask you now to measure the size of the stakes involved, to explore the road they are opening up toward a shared goal, in short, to allow our committee to perform its heavy but thrilling mission.

We shall have to explore the field of the possible and make the most of our community objectives. In particular, we must take advantage of the possibilities offered by the awareness characterizing each of our meetings. New and more coherent paths are opening up before us. Let us move down them with the same resolution, convinced that the future of unity, peace, and shared well-being that we want for the Islamic Ummah depends to a great extent on our capacity to adopt and implement a cultural strategy based on our values.

My dear delegates:

In placing emphasis on information and communications, the vectors of culture, I am not forgetting the education and training that are inseparable from them and that they help promote.

These two domains are even at the center of our concerns and we have already made considerable efforts in their behalf, but the crisis of values in the world today makes them even more important. There is also a need to follow the march of history, enabling our countries' youth to gain access to knowledge and technological progress.

It is comforting to note that by trying to rouse a better awareness of the cultural values of Islam in the face of multiple attacks on our values, the institutions and organs of the OCI have not lost sight of this element.

Nevertheless, it is understood that better coordination of their activities is indispensable in order to avoid scattering and duplication.

The cultural strategy with whose drafting our committee has been entrusted will promote such coordination, but reflection must be constant and above all, come through periodic concertation between cultural institutions and on the occasion of statutory conferences of the ministers of culture. Creation of the Special Fund for the Development of Information and Cultural Affairs will also help.

My dear delegates:

In order to combine development and modernity, we must also have cohesion and rationality. I know that you are aware of this and that you will succeed in demonstrating imagination and tolerance in the search for the most appropriate paths leading to the achievement of objectives assigned to this session.

It is in this hope that I wish the third session of the Standing Committee of the OCI for Information and Cultural Affairs complete success and hereby declare it officially open.

Thank you. *Assalamou alaikoum wa rahmatullah wa barakaatouhou!*

* OCI Secretary General

90AF0421D Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 15 Jun 90 p 7

[Speech by Dr. Hamid Algabid, OCI (Organization of the Islamic Conference) secretary general, to third session of COMIAC: "Senegal Remains Committed to Islamic Causes"]

[Text] It is always with great pleasure that I return to Senegal, a founding member of the Islamic Conference Organization and whose very active and committed contribution to the consolidation and development of common Islamic action compels our admiration. This tells you of the joy I feel in being in Dakar today in the midst of these very warm and welcoming people, on the occasion of the meetings of the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs [COMIAC].

Mr. President, dear brothers:

The third session of the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs takes place at a crucial time in the history of our organization, which just celebrated its 21st anniversary in February and which, backed by the experience acquired, reflects, thinks, and makes projections for the future.

How can one help Islamic nations, as this century draws to a close and as the third millennium approaches, to face the many challenges emerging on the horizon: challenges of development, scientific and technological challenges, challenges of growing frailty and exclusion, challenges of the dislocation of our social structures as the result of outside influences.

This is the basic question facing us and now more than ever, this question makes us yield an eminent place to the mission of the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs as the privileged instrument of reflection and orientation for laying the foundations of common Islamic action in such vital sectors as information and culture.

Mr. President and dear brothers:

Since its creation, the Organization of the Islamic Conference has been aware of the important role that information must play in order to face the challenges confronting the Muslim world and counter campaigns orchestrated by forces hostile to Islam. Nor is it any accident if one of the first specialized institutions set up by the Islamic Conference Organization is an institution operating precisely in the field of information.

In this case, we are referring to the International Islamic Press Agency (IINA), the principle of whose creation was accepted and adopted at the second Islamic Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Karachi in December 1970, scarcely two years after the very creation of the Islamic Conference Organization. The formation a few years later, in 1975, of the Organization of Radiobroadcasters of Islamic States (ISBO) is one more manifestation of the interest and priority which member states accord to the matter of information.

Vector of Training and Education

In reviewing how far we have come since that time, I must say that many efforts have been made by the states belonging to the Islamic Conference Organization in order to develop the information sector and broaden its role as a vector of training and education in addition to its prime mission of disseminating the news.

Thus it is that the IINA and the ISBO, despite many difficulties facing them, difficulties of a financial, material, and human nature, have continued their march forward and are gradually used as precious tools to strengthen inter-Islamic cooperation in the field of information.

At your generous prompting as well, the first session of the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs decided to hold an Islamic Conference of Ministers of Information of members of the Islamic Conference Organization in order to examine major problems facing Islamic information, strengthen intra-Islamic cooperation on the subject, and draft an Islamic information strategy so as to respond better to the requirements of the mission assigned to the information sector by our sovereigns, chiefs of state, and governments.

This conference, held on 11-12 October 1988 in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, in response to the generous invitation of the servant of the two holy mosques, King Fahd Bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Sa'ud, led to important decisions and recommendations whose implementation is now a major concern of the General Secretariat.

The first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Information in fact adopted the document titled "The Information Plan of the Islamic Countries and Its Updating." The purpose of this important document is to set forth the main guidelines making it possible to reformulate and update the existing Information and Organization Plan of the Islamic Conference.

In its enthusiasm, the conference also approved another important document titled "Information Strategy of Islamic Countries" defining the ways and means making it possible to achieve the objectives we have set forth on the subject and a plan aimed at drafting an Islamic program for the development of information like that set up by UNESCO.

Finally, the first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Information took a certain number of measures aimed at revitalizing the IINA and ISBO and set up a ministerial follow-up committee.

As I previously indicated and thanks to the continuous guidance of President Abdou Diouf, the General Secretariat and the follow-up committee are working hard to implement all these decisions and recommendations. A suitable report has been submitted to your committee on the subject.

I would simply like to add that today as in the past, we are facing the same challenges and concerns. Information must serve as a link, an element of rapprochement and understanding between the diverse peoples of our vast Ummah. It must help strengthen their faith and ensure their education and training. It must help to defend Islam and Muslims against the unjust and unjustified attacks of which they are the object. It must help defend Islamic causes, primarily the cause of Palestine and of Al-Quds Al-Charif. Finally, it must help defend Islamic culture and values and transmit the eternal message of Islam to the rest of the world.

Mr. President, dear brothers:

From the sacred enclosure of the Ka'aba, center of revelation and point of convergence of Muslims, the sovereigns, kings, and chiefs of state and government of the member countries of the Islamic Conference Organization, meeting at the third Islamic summit conference, proclaim, with faith in the precepts of Islam, which makes the search for knowledge an obligation for every Muslim man and woman, their determination to cooperate and coordinate their efforts in the field of culture and education for the purpose of fighting the deterioration of our social values, eliminate ignorance and illiteracy, and promote progress and the cultural fulfillment of the peoples of the Ummah.

Ten years after that solemn and powerful commitment made by the highest bodies of the Islamic Conference Organization, I must pay homage to the effort and sacrifice made for the achievement of the objectives contained in that historic Declaration of Makkah Al-Moukarramah.

Unprecedented efforts have in fact been made to express these commitments in action, and thus it is that institutions such as the Islamic Solidarity Fund and the Islamic Foundation for Sciences already in existence are now joined by others such as the Islamic Organization for Education, Science, and Culture, or the Islamic Center for Research on Islamic History, Art, and Culture. In the same period, considerable efforts have been made to set up universities, centers and Islamic institutes whose prime mission is to be privileged places for the propagation of the Islamic faith, the dissemination of knowledge, and the training and education of Muslim youth.

Mr. President, dear brothers:

Such great achievements have unquestionably been made possible by the efforts and sacrifices made by member states, but also by the work of reflection, orientation, and follow-up made by the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs, which received from the third summit conference of Makkah Al-Moukarramah the mission of seeing to the implementation of resolutions and decisions made by our leadership organs in the noble design of preserving the values of the Islamic cultural heritage and contributing to the general progress of the peoples of the Ummah.

In this connection, I must recall, in order to express my pleasure, the great "first" constituted by the holding here in Dakar in January 1989, at the prompting of President Abdou Diouf, of the first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Culture.

This first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Culture enabled member states to engage in a far-reaching debate on issues of cultural development and threats facing the Islamic Ummah and its cultural identity due to the foreign cultural invasion and alienation created by different modern communications media. It has particularly enabled member states to study and take concrete measures aimed at fighting such threats, strengthening intra-Islamic cooperation, and promoting the cultural fulfillment of the peoples of the Ummah as the condition of their economic and social progress.

In this connection, the Dakar Declaration on the Protection and Development of Islamic Culture and Inter-Islamic Cultural Cooperation, adopted by the conference, is a veritable charter of action for member states. Henceforth, the General Secretariat has begun, on instructions from President Abdou Diouf, implementing the different decisions made by the first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Culture, particularly execution of Resolution No. 3/1-CIMC on the drafting of a cultural strategy and plan of action for the Muslim world.

A detailed report on the implementation of the decisions of the first Islamic Conference of Ministers of Culture will be presented to your committee. But a preliminary conceptual framework for the definition of a cultural strategy and plan of action for the Muslim world has been drafted by an ad hoc work group set up by me following the Dakar Conference. The first session of the intergovernmental committee of experts entrusted with the task of drafting the cultural strategy and plan of action for the Muslim world will take place in Cairo in the Arab Republic of Egypt from 20 to 21 June 1990. The preliminary conceptual framework drafted by the ad hoc work group is intended to be a working document and an open contribution to enrichment. I therefore hope that the member states and Islamic institutions will participate actively in this effort of enrichment so indispensable to the development of a cultural strategy and plan of action reflecting the cultural diversity, concerns, and aspirations of our vast Ummah.

Mr. President, dear brothers:

Much has undoubtedly been undertaken and much has undoubtedly been accomplished. And yet, we must at the same time say that much remains to be done in order to translate into facts the commitments made by the sovereigns, kings, and chiefs of state and government of the member states of the Islamic Conference Organization in the area of matters under the competency of your august committee. In so stating, I am thinking about what has been accomplished in the fields of information and culture as well as what we must urgently undertake in these fields in accordance with the solemn commitments made by high officials of Islamic nations in the historic Declaration of Makkah Al-Moukarramah. If we want to enter the coming millennium on a solid footing, matters of education, formation, and training must have our complete attention and devoted interest. In order to meet all these challenges and accomplish all these objectives, we must naturally double our efforts and find more means because, I must add, our means have not always been on a par with our ambitions.

I shall conclude with these words, but before doing so, allow me to say how much I appreciated the warm welcome and generous hospitality extended to us by Senegal and its leaders.

I know how deep and sincere they attachment to Islam and Muslims is. I know how committed Senegal and its leaders are to Islamic causes and the consolidation of common Islamic action.

It is testimony to Senegal's dynamic action to Islamic causes and homage to President Abdou Diouf's qualities as a statesman of great vision and wisdom that his peers have successively chosen him and his country to assume eminent missions on behalf of common Islamic action, first in January 1981, at the third Islamic summit conference meeting in Makkah Al-Moukarramah/Taif, when the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs was formed, to be led and guided by President Diouf at his peers' request. Then, in January 1987, the Fifth Summit Conference unanimously decided to hold its next session in Dakar.

Speaking for myself and on behalf of the General Secretariat, I wish to join in the homage thus paid to President Abdou Diouf, his people, and his country.

May God bless Senegal, his people, and its leaders. May God bless our action in the service of the peoples of the Ummah.

Wassalamou Alaikoum Wa Rahmatullahi Wa Barakatouhou.

* Media Use Urged

90AF0421E Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 16-17 Jun 90 p 6

[Editorial by A. Latif Gueye]

[Text] The context in which the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs of the Islamic Conference Organization is meeting should cause us to reflect.

Communications in general and cultural problems are in fact at the heart of challenges facing the Muslim world. Leaders of the Ummah must be convinced once and for all that our community has friends, but enemies as well.

The principal weapon of those enemies is cultural destabilization through communication. In the world today, information is no longer propaganda, but rather, a strategy scientifically worked out for the purpose of changing people's thinking, behavior, and even the political and economic foundations of civil societies.

Are we aware of the decisive role played by the media, by communications in general, in the recent upheavals in East Bloc countries that have changed the face of the world?

That context is the perfecting and sophistication on unimaginable levels of techniques for manipulation of public opinion through the media. We do not simply have to deal with advertising for products loaded with cultural messages aimed at changing our buying habits.

Rather, we must contend with subliminal images passing furtively on our screens and attaching themselves firmly to our subconscious, inexorably modifying our way of being, thinking, acting, and living.

With NASA, the Americans have invented direct satellite television that within a few years will enable families equipped with a simple dish costing less than 3,000 CFA [African Financial Community] francs (3,000 francs) to pick up directly, with no control by our broadcasting stations, the most dangerous television broadcasts for the mental health of our children.

If we are not careful, if a united, powerful Ummah does not meet the communications challenge, we risk the blossoming of a new civilization of horror and decadence with the underlying substratum of the trinity of violence, sex, and money.

And yet, our community does have the means to meet the challenge. It is simply a matter in every country of making every Muslim aware that his individual will and strength are linked to the strength and will of a billion and a half Muslims throughout the world. Next, the leaders of the Ummah must grant a privileged place, give priority, to scientific and technical research, particularly in the field of communications. Finally, Muslims throughout the world must be convinced that they can win no battle if they do not follow the inalterable precepts of the sublime Koran and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PSL).

With a multisecular tradition of Muslim religious history, history marked by the existence in the 17th century of a chain of Islamic empires governed by the *shari'ah*, a country that has among its sons freedom fighters who have sacrificed their lives for the cause of God, with a profoundly generous, courageous people attached to the values and ideals of Islam, a nation that will have the distinguished honor of receiving *Inch Allah* next year, the next summit conference of the OCI [Organization of the Islamic Conference].

Senegal assuredly has all the assets for occupying a vanguard place in this battle, for meeting the challenges facing our community.

"Power belongs to Allah, the Prophet, and true believers, but hypocrites cannot understand this." (Holy Koran)

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